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This study tracks tensions between different modes of knowledge in a body of 
eighteenth-century fictions centered around themes of detection and punishment of 
crimes, exemplary among which are Aphra Behn’s The History of the Nun (1689), Daniel 
Defoe’s Roxana (1724), Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1748), Henry Fielding’s Tom 
Jones (1749), and William Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1794). Focusing on crimes as 
varied as forgery, rape, and murder, this set of fictions raises important questions about 
eighteenth-century narrative techniques and formal elements. For example, why is the 
narrator of Aphra Behn’s The History of the Nun at once omniscient and limited? Why 
does the ending of Defoe’s Roxana seem abrupt and inconclusive? Critics struggle to find 
satisfactory answers to these questions because they often read intrusive narrators, abrupt 
conclusions, and disconcerting tonal shifts as stylistic faults or as ineptitude at realistic 
narration. I argue that formal peculiarities of eighteenth-century fiction about criminal 
investigation are in fact revealing narrative symptoms of an attempt to resolve conflicts 
between competing theories of knowledge rooted in theology, empirical philosophy, 
probabilistic reasoning, and other modes of understanding. 
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Introduction 
      Detection, the Problem of Knowledge, and Eighteenth-Century British Fiction 
An unexpected set of synergies between Henry Fielding’s famous novel The 
History of Tom Jones (1749) and his lesser-known pamphlet Examples of the 
Interposition of Providence in the Detection and Punishment of Murder (1752) inspired 
me to undertake this study about detection and the problem of knowledge in eighteenth-
century British fiction.1 Structured as a puzzle, Fielding’s Tom Jones incorporates a series 
of mysteries, false accusations of criminal offenses, and solutions that demand 
negotiations with different theories of knowledge. Detection, or discovery of concealed 
crimes and transgressions, seems at first glance to be contingent on empirical inquiries; 
but, more often than not, detection is a result of random accidents that are often recast as 
providential interventions in Fielding’s fiction. As a result of a series of “strange 
chances,” Tom and his supposed parents—Jenny James and Partridge—are absolved of 
misdemeanors and crimes whereas the real villains—Blifil, Mr Dowling, and Black 
George—are condemned (769). Lest it seem that detection was primarily a fictional 
concept for Fielding, here is another fact: an active magistrate, Fielding was directly 
responsible for establishing the Bow Street Runners, commonly referred to as the 
London’s first professional police force. Fielding managed to recruit and train a body of 
men who are now seen as “the first English detectives,” and successfully introduced new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Henry Fielding, Examples of the Interposition of Providence in the Detection and Punishment of 
Murder in An Enquiry Into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers and Related Writings, ed. Malvin R. 
Zirker.  The Wesleyan Edition of the Works of Henry Fielding (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988), 175-219; Henry 
Fielding, The History of Tom Jones, A Foundling, ed. Fredson Bowers and Martin C. Battestin, 2 vols. 
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1975). Henceforth, Tom Jones. 
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aggressive policies of criminal detection.2 Fielding’s professional commitment to the 
work of detection did not stop him from writing a pamphlet that at first glance seems 
antiquated or outmoded, Examples of the Interposition of Providence in the Detection 
and Punishment of Murder. In the title of Fielding’s pamphlet, the term “detection” 
appears to be curiously located between providence and punishment of murder. As a 
result, even as the word “detection” signifies the act of discovery of crime in the 
pamphlet, it also isolates providence as the entity that carries out investigations of 
murders. The way that providence works in the pamphlet, moreover, is strangely similar 
to contingencies and accidents that result in the detection of crimes in Tom Jones. For 
example, in one of the stories inscribed in the pamphlet, a servant or a random stranger 
suddenly or “luckily” appears at the scene of crime whereby the criminal is 
apprehended.3 
The term ‘detection,’ which etymologically means finding out what is concealed 
or hidden, can be used to describe discovery of crimes, tricks, errors, symptoms of 
disease, hidden causes, traces of a substance, etc.4 Yet, as Fielding’s case shows, 
eighteenth-century fiction writers frequently present detection as synonymous with 
criminal investigation, which need not be carried out by detective-like figures. Fielding’s 
Tom Jones urges us to ask whether detection takes place because of the plot’s 
commitment to providential design or to random chance or accident. Does detection that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 J.M. Beattie, The First English Detectives: The Bow Street Runners and the Policing of London, 1750-
1840 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012), 14-25. Also, see Pat Rogers, “Poacher and Gamekeeper: Fielding, the 
Law and the Novels,” in Henry Fielding (1707-1754): Novelist, Playwright, Journalist, Magistrate: A 
Double Anniversary Tribute, ed. Claude J. Rawson (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2008), 
246. 
 
3	  Fielding,	  Examples of the Interposition of Providence, 190.	  
4 See the Oxford English Dictionary Online. 
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require God-like knowledge also necessitate its narrative corollary, an omniscient third-
person narrator? In this study, I identify a body of fictions by Aphra Behn, Daniel Defoe, 
Samuel Richardson, and William Godwin that are exemplary of epistemological and 
narratological problems surrounding detection and punishment of crimes. Although 
critics often identify William Godwin’s Caleb Williams as a proto-detective novel, there 
is still no methodical study of eighteenth-century writers’ approaches to detection. My 
project fills this gap: it draws attention to an early body of crime fiction that is only 
partially analogous to nineteenth-century detective stories of Edgar Allan Poe and Arthur 
Conan Doyle. Rather than presenting detection as a matter of collecting forensic 
evidence, eighteenth-century writers use the subject of detection opportunistically to 
demonstrate tensions between religious and rational modes of knowledge. The 
epistemological rifts in these fictions manifest as peculiar narrative symptoms such as 
abrupt shifts in point of view, seemingly endless repetitions, and random digressions.  
My intention, however, is not so much to rewrite the history of the detective novel 
as to delineate the cultural and aesthetic significance of the concept of detection during 
the eighteenth century. In the subject of detection, eighteenth-century writers found 
opportunities to explore plural epistemologies associated with empirical practices, 
providential beliefs, rhetorical and mathematical theories of probability, and skepticism. 
The pursuit of detection triggers the difficulty of distinguishing truth from falsehood, fact 
from belief, or what philosophers call the problem of knowledge, in eighteenth-century 
crime stories. I argue that the problem of knowledge surrounding detection of crimes 
manifests as seemingly edgy formal traits of eighteenth-century fiction about criminal 
investigation. Intrusive narrators, unsatisfactory conclusions, tonal shifts, and repetitions, 
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that critics regard as stylistic faults, “departure[s] from the canons of formal realism,” or 
just commonplace tropes of eighteenth-century fiction, I argue, are to be understood not 
as failures of technique but rather as revealing symptoms of an attempt to resolve 
conflicts between competing theories of knowledge.5 
While the problem of knowledge was already central as early as the works of 
Plato and Aristotle, I am especially concerned with its instantiations in late seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century British fictions. Eighteenth-century writers, my study shows, were 
at once drawn toward and conflicted about theories of empiricism and skepticism, 
probabilistic knowledge, and providential ways of understanding the world: these 
theories were at times complementary or comparable but often acted in conflict with one 
another, forcing choices and affecting authors’ attitudes. It is a critical commonplace that 
empiricism was the mode of knowledge that ruled the eighteenth-century imagination. 
Emphasizing the role of sense experience or direct observation in the acquisition of 
knowledge, empiricism was expounded by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
philosophers and natural scientists such as Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, John Locke, and 
David Hume. British Empiricists challenged epistemological views of continental 
rationalists like René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza who regarded intellectual or 
deductive reason (instead of sensory experience or religious doctrines) as the primary 
source of knowledge.  
Unsurprisingly, then, two of the most influential studies on the eighteenth-century 
novel, Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel (1957) and Michael McKeon’s The Origins of the 
English Novel, 1660-1740 (1987), attribute changes in the period’s fiction to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1957), 288. 
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epistemology’s growing empiricism. Watt famously notes that empirical practices, 
consisting of observations and systematic organization of details, transform novelistic 
characterization and presentation of background: eighteenth-century writers use 
contemporary names to individualize their characters and situate them in recognizable 
settings, and in the process their novels are “distinguished from other genres and from 
previous forms of fiction.” 6 Michael McKeon extends Watt’s argument and suggests that 
the rise of the novel corresponds to the epistemological crises of secularization in the 
early modern Europe. According to McKeon, the transition from romance to history to 
the novel coincides with an epistemological shift from sixteenth-century “romance 
idealism” (characterized by atemporal truth) to seventeenth-century “naïve empiricism” 
(characterized by claims to historical veracity and documentary authenticity), to 
eighteenth-century “extreme scepticism” (characterized by suspicion of romance as well 
as history, resulting in unavailability of narrative truth).7  
McKeon’s insight that epistemological and ethical crises trigger generic and 
social changes is extremely important for my argument; however, my study challenges 
the rigid schematization and teleological bent of McKeon’s work, which separates 
empiricism from other modes of knowledge and prevents the readers from noticing the 
coexistence of different epistemologies during the eighteenth century. The fact is that 
most eighteenth-century writers found it difficult to ignore the “central doctrines and 
narrative modes of Christianity.”8 Put another way, the growth of empiricism did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Watt, 18. 
7 Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986), 
xvii; 21.  
8 Leopold Damrosch, God’s Plot and Man’s Stories: Studies in the Fictional Imagination from Milton to 
Fielding (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 2. 
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result in the disappearance of the puritanical belief in providence; as Leopold Damroch 
points out, “religious doctrine[s] were reimagined, and covertly tested” but never 
dismissed from the eighteenth-century “mimetic tales about ordinary life.9 To give an 
example, Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones not only demonstrates McKeon’s “extreme 
scepticism” but also embodies a structure which, in Damrosch’s words, is an “analogue 
of God’s structure,” if not “a literal instance of it.”10  
What’s more, eighteenth-century writers increasingly experimented with 
probabilistic views of knowledge to delineate truths in their narratives. Historians of 
probability Ian Hacking and Lorrraine Daston observe that the concept of probability 
acquired its modern connotations around 1660, and there was sudden proliferation of the 
mathematical doctrine of chances toward the end of the seventeenth century.11 
Challenging Hacking’s Foucauldian view of the emergence of probability, scholars of 
rhetoric and literature, such as Barbara Shapiro and Douglas Lane Patey, indicate that 
gradual changes in the understanding of probability and probable inference had 
implications not only for the discipline of mathematics but for philosophy, law, theology, 
medicine, and artistic productions.12 As probabilistic forms of reasoning gained 
popularity—including the weighing of trial evidence by judges, the evaluation of 
competing conjectures by natural scientists, and the assessment of odds of winning by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 3. 
10 Damrosch, God’s Plot and Man’s Stories, 289. 
11 Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophic Study of Early Ideas about Probability 
Induction and Statistical Inference (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975), 17; Lorraine Daston, Classical 
Probability in the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988), 8-9. 
12 See Barbara Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the 
Relationships between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1983); Douglas Lane Patey, Probability and Literary Form: Philosophic Theory and Literary Practice in 
the Augustan Age (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984) 
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gamblers—Shapiro insists, “knowledge in all fact-related fields was seen to fall along a 
continuum. The lower reaches of this continuum were characterized as ‘fiction,’ ‘mere 
opinion,’ and ‘conjecture’; its middle and high ranges as ‘probable’ and ‘highly 
probable’; and its apex as ‘morally certain.’”13 Acceptance of probability as a substitute 
or supplement to certainty was visible in the experiments conducted by the Royal 
Society, in the works of theologians like John Tillotson and Joseph Butler, in 
philosophical treatises by John Locke and David Hume, in English legal institutions 
reliance on circumstantial evidence, in medical theories that recommended diagnoses 
based on symptoms or probable signs.  
Most importantly, as Douglas Lane Patey brilliantly demonstrates in his book 
Probability and Literary Form (1986), literary and philosophic concepts of probability 
work internally in eighteenth-century fiction and Augustan literary criticism: “What is 
distinctive about the Augustan character is that he is a reader of probable signs and 
exercises his sagacity within a narrative whose very fabric is a structure of conjectures 
and expectations, probable inferences by which he judges others and by which he is 
himself judged.”14 Even as a sagacious character makes astute judgments by weighing 
probable signs and circumstances, according to Patey, eighteenth-century fiction’s ideal 
reader follows interpretative procedure based on the probabilistic view of knowledge. 
One of the consequences of the changing understanding of probability, according 
to Patey, was that the term ‘conjecture’ lost its “sense of divinatory prognostication, of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Barbara Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, 4.  
14 Douglas Lane Patey, Probability and Literary Form, ix; 213.  
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which the casting of lots was a familiar example.”15 Patey rightly notices that there was a 
change in the meaning of conjecture in the Augustan period, but he overlooks its nuances 
when he states that “conjecture was in the Augustan period the term for any probable 
inference.”16 Until the seventeenth century, conjecture was closely associated with the 
interpretation of signs, dreams, or omens; forecast, or prognostication.17 John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost (1667), for instance, refers to the “Ominous conjecture [cast] on the whole 
success” of the fallen angels to win heaven through direct war.18 With developments in 
the mathematical theories of probability in the eighteenth century, the word “conjecture” 
increasingly gained connotation of a speculation involving computation of probability, 
risk, and profit. My study shows that even as eighteenth-century novelists extend the 
rules of probability to examine the uncertainties that multiply in the wake of crimes, they 
try to reconcile probability with providential design, and thereby preserve conjecture’s 
association with prognostication. The tension between two senses of the conjecture 
remained unresolved until the end of the eighteenth century.  
Whereas Patey, McKeon, and Damrosch track the dynamic between a particular 
epistemological theory and eighteenth-century narrative forms, what remains largely 
unexplored is the extent to which different theories of knowledge associated with 
empiricism, providentialism, probability, and skepticism interacted with one another in 
eighteenth-century fictions. As the eighteenth-century epistemological crisis becomes an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid., 48. 
16 Ibid. 
17 This meaning is now obsolete. Oxford English Dictionary does not provide examples of this usage after 
1697.  
 
18 John Milton, Paradise Lost in The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), II.123, 378. 
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episode in the history of secularization, most critics tend to ignore the fact that empiricist 
and probabilistic views of knowledge coexisted with providential and religious modes of 
knowledge in the eighteenth century.19 In this study, by focusing on eighteenth-century 
fictions wherein it is often unclear whether detection of crimes requires knowledge of 
God’s providence, empirical observations, random accidents, or adroit calculations of 
probability, I map the eighteenth-century problem of knowledge, which in turn has 
implications for how we understand the forms of the period’s fiction more generally. 
What is true for eighteenth-century fictions about detection of crimes is also true for other 
fictions of the period: they do not illustrate any single epistemology. Instead these 
fictions manifest different theories of knowledge, test them, and register conflicts 
between them by way of formal commitments: point of view, voice, structure, character, 
and descriptive detail.  
 While it is possible to undertake a purely cultural study of the problem of 
knowledge, my project shows how formal traits presenting epistemological conflicts and 
their ethical implications are clearly visible and noteworthy. In thinking about form as an 
epistemological and ethical category, I follow the models of Sandra Macpherson and 
Frances Ferguson who deftly weave narrative form with moral philosophy and legal 
history.20 In Harm’s Way: Tragic Responsibility and the Novel Form, Sandra 
Macpherson shows that “the realist novel is a project of blame not exculpation.”21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, xxii. 
20 Sandra Macpherson, Harm’s Way: Tragic Responsibility and the Novel Form (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
UP, 2010). Frances Ferguson. “Rape and the Rise of the Novel,” in Misogyny, Misandry, and Misanthropy, 
ed. R. Howard Bloch and Frances Ferguson (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1989).  
21 Macpherson, Harm’s Way, 13.  
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Shifting attention away from contract to “strict liability,” Macpherson demonstrates that 
the realist novel is ultimately a tragic form, committed to holding persons accountable for 
accidents of fate.22 Macpherson’s provocative analysis of whether the state of a person’s 
mind is relevant to the question of her responsibility for her actions helps me connect 
narrative strategies of epistemology to notions of judgment and justice in fictions about 
detection of crimes. Detection in eighteenth-century fictions entails debates about 
judgment and punishment of crimes. Aphra Behn’s The History of the Nun (1689) and 
William Godwin’s Caleb Williams, for instance, end with legal trials, and Daniel Defoe’s 
Roxana (1724) and Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1748) build the expectation that 
criminals will be judged and punished by divine providence.23  
Macpherson’s exclusive focus on “formal realism” prevents her from exploring 
non-realist fictions, such as those of Aphra Behn, that can potentially complicate her 
argument about intention and responsibility. Taking my cue from Macpherson’s 
“feminist and formal ethics,” in my opening chapter on Aphra Behn’s The History of the 
Nun, I show that the female protagonist who murders her two husbands and strategically 
conceals the evidence of the crimes is not just Macpherson’s “person” who is punished 
for “things that [she] did unintentionally,” but an active agent who gains heroic status by 
taking responsibility for her actions.24 Unlike Macpherson, I self-consciously avoid the 
term “realist novel” throughout this project, and instead focus on the formal traits of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Macpherson, Harm’s Way, 4. 
23 Aphra Behn, The History of the Nun; or, the Fair Vow-Breaker in The Fair Jilt and Other Stories, vol. 3 
of The Works of Aphra Behn, edited by Janet Todd (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1995); Samuel 
Richardson, Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady, edited by Angus Ross (London: Penguin, 1985); 
Daniel Defoe, Roxana: The Fortunate Mistress, edited by W.R. Owens and P.N. Furbank (London: 
Pickering & Chatto, 2009). 
24 Ibid., 5. 
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discursive category of fiction. I use the term “fiction” as opposed to “realist novel” for 
three reasons: first, it can be applied to a wider variety of prose narratives written during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; second, in aligning itself to invention and 
innovation, “fiction” reminds the readers that narratives are first and foremost aesthetic 
forms, requiring engagement with style.25 Finally, “fiction” makes explicit the demand 
for epistemological engagement from readers, for it frequently appears as a companion to 
or at variance with “fact” in eighteenth-century cultural and intellectual contexts.26 By 
mobilizing the term “fiction,” my project reignites interest in non-realist narrative 
techniques such as intrusive narrators, exaggerations, and digressions as well as in 
literary representations of events that are at once probable and incredible. As an aesthetic 
category, eighteenth-century fictions about detection of crimes demand rigorous 
rhetorical criticism. This set of fictions, I suggest, raises puzzling questions about 
eighteenth-century plots and formal innovations. For example, why is the narrator of 
Aphra Behn’s The History of the Nun (1689) at once omniscient and limited? Why does 
William Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1794) embody several crime stories that have the 
same gist and therefore make the plot repetitive?27 Chapters 1 and 4 offer tentative 
answers to these formal conundrums. Since the narrator of Behn’s fiction wavers between 
empiricism and omniscient knowledge of sacred and secular offenses, there are frequent 
shifts in the points of view and tone of The History of the Nun whereby the readers only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Refer to the different meanings of “fiction” in the Oxford English Dictionary Online <www.oed.com>  
26 A number of early modern writings did not distinguish between fact and fiction. See the discussion of 
fact/ fiction continuum in Mary Poovey’s Genres of Credit Economy: Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and 
Nineteenth-Century Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 77; Catherine Gallagher’s 
Nobody’s Story: The Vanishing Acts of Women Writers in the Marketplace, 1670-1820 (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1994), xvi. 
27 William Godwin. Things as They Are: or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams in Collected Novels and 
Memoirs of William Godwin.Vol 3. Ed. Pamela Clemit (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1992). 
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get tentative answers to how and why the female protagonist murders her two husbands. I 
suggest that William Godwin’s Caleb Williams, at times, seems repetitive because it 
manifests the principles of chemist Joseph Priestley’s empiricism: the work presents 
similar sounding stories as proofs of its claim about the prevalence of injustice.   
The focus on narrative techniques that appear as formal anomalies to modern-day 
readers of eighteenth-century novels makes this study a meaningful interlocutor in the 
scholarship that resists the imposition of narrative standards of realism on the period’s 
fictions. In his persuasive book Popular Fiction Before Richardson (1969), John Richetti 
warns us that it is dangerous to expect narrative effects of realism from a “body of 
writing which was at least partly unaware of, if not hostile to, them.”28 One of the central 
problems with using “realism” as a standard for evaluating eighteenth-century fictions, 
according to J. Paul Hunter, is that instances “of the supernatural or para-natural, the 
miraculous or the magical, the inexplicable or the uncertain, the improbable or the 
coincidental—varieties all of the strange and surprising—tend to be seen as flaws, or 
explained away.”29 What’s more, the criteria of realism, Ros Ballaster suggests, prevent 
us from acknowledging women writers’ responses to epistemological and formal 
questions on the one hand, and ideological questions of gender and class on the other 
hand. 30 Following the leads of Richetti, Hunter, and Ballaster, my study examines the 
“strange and surprising” narrative effects of eighteenth-century fictions by both male and 
female writers. As men and women, masters and servants had varying degrees of access 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 John Richetti, Popular Fiction Before Richardson: Narrative Patterns 1700-1739 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1969), 4. 
29 J. Paul Hunter, Before Novels: Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century Fiction (New York and London: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 32.  
30 See chapter 1 of Ros Ballaster’s Seductive Forms: Women’s Amatory Fiction from 1684 to 1740 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), 7-31. 
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to knowledge in the eighteenth century, my project reveals that the period’s theories of 
knowledge were often laden with social biases.  
In reading an eighteenth-century fiction about crime and judgment of its 
punishment, navigation through the problem of knowledge ultimately requires active 
participation from readers. According to Catherine Gallagher, “eighteenth-century 
readers “had to be taught how to read fiction, and as they learned this skill (it did not 
come naturally), new emotional dispositions were created.”31 Along with “new emotional 
dispositions,” I point out in my final chapter on Godwin, eighteenth-century stories about 
investigation of crimes also create different intellectual dispositions. Godwin relies on 
chemist Joseph Priestley’s and philosopher David Hartley’s empirical philosophy and 
associationist psychology respectively to teach the readers that observations and 
sensations vary with circumstances and provide unreliable evidence of crimes. As 
eighteenth-century narratives experiment in different modes of knowledge, they 
sometimes prompt readers to read providential signs (encoded as dreams or prayers) 
critically; at other times, they call upon readers to examine outward or physiognomic 
signs; more frequently, they require readers to make conjectures and causal connections 
to unravel crimes. Writers such as Daniel Defoe, Samuel Richardson, and William 
Godwin encouraged their readers to read texts carefully and critically, and thereby carry 
out the tasks of detection and judgment of crimes, which their stories initiate but do not 
always complete.   
Let me provide two brief examples of investigation of crimes in Tom Jones that 
clarify my claims regarding detection, narrative form, and the problem of knowledge in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Catherine Gallagher, Nobody’s Story, xvii. 
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eighteenth-century fiction. In Fielding’s fiction, the obsessive grappling with the 
questions of knowledge (how can we know, what do we know, how can we be certain 
about what we know) becomes apparent in the strange twists and turns of the plot as well 
as in the intrusive commentaries of its witty and unreliable narrator. The concern with 
detection and questions of knowledge first appears when Mrs. Deborah Wilkins, the 
housekeeper of Squire Allworthy, undertakes a probabilistic inquiry to find the parents of 
infant Tom who has mysteriously appeared on her master’s bed. With the assistance of an 
elderly matron, Deborah Wilkins identifies Jenny Jones as the “likeliest person” to have 
given birth to a bastard.32 Deborah Wilkins’s inference, the narrator indicates, is drawn 
from her observation that Jenny, as Miss Bridget’s nurse, has lately spent a lot of time at 
the Allworthy household. Echoing David Hume’s sentiments that “all knowledge 
degenerates into probability,” the narrator makes it obvious that the evidence against 
Jenny is circumstantial and the housekeeper’s conjecture only represents a strong 
probability of Jenny being Tom’s mother: “it is possible Mr Allworthy might have 
required some stronger evidence to have convicted her.”33 By commenting on the 
limitations of Wilkins’s investigation, the narrator demonstrates his dissatisfaction with 
empirical and probabilistic modes of knowledge, and increasingly aligns himself with 
Humean skepticism. 
 The mystery of Tom’s parentage, which does not get solved until the very end of 
the novel, generates epistemological uncertainty and has implications for the form and 
the ethics of the novel.  At the most basic level, the mysterious appearance of baby Tom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Fielding, Tom Jones, 48. 
33 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David F Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 2000),1.4.1;121, and Fielding, Tom Jones, 50. , 
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disrupts the order of the Allworthy household and threatens to criminalize innocent and 
frequently marginalized members of his community: the presumed mother of Tom, Jenny 
Jones, is perceived as a “hussy” who needs to be sent to Bridewell; charged with 
seduction and deception, Partridge, Tom’s supposed father, is deprived of his living; and 
as a bastard, Tom is prone to accusations of a range of misdemeanors and felonies.34 
Each new accusation of crime is followed by a preliminary investigation and 
epistemological debates that often prompt narratorial interventions that disrupt the 
momentum of the plot. In yet another example of an investigation of a crime, Blifil 
accuses Tom of battery and assault, provoking his tutors Reverend Thwackum and 
philosopher Square to employ empirical and quasi-religious theories of knowledge to 
investigate the case and pass a judgment in Blifil’s favor. According to the narrator, the 
tutors’ decision that Tom is guilty of a serious crime rests as much on the empirical 
evidence of Blifil’s bloody nose as their limited understanding of virtue and religion. In a 
commentary to this episode, the narrator insists that the two tutors are “the objects of 
derision in this history” not only because they fail to observe Blifil’s provocation (he 
refers to Tom as a “beggarly bastard”), but also because they neglect virtue and religion, 
and lack “all the natural goodness of heart.”35 In contrast to the two tutors, Allworthy 
subscribes to a theory of knowledge that appeals to his conscience (or “something within 
his own breast”) for preventing the excessive punishment of Tom.36 
The extradiegetic narrator, who does not directly participate in the plot of Tom 
Jones, withholds the promise of omniscience or certain knowledge that can unravel all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Fielding, Tom Jones, 40; 103. 
35 Ibid., 129-130. 
36 Fielding, Tom Jones, 132. 
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mysteries. When Partridge is wrongly punished for fathering Tom, the narrator uses the 
epithet “poor Partridge” to indicate the accused’s innocence.37 Despite his God-like 
omniscient knowledge, the narrator cannot distinguish between truth and conjecture, fact 
and belief, in the presence of plural epistemologies, and his irresolution threatens the very 
structure and suspense of the narrative. The narrator, therefore, tells the readers that 
although he is privy to the fact of Partridge’s guilt or innocence, he lacks authority to 
share this knowledge: “Whether [Partridge] was innocent or not, will perhaps appear 
hereafter; but if the Historic-Muse hath entrusted me with any Secrets, I will by no means 
be guilty of discovering them till she shall give me leave.”38 By suggesting that he cannot 
disclose information and share conclusions until the proper time, the narrator preempts 
the persona of a nineteenth-century detective. Yet the narrator is not exactly an 
eighteenth-century Sherlock Holmes: rather than clearing up the mystery, he often 
discloses confidential information that intensifies uncertainty. When Allworthy decides to 
punish Partridge, the narrator draws attention to the gap in his knowledge and reveals that 
Jenny had an intimate relationship with an eighteen-year-old boy in Partridge’s 
household. This information functions as a red herring, for Jenny’s sexual history has 
nothing to do with Tom’s birth. By concealing and revealing information, Fielding’s 
“deliberately suppressive” narrator becomes the site at which the problem of knowledge 
becomes apparent in Tom Jones.39 This narrator occasionally “lend[s] the Reader a little 
assistance,” but more often than not, he defers the matters to “the judgment of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid., 101. 
38 Ibid., 101. 
 
39 Meir Sternberg uses the term “deliberately suppressive” to describe Fielding’s narrator who withholds 
information in order to create suspense. Cited in Jonathan Culler’s The Literary in Theory (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2007), 187. 
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sagacious reader.”40 To be “sagacious,” Fielding indicates, is to have keen mental 
discernment, good judgment, the qualities of a natural theologian, and the ability to make 
observations and probable inferences.41 The term appears in a variety of epistemological 
contexts, but it always used to describe the reader and never any character. “Sagacity,” 
therefore, becomes synonymous with the capacity of the reader to solve narrative puzzles.  
 My project combines the merits of close reading with cultural criticism as I situate 
each fiction in an archive of literary, legal, scientific, mathematical, philosophical, and 
theological works, to outline the dimensions of a culture that was troubled by 
incompatibilities between different theories of knowledge. While I recognize that 
eighteenth-century fictions about detection of crimes encompass a wide range of styles 
and genres, still, I avoid in-depth analysis of the distinctions between the sub-genres in 
order to track similarities and changes in the concept of detection in eighteenth-century 
fictions over the course of the eighteenth century (1660-1800).  
This study further bears the imprints of an eclectic mix of twentieth-century 
criticism. My understanding that at any given point in the eighteenth century different 
epistemological theories and practices vied with one another echoes Raymond Williams’s 
influential idea that there are “complex interrelations between movements and tendencies 
both within and beyond a specific dominance” in every culture.42  Williams’s terms 
“dominant,” “residual,” and “emergent,” however, seem overly schematic in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Fielding, Tom Jones, 47; 258. 
 
41 According to Douglas Patey, “sagacity is the capacity for reading signs well, especially those outward 
signs that ‘discover’ the ‘secret’ of character,” 85. My interpretation of the term, as the example shows, is 
slightly different.  
42 See Raymond Williams, “Dominant, Residual, and Emergent” (1977) in Cultural Theory: An Anthology, 
ed. Imre Szeman and Timothy Kaposy (Oxford and Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 353-57; and 
Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 1977).	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eighteenth-century context.43 Rather than categorizing epistemological practices as 
dominant or emergent, this project shows that competing theories of knowledge often 
assumed similar cultural importance during the eighteenth century. 
No story about detection, epistemology, and narrative forms can bear to ignore 
Roland Barthes’s influential concept of the hermeneutic code: the “hermeneutic” code, 
after all, embodies the logic of question and answer, mystery and solution. In Barthes’s 
perspective, readers desire to acquire knowledge and solve the narrative enigma acts as a 
text’s structuring force: “The dynamics of the text…is thus paradoxical…the problem is 
to maintain the enigma in the initial void of its answer; whereas the sentences quicken the 
story’s ‘unfolding’ and cannot help but move the story along, the hermeneutic code 
performs an opposite action: it must set up delays (obstacles, stoppages, deviations) in the 
flow of the discourse.”44 Although Barthes’s S/Z is useful for theorizing suspense in 
novels, its emphasis on realist historiography limits its usefulness for studies on 
eighteenth-century fictions. In contrast to Barthes’s work, Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of 
Criticism (1957) refrains from falling into the teleological trap of elevating realism over 
other prose fictions in the eighteenth century; the novel is not very different from prose 
fictions such as romance, scandal chronicles, and rogue narratives. In Frye’s cheeky 
words, “the forms of prose fiction are mixed, like racial strains in human beings, not 
separable like the sexes.”45 Frye’s idealization of romance structures, at times, compels 
one to see the hand of Providence in eighteenth-century plots where none might exist. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Williams, Marxism and Literature, 121. 
44 Roland Barthes, S/Z: An Essay, trans. Richard Millar (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974; Paris: Seuil, 
1970), 75. 
45 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000), 305. 
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J.L. Austin’s performance theory helped me to resist such a temptation. Following 
Austin, I show in my chapter on Richardson’s Clarissa that prayers need not signify 
access to providential knowledge: prayers are often “performative utterances”—
utterances that although neither true nor false are capable of transforming reality.46  
The most profound and apparent influence on this work, however, is that of early 
modern British philosophers Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume, whose 
works not only illustrate but also contribute to the epistemological conflicts of the period 
under scrutiny. Unsurprisingly, then, I study eighteenth-century fictions about detection 
of crimes alongside their major philosophical contributions, because it is Hobbes, Locke, 
and Hume who not only theorize what we now understand as empiricism and 
philosophical probability, but also stage debates about notions of knowledge associated 
with providence, human conscience, and miracles.47  
An inquiry into narrative forms and plural epistemologies remains relevant for the 
field of eighteenth-century studies for it disrupts the familiar story that late seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century literary and cultural texts primarily manifest the philosophic 
movement of the “secular” Enlightenment. Unlike many scholars of the period who 
accord primacy to rational and secular knowledge (notably Ian Watt, Michael McKeon, 
and John Bender) and insist that the novel is “an institution of the Enlightenment,” my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See J.L. Austin. How to do things with Words. (Cambridge and Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1962). 
47 Notable among philosophical works of the period are Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (Ontario: Broadview 
Press, 2011); Locke, John An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1979); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. 
Norton (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000). 
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project calls attention to the dialogues between different forms of knowledge that shape 
forms, rhetoric, and themes of eighteenth-century British fictions.48 
By foregrounding eighteenth-century crime fictions' commitment to encoding 
non-secular and providential forms of knowledge in biblical prayers, prophecies, curses, 
premonitions, and dreams, my project contributes to a growing body of scholarship 
interested in “re-enchanting” and de-secularizing the Enlightenment. In particular, my 
study extends Jesse Molesworth’s argument that eighteenth-century fictions rarely 
promote “an ascendant secular or rational conception of the world.”49 Molesworth’s 
Chance and the Eighteenth-Century Novel draws on both rational and irrational 
treatments of probability to show that there was no straightforward advance toward 
rational judgment in the eighteenth century and challenges Max Weber’s “secularization 
thesis.” 50 Besides over-emphasizing “formal realism”—which, as I pointed out earlier, is 
a controversial standard for evaluating eighteenth-century fiction—Molesworth 
problematically reads all eighteenth-century narratives as exemplary of games of 
chance.51 In doing so, Molesworth overlooks the extent to which theories of probability 
interacted with providential and empirical ways of understanding the world in the 
period’s fictions. Unsurprisingly, then, for Molesworth, the answer to the question “Can 
the novel enlighten?” is an emphatic no.52 My answer, as evident from my analyses of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel; Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740; John 
Bender, Ends of Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford UP, 40).  
49 Jesse Molesworth, Chance and the Eighteenth Century Novel: Realism, Probability, Magic. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2010, 2.  
 
50 Ibid., 52 
51 Molesworth, Chance and the Eighteenth-Century Novel, 135. 
52 Ibid. 1 
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problem of knowledge, is both yes and no. Since eighteenth-century fictions about 
detection of crimes often recast chance occurrences as providential events or set 
empirical limits on otherwise random chance, my response is more similar to that of 
Simon During, Nicholas Paige, and Gauri Viswanathan—that is enlightenment and 
enchantment are not diametrically opposite propositions: fictions can at once enlighten 
and enchant their readers.53 
In each of four chapters of this dissertation, I examine formal anomalies within an 
exemplary fiction about detection of crimes in the context of the epistemological theories 
that animate that narrative, mapping changing attitudes toward divine providence, 
empiricism, theories of probability, and skepticism as they affect stories structured 
around the detection of crime, its judgment, and its punishment. Although minor 
misdemeanors and major crimes such as theft, rape, and murder punctuate the plots of 
eighteenth-century fictions about criminal investigation crimes in the selected texts tend 
to hover around accusations of murder. This is no accident: murder, as Stephen Kern 
points out in A Cultural History of Causality, allows one to think critically about the 
problem of causality; more specifically, for the purpose of this project, it enables one to 
examine the problem of knowledge with unusual concreteness.54  My first chapter 
focuses on the wild tonal shifts in Aphra Behn’s scandalous novella The History of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See Simon During, Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic (Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 2002), 65; Nicholas Paige “Permanent Re-Enchantments: On Some Literary Uses of the Supernatural 
from Early Empiricism to Modern Aesthetics” in The Re-Enchantment of the World: Secular Magic in a 
Rational Age, edited by Joshua Landy and Michael Saler (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009), 159-180; Gauri 
Viswanathan, “The Ordinary Business of Occultism.” Critical Inquiry 27.1 (2000): 1-20. Sarah Kareem 
shares a similar insight in her recent book on wonder about everyday experience in eighteenth-century 
fiction. Eighteenth-Century Fiction and the Reinvention of Wonder (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014).  
54 Stephen Kern, A Cultural History of Causality: Science, Murder, Novels, and Systems of Thought, 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004). 
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Nun. Questions about knowledge and the detection of crimes are filtered through a female 
narrator who comes across as curious and confused, intrusive and restrained, reliable and 
unreliable. Looking back in certain respects to early modern providential murder 
pamphlets and crime ballads, Behn indicates that detection might take place by way of 
strange miracles, not least the sudden opening of the eyes of a dead man to view his 
murderer. The narrator, however, is reluctant to confirm the existence of providential 
detection and justice. She consistently backs providential ideas by empirical observations 
or probabilistic conjectures, giving rise to tonal inconsistencies that speak to the period’s 
problem of establishing the conditions for truth and justified belief when several 
dominant theories of knowledge coexist.  
Daniel Defoe, unlike Aphra Behn, never dismisses the power of divine 
providence and supernatural phenomena such as premonitions and second sights to detect 
and punish crimes. In my second chapter, I situate Defoe’s picaresque tale of detection 
The Fortunate Mistress (also known as Roxana) alongside works on casuistry, John 
Locke’s philosophical treatises, and some of Defoe’s lesser-known works, including An 
Essay on the History and Reality of Apparitions. Whereas theologians such as William 
Perkins and William Sherlock perceived conscience as a divine faculty capable of 
detecting and punishing crimes, Hobbes and Locke referred to conscience as an abstract 
metaphor that could never supply certain knowledge. Taking his cue from Locke, Defoe’s 
character, Susan, makes empirical observations and probabilistic conjectures important 
for unlocking Roxana’s secrets. At the same time, collapsing providence into 
eschatology, Defoe refuses to answer whether Roxana killed her daughter. The novel’s 
end thus seems abrupt and inconclusive.   
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Besides offering an explanation for the extraordinary length of the dénouement of 
Samuel Richardson’s epistolary fiction Clarissa, my third chapter reads the novel’s 
ending in the context of mathematical treatises on probability. As a printer, Richardson 
regularly printed issues of the important scientific periodical Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society, including papers of theorists of mathematical probability such as 
Jacob Bernoulli, Abraham de Moivre, and John Arbuthnot. Denying readers the thrill of a 
happy ending or the satisfaction of poetic justice, Richardson indicates that his 
conclusion conforms to the rules of probability while also being compatible with the 
orthodox notions of Christian afterlife. If his readers calculate providential outcomes just 
as mathematicians calculate probabilities in games of chance, they will be able to infer 
the rewards and punishments reserved for his protagonists in the world beyond the text.  
In my final chapter, I track the tensions and overlaps between epistemologies 
associated with Calvinist theology, David Hartley’s associationism, David Hume’s 
skepticism, and Joseph Priestley’s scientific empiricism to account for the repetitive 
stories, stylistic fluctuations, and conflicted endings of William Godwin’s Caleb 
Williams. Through Caleb’s unsuccessful attempts to find empirical proofs of his master’s 
supposed crime, Godwin demonstrates the extent to which class difference affects 
knowledge. When causal relations cannot be established, probabilistic events become 
uncannily similar to accidents or chance occurrences in Godwin’s fiction. The resultant 
uncertainty generates the pessimistic mood that engulfs the novel’s published and 
manuscript endings. Still, the published ending is less bleak than the original ending, for 
it underplays moral and epistemological skepticism and actively encourages readers to 
read narratives skeptically in order to bridge the gap between knowledge and justice.  
 24 
Chapter 1 
    Almost Providential Detection of Murder: 
 Uncertain Knowledge and Tonal Shifts in Aphra Behn’s The History of the Nun 
  
At once explicit and withholding in its representation of the investigation and 
punishment of crimes, Aphra Behn’s The History of the Nun: or, The Fair Vow-Breaker 
(1689) is a curious text.1 Written toward the end of Behn’s life and against the backdrop 
of the major political unrest that culminated in the Glorious Revolution, this medium-
length prose fiction displays a range of narrative peculiarities, among which might be 
counted a seemingly omniscient yet also strikingly limited narrator, tonal inconsistencies, 
and a rapid ending. The story is sensational but not complicated: a devout nun 
transgresses her sacred vows, inadvertently enters into a bigamous relationship, and 
eventually kills both husbands. Still, the narrative structure and the voice that tells this 
story—alternately claiming to know everything and almost nothing—confound both 
readers and critics. Frederick M. Link, for instance, notes the contradictory statements 
made by the narrator of The History of the Nun and then passes the following judgment: 
“The structural failure, the rapid conclusion, and the spurious moral all suggest that Behn 
had no real focus in the story.”2 As an example of narrative oddity, I quote the long-
winded opening sentence of The History of the Nun:  
Of all the Sins, incident to Human Nature, there is none, of which Heaven has 
took so particular, visible, and frequent Notice, and Revenge, as on that of 
Violated Vows, which never go unpunished; and the Cupids may boast what they 
                                                
1 Aphra Behn, The History of the Nun; or, the Fair Vow-Breaker. The Fair Jilt and Other Stories, vol. 3 of 
The Works of Aphra Behn, ed. Janet Todd (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1995). References are to this 
edition.  
 
2 See Frederick M. Link, Aphra Behn (New York: Twayne, 1968), 144-145. 
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will for the encouragement of their Trade of Love, that Heaven never takes 
cognizance of Lovers broken Vows and Oaths, and that ’tis the only Perjury that 
escapes the Anger of the Gods: But I verily believe, if it were search’d into, we 
should find these frequent Perjuries, that pass in the World for so many 
Gallantries only, to be the occasion of so many unhappy Marriages, and the cause 
of all those Misfortunes, which are so frequent to the Nuptiall’d Pair (211). 
 
The modulations in the voice are so stark that we almost seem to be in the company of 
two narrators. The first independent clause gives the impression of an all-knowing 
narrator who assumes the omniscience of God-like knowledge, flaunting a providential 
way of understanding the causes and consequences of human actions. In a confident tone, 
the narrator identifies a vengeful God who punishes vow breakers and is the sole cause of 
their misfortunes. Rather than illustrating or expanding this assertion, the clause 
following the colon replaces the unequivocal assertion of an omniscient narrator by the 
exhortation of an irresolute first-person narrator. This nameless first-person narrator cites 
her own beliefs to support her observations and urges the reader to examine the 
consequences of perjuries.  Alternating between appeals to providentialism (offenders’ 
misfortunes represent God’s disapproval), exhortations to undertake enquiries and 
observations (God notices transgressions and you should too), and entreaties to note the 
frequency of perjuries, the narrator seems to be teetering on the brink of fragmentation.  
Given the text’s formal oddities, it is hardly surprising that The History of the Nun 
attracts little critical attention. At first glance, the work appears to be one of the many 
disjointed and diffuse early modern narratives that in John Richetti’s words are “beyond 
redemption—morally or aesthetically.”3 Earlier types of prose fiction, such as those by 
Aphra Behn, are relegated to a couple of paragraphs in Ian Watt’s classic book The Rise 
of the Novel because they fail to capture “actual experiences” of middle-class individuals 
                                                
3 John Richetti, Popular Fiction Before Richardson: Narrative Patterns 1700-1739 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1969), 262. 
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and are “not consistently oriented in the direction of formal realism.” 4 In his remarkable 
book Popular Fiction Before Richardson, Richetti shows that fiction was not a stable 
category until the 1740s, and indicates that the imposition of “the narrative effects 
(summed up in the term realism)” on all eighteenth-century prose fictions contributes to a 
“distortion of literary history.”5  Watt’s selection of texts, Richetti indicates, is 
completely male-dominated: “Defoe…was not the only practising hack writer of what we 
can now call fiction.”6  Richetti, in contrast, discusses prose fictions by women writers 
like Delarivier Manley and Eliza Haywood. Yet Richetti also refuses to consider the 
narrative effects of women writers’ works on their own merits, reinforcing the impression 
that “the great bulk of this pre-Richardsonian fiction is artistically despicable.”7 Early 
prose fiction, Richetti concludes, is “bad art,” which should be read as “a cultural 
artefact, a set of emotional and ideological stimuli, [or] machines for producing 
pleasurable fantasies.”8 One of biggest limitations of reading all fragmentary 
seventeenth-century prose fictions as aesthetic failures, valuable only for their 
sociological information or for their capacities to produce pleasure, as Ros Ballaster 
points out, is that it blinds us to women writers’ “intervention in party and sexual 
politics” through narrative forms.9  
                                                
4 Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding (Berkeley and Los Angeles : 
University of California Press, 1957), 27, 33. 
 
5 John Richetti, Popular Fiction Before Richardson, 4.  
 
6 Ibid., 5. 
 
7 Ibid.  
 
8 Ibid., 4, 8. 
 




This chapter responds to Ros Ballaster’s call simultaneously to subject Aphra 
Behn’s writings to “epistemological and formal questions of genre and its formation” (the 
kind that characterize Michael McKeon's approach to fiction) as well as to “socio-
political and ideological questions of gender” (associated with feminist critics such as 
Jane Spencer and Janet Todd).10  It expands on Ballaster’s insight that Behn’s narrators 
are not merely “sources of biographical investigation”; instead, they are formal devices 
that helped Behn attain her literary and socio-political goals.11 At the same time, the 
chapter takes issue with Ballaster’s easy appropriation of psychoanalytical categories to 
make sense of an entire range of literary techniques and effects across Behn’s writings: 
“Behn’s narrative voice,” irrespective of the genre, Ballaster tends to think, “is precisely 
that of the lover addressing his or her absent object.”12 Rather than reading the edgy, 
unstable, and partial narrative traits of The History of the Nun as erotic or enticing effects 
of the text upon the reader, I suggest that they are revealing symptoms of a female 
writer’s attempt to address epistemological and ethical problems associated with 
investigation of crimes and more generally with the problem of knowledge. The female 
narrator who wavers between a limited empiricism and omniscient knowledge of sacred 
                                                
10 See Michael McKeon’s The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 (Baltimore and London: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1987), 20-21. Janet Todd’s The Sign of Angellica: Women, Writing and Fiction, 
1660-1800 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 77, and Jane Spencer’s The Rise of the Woman 
Novelist: From Aphra Behn to Jane Austen (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 42.  
 
11 Ballaster, Seductive Forms, 7. Besides Ballaster, see Catherine Gallagher’s Nobody’s Story: The 
Vanishing Acts of Women Writers in the Marketplace, 1670-1820 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1994) and Jacqueline Pearson’s “Gender and Narrative in the Fiction of Aphra Behn,” 
Review of English Studies, New Series, Vol. 42, No. 165 (Feb., 1991): 40-56, for subtle discussions of 
Aphra Behn’s narrative techniques that helped her to succeed in the patriarchal eighteenth-century literary 
marketplace. Also see Kirsten T. Saxton, Narratives of Women and Murder in England, 1680-1760. Deadly 
Plots (Burlington, Ashgate, 2009), 34; Ann Messanger, His and Hers: Essays in Restoration and 
Eighteenth-Century Literature (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 46, for readings that 
emphasize Behn’s socio-political goals. 
 
12 Ballaster, Seductive Forms, 70. 
 28 
and secular offenses, the resultant tonal shifts, and the dénouement in which strange 
miracles precipitate detection of crimes and the novel’s end are complex responses to 
pressing concerns about the problem of knowledge. I use the phrase “problem of 
knowledge” to refer to the difficulty of distinguishing between fact and belief, truth and 
conjecture, given the continuum and overlap between different epistemological theories 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although the problem of knowledge was 
already central as early as the works of Plato and Aristotle, in this chapter, I am 
especially concerned with its instantiations in late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
women’s fiction in England. For Behn, I show, the philosophical problem of knowledge 
was intertwined with the problem of female self-knowledge.  
The problem of female self-knowledge surfaces at the level of the content in The 
History of the Nun when Behn’s heroine, Isabella, fails to find a model of conduct or 
interpretation in the Christian Scriptures or tradition, and pursues a transgressive passion 
that prompts more serious crimes. Epistemological uncertainties further manifest at the 
formal level in the female narrator’s descriptive account of Isabella’s actions and 
intentions: besides offering empirical and probabilistic analyses of Isabella’s deeds and 
motives, the female narrator surprisingly evokes the epistemology of providence in lieu 
of evidence. Even as Behn’s fiction looks forward in certain ways to nineteenth-century 
detective stories of Edgar Allan Poe and Arthur Conan Doyle, it looks back in other 
respects to early modern crime ballads and providential pamphlets. These crime ballads 
and pamphlets present a providential view of detection by reminding readers of God’s 
power to detect and punish secret crimes. Behn’s narrator, however, is reluctant to 
confirm the existence of providential detection and justice; she consistently backs 
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providential ideas by empirical observations or probabilistic conjectures. The History of 
the Nun is one of the main examples of late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century fictions 
about detection of crimes, peculiar to a culture that had trouble deciding whether to think 
of investigation of crimes as God's prerogative, as a call for empirical observations, or as 
a speculative enterprise akin to calculations of probability. 
 Writing in a conflicted culture that was at once attracted to and troubled by the 
notion of divine providence, Behn adopts a narrative framework that helps her explore 
providential epistemology without declaring her religious beliefs.13 It is clear from the 
prefatory dedication that the female narrator is not simply a persona of or stand in for 
Aphra Behn. Behn strategically informs her patroness Hortense Mancini, the Duchess of 
Mazarine, that “the Story is true, as it is on the Records of the Town, where it was 
translated” (208). Mancini, the niece of Cardinal Mazarin, had separated from her husband 
in 1666; she later became the mistress of Charles II.14 Behn, who is assumed to have 
written lampoons on Mancini, hovers between sympathy and satire for the Duchess in the 
dedication to The History of the Nun. By presenting a “true” account of a vow breaker, 
Behn aims to provide Mancini new insights into her offenses. The dedicatory frame 
quickly fades into the background; Aphra Behn, the historical figure and the writer, who 
                                                
13  Aphra Behn’s religious attitudes baffle critics who variously regard her as a closet Catholic, a supporter 
of Anglicanism, and even a polytheist. See George A. Starr, “Aphra Behn and the Genealogy of the Man of 
Feeling,” Modern Philology 87 (May 1990): 362; Maureen Duffy, The Passionate Shepherdess: Aphra 
Behn, 1640-89 (London: Cape, 1977), 92, 239, 283. Arlen Feldwick and Cary J. Nederman suggest that 
Behn extended “the cause of deism.” See “‘Religion Set the World at Odds’: Deism and the Climate of 
Religious Tolerance in the Works of Aphra Behn” in Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration 
Before the Enlightenment. Ed. John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 218. My own reading is influenced by Janet Todd’s observation that religion in 
Behn’s works often appears as a matter of style. Janet Todd, “Introduction” to Aphra Behn, Oronooko, the 
Rover and Other Works (London: Penguin, 1992), 3-4.  
 
14 Mancini appears in lampoons copied in Astrea’s Brooke for Songs and Satyrs, a work that was 
presumably owned and partially compiled by Aphra Behn. See Janet Todd’s introduction to The History of 
the Nun in volume 3 of The Works of Aphra Behn, 206.  
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appropriates editorial omniscience, claiming to know the true story, vanishes from the 
narrative proper. Instead we are introduced to an unnamed first-person narrator attempting 
to acquire true knowledge of the intentional and unintentional crimes committed by 
Isabella. In this chapter, I contextualize and examine the somewhat paradoxical 
epistemological practices of this female narrator who observes crimes and occasionally 
claims omniscient knowledge. I further assess the implications of the narrator’s changing 
attitude toward various epistemological practices for the novel’s tone and style. By way of 
conclusion, I examine the ethical implications of the epistemological conflicts in The 
History of the Nun. The seemingly abrupt ending of Behn’s novel, I suggest, undermines 
epistemological practices and moral judgments that hinder or censure female knowledge. 
In doing so, I extend feminist arguments—like those of Ros Ballaster, Corrinne Harol, and 
Sandra Macpherson—that link narrative strategies with epistemology and ethics, and 
enable us to celebrate Behn’s fictions for their stylistic effects and moral ambiguities.15 
 
An Almost Certain Narrator 
 Although such a generic label may seem anachronistic, The History of the Nun is 
fairly described as a crime novel that presents readers with a web of wrongdoings in 
which sins against God are interwoven with crimes against men. Its plot and narrative 
ambiguities rest upon gaps among knowledge, judgment, and justice. Set in Iper, a 
                                                
15 Ballaster, Seductive Forms, 19. Corrinne Harol focuses on Behn’s use of literary tropes to explore the 
moral dilemmas central to Behn’s fiction. She suggests that Behn’s ends are “simultaneously feminist, 
political, and generically innovative.” See Enlightened Virginity in Eighteenth-Century Literature (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 41. Also, see Harol’s analysis of the moral ambiguity of Oroonoko’s 
narrator in “The Passion of Oroonoko: Passive Obedience, The Royal Slave, and Aphra Behn’s Baroque 
Realism,” ELH 79, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 447-475. Sandra Macpherson, Harm’s Way: Tragic 
Responsibility and the Novel Form (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). Macpherson does 
not explore Behn’s writings; however, I suggest in this chapter’s conclusion that Harm’s Way provides a 
useful model for understanding the nexus of agency and responsibility in The History of the Nun. 
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French territory, Behn’s fiction tells the story of the devout nun Isabella de Vallery, who 
does not know the consequences of disobeying divine laws and breaks her sacred vows to 
marry Henault. As “criminals [who] transgress’d the Law,” the couple faces poverty and 
privation, forcing Henault to join the religious war against the Turks (239). The report of 
Henault’s death prompts impoverished Isabella to marry an accomplished suitor of her 
youth, Villenoys. Henault miraculously reappears at Isabella’s doorstep several years 
later, bringing the narrative to a crisis: fearing destitution and legal prosecution for 
bigamy, Isabella kills Henault, then subsequently convinces Villenoys that Henault died 
of heartbreak and persuades him to dispose of her first husband’s body. Unwilling to trust 
Villenoys with the secret of Henault’s death, she plans and executes the murder of her 
second husband. Supernatural and improbable events accelerate the novel’s ending, in 
which Isabella is caught and beheaded.  
 Apposite to a story in which seemingly minor lies and harmless transgressions 
escalate into horrific murders, The History of the Nun dwells on the problem of uncertain 
knowledge and indicates that there might not be any direct correlation between 
knowledge and judgment of crimes. Issues of knowledge and judgment in Behn’s fiction 
are filtered though a unique female narrator who comes across as at once curious and 
confused, intrusive and restrained, unreliable and reliable. She occasionally invites 
readers to share her judgments; yet, more often than not, she revels in moral ambiguity 
and refuses to clarify whether Isabella is punished for breaking sacred vows or for killing 
her husbands. Jacqueline Pearson, observing that Behn’s narrators are given to self-
contradictions and ambivalences, argues that such “complex, uncomfortable, flawed, or 
even duplicitous narrators…are Behn's most effective tool in her analysis of 
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patriarchy.”16 I will argue that these narrators serve as proto-feminist tools for analyzing 
not just patriarchy in the sense of masculine power but for mediating the theories and 
plural underpinnings of the late-seventeenth century philosophical and gendered 
problems of knowledge. The narrator of The History of the Nun tracks seventeenth-
century knowledge practices that frequently exclude women from serious practices of 
inquiry and deny them epistemic authority. In a telling passage that appears immediately 
after the first-person narrator has made strong claims about divine retribution, we get a 
glimpse of her theological and philosophical bent:   
I am almost certain, there is not one Example to be produc’d in the World, where  
Perjuries of this nature have past unpunish’d, nay that have not been persu’d with 
the greatest and most rigorous of Punishments [sic] I could my self, of my own 
knowledge, give an hundred Examples of the fatal Consequences of the Violation 
of Sacred Vows; and who ever make it their business, and are curious in the 
search of such Misfortunes, shall find, as I say, that they never go unregarded 
(212). 
 
Though marked by exaggeration and rhetorical flourish, the narration itself seems gender 
neutral. Yet what the narrator knows is influenced by her gender. Indeed, what stands out 
in the passage is a female narrator’s attempt to establish her own subjective knowledge as 
indubitable truth and thereby achieve epistemic authority. The narrator initially admits 
that her understanding of divine punishment for perjury is conjectural and theoretically 
fallible: she lacks omniscient knowledge of perjuries and at best can be “almost certain” 
that perjurers face providential justice (212). This conjecture, however, gains an aura of 
objectivity or the status of settled truth when the narrator cites her “own knowledge” as 
the basis for invoking “an hundred Examples” as evidence in favour of her hypothesis 
(212). Female knowledge, the narrator indicates, is verifiable by observation and 
experience. The hyperbolic phrase, at first glance, withholds an irony: the passage, after 
                                                
16 Pearson, “Gender and Narrative,” 42.  
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all, does not include a single concrete example of divine retribution. Still, as the narrative 
progresses, Isabella’s misfortunes emerge as supporting evidence for the narrator’s 
hypothesis. In other words, what initially seems like a rhetorical gesture is also an attempt 
to offer evidence or proofs beyond reasonable doubt that can help readers judge whether 
the narrator’s proposition is true or false. The absence of counter-examples (“there is not 
one Example”) and the narrator’s ability to furnish eventually verifiable evidence in 
support of her assertion signify a high degree of probability of God’s punishments for 
perjurers (212).  
 We encounter a whole range of expressions signifying different degrees of 
knowledge in the passage: “I say” and  “my own knowledge” signal opinions and 
conjectures, whereas phrases such as “almost certain” and “they never go unregarded” 
stand for probable truths and nearly certain knowledge. This set of expressions is in 
keeping with the emergence of the new probabilistic view of knowledge during the 
seventeenth century.17 According to Barbara Shapiro, English experimentalists of the 
mid-seventeenth century, such as Robert Boyle, abandoned Francis Bacon’s idea that 
inductive method (wherein general laws are inferred from particular instances) could 
yield certain knowledge and instead adopted a probabilistic view of knowledge. 
Knowledge in all fields, according to this view, fell along a continuum, stretching from 
                                                
17 See Ian Hacking’s canonical work on the topic The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), 10, 86. Douglas Lane Patey’s Probability and Literary Form: Philosophic Theory 
and Literary Practice in the Augustan Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) provides an 
interesting account of the nexus of probability, rhetoric, and literary form in the eighteenth century. Patey 
charts the impact of “probabilistic process of sign-inference” on “the Augustan theory of literature,” 89. 
Emphasis on literary probability, according to Patey, “was the property of the Augustan age as a whole,” 
89. Patey, I believe, elevates probabilistic view of knowledge over other modes of knowledge such as those 
rooted in empirical philosophy and theology, whereby it seems that epistemological questions could only 
have been answered with the assistance of probability theories in the long eighteenth century. 
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fiction and conjecture to the probable and the morally certain.18 After 1660, Ian Hacking 
points out, knowledge and opinion, once formally disparate, increasingly tended to 
become indistinguishable from each other.19 The new consensus was that all one could 
expect of knowledge was probability: rather than absolute certainty of demonstration, 
physical sciences privileged hypotheses that were tentative and infinitely revisable. 
Building on Shapiro’s work, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer suggest that the 
“probabilistic view of knowledge” freed philosophers and scientists from the dogmatism 
of universal assent and absolute truth; instead, “one could [now] attain to an appropriate 
certainty and aim to secure legitimate assent to knowledge claims.”20 By suggesting that 
she is “almost certain,” Behn’s female narrator promises readers the highest degree of 
probabilistic assurance to the text’s readers. 
  Yet the same narrator encourages readers to undertake independent investigations 
to arrive at the same conclusion as herself those “who ever make it their business, and are 
curious in the search of such Misfortunes, shall find, as I say, that they never go 
unregarded” (212). What is important to recognize here, insofar as it characterizes the 
narrator’s approach to questions of knowledge, is that she is not simply working with the 
epistemic scale of merely possible to highly probable, but genuinely interested in certain 
knowledge or ultimate truth. The narrator’s repetitive assertion that God punishes all 
transgressions is a dictum or a general truth embodying scriptural wisdom: “For God will 
                                                
18 See Barbara J. Shapiro’s Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), 4.  
 
19 Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, 180. 
 
20 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental 
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24.  
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bring every deed into judgment, including every secret thing, whether Good or evil.”21 I 
point to this element to show that the probabilistic view of knowledge, rather than 
operating alone, mediates and competes with other existing theories of knowledge in 
Behn’s text. One name for the set of knowledge practices or habits of mind that may 
stand behind the narrator’s advice to readers to observe, search, and gather evidence 
concerning the adversities of perjurers is empiricism. Based on a belief that knowledge is 
primarily derived from sensory perceptions and past experiences, empiricism was defined 
by seventeenth-century English philosophers and scientists such as John Locke and Isaac 
Newton. Empiricists reacted against the continental rationalism of René Descartes and 
Baruch Spinoza, rejecting its two main tenets: first, that reason provided certain answers 
or necessary truths; second, that knowledge was innate and intuitive. Influential critics of 
eighteenth-century literature and culture such as Ian Watt, J. Paul Hunter, and Michael 
McKeon have long noticed the impact of empiricism on the period’s fiction.22 But what 
remains largely unexplored is the extent to which empiricist theories interacted with 
probabilistic and providential views of knowledge. More often than not, critics tend to 
underplay the extent to which religious ideas of providence and God’s knowledge 
continued to sway the imaginations of both elite and popular writers. As Behn and her 
successors tackled epistemological questions regarding the conditions and limits of 
knowledge, they also had to ask to what extent God knew and controlled human affairs. 
After all, providential knowledge has huge implications for our understanding of 
                                                
21 Ecclesiastes 12:14 
 
22 See J. Paul Hunter, Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century English Fiction (New 
York: Norton, 1990). Also, see discussions of empiricism and eighteenth-century fiction in Michael 
McKeon’s The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740 and in Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel: Studies in 
Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).  
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causation: a commitment to providence implies a belief that things happen in a particular 
way because God knows that they will so happen.  
The concept of providence or belief in God’s power to control, sustain and judge 
human actions was polymorphous enough to appeal to seventeenth and eighteenth-
century writers of varied religious affiliations. In his pioneering study Religion and the 
Decline of Magic, on early modern attitudes toward nature, Keith Thomas shows that 
providence offered Anglican and Puritan theologians a means for discerning a divine plan 
amidst chaos and crisis.23 Recent works such as Alexandra Walsham’s Providence in 
Early Modern England revise this argument to show that providentialism was not limited 
to Anglican and Puritan theologians; instead, it was a widespread feature of the religious 
culture in seventeenth-century England. In Walsham’s perspective, “[providentialism] 
was a set of ideological spectacles through which individuals of all social levels and from 
all positions on the confessional spectrum were apt to view their universe, an invisible 
prism which helped them to focus the refractory meanings of both petty and perplexing 
events.”24 Puritan divine Thomas Beard and English merchant John Reynolds, for 
example, mobilized the idea of providence to prove that God always detects and punishes 
crimes either directly through miracles or indirectly through the criminal’s conscience; 
their aim was to at once provide proof of God’s presence and to contain unregulated 
                                                
23 Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth-Century England (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 104-112. 
 
24 See See Alexandra Walsham, Providence in Early Modern England (London, Oxford UP, 1999), 112. 
Henry Hitch Adams, English Domestic or Homiletic Tragedy 1575-1642 (New York: Columbia UP, 1943).  
Other studies that have revised the connection between providentialism and puritanism include Raymond 
Gillespie’s Devoted People: Belief and Religion in Early Modern Ireland (Manchester, 1997); David D. 
Hall, Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment: Popular Religious Belief in Early New England (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1990).  
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desire.25 Stories of “miraculous detection and severe punishment,” Reynolds hoped, 
would “keep us within the lists of Charity towards men, and the bonds of filial and 
Religious obedience towards God.”26 God’s miraculous intervention for solving crimes, 
according to Reynolds, increases our piety as well as humanity.  
Both the scope and limits of providential knowledge of crimes are placed under 
scrutiny in The History of the Nun. By emphasizing God’s control over her life, Isabella 
abnegates agency and justifies transgressive desires as well as passionate crimes. 
Immediately after killing her two husbands, Isabella asks, “Oh! What Fate, what Destiny, 
is mine? Under what cursed Planet was I born, that Heaven it self could not divert my 
Ruine?” (254). The implication of the rhetorical question is clear: omniscient and 
omnipotent God could have technically prevented Isabella from committing crimes and is 
therefore responsible for their deaths. While at this juncture we clearly hear the 
character’s voice, elsewhere the narrator actively intervenes and comments on Isabella’s 
imperfect understanding of providence:  
I have already said, she had try’d all that was possible in Human Strength to 
perform, in the design of quitting a Passion so injurious to her Honour and 
Virtue…She had try’d Fasting long, Praying fervently, rigid Penances and 
Pains…she could not conquer and submitted to her Fate, as a thing destin’d her by 
Heaven it self; and, after all this opposition, she fancy’d it was resisting even 
Divine Providence, to struggle any longer with her Heart; and this being her real 
Belief, she the more patiently gave way to all the Thoughts that pleas’d her (235). 
 
                                                
25 See Hal Gladfelder’s reading of John Reynolds’s The Triumph of God’s Revenge, against the Crying and 
Execrable Sinne of Murther in Criminality and Narrative in Eighteenth-Century England: Beyond the Law 
(Baltimore and London: John Hopkins UP, 2001). According to Gladfelder, Reynolds’s narratives aim at “a 
more general deterrence, a kind of moral policing” that force individuals to control their passions and avoid 
transgressions, 39. 
 
26 See the preface to John Reynolds’s The Triumphs of God’s Revenge Against the Crying and Execrable 
Sinne of Murther (London, 1679), iv. This compilation of clerical discourses and sensational stories was 
first published in 1621.  
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Here the intrusive narrator expresses a complex set of emotions and opinions on 
Isabella’s decision to violate her vow of devotion in the pursuit of passion. The 
authoritative “I” shows concern for Isabella’s predicament and urges the readers not to 
judge the protagonist harshly: she has tried prayers and penance, fasting and 
mortification, and has followed the tenets of her religious education without finding relief 
from love and longing. Failing to derive an adequate model of conduct or interpretation 
from the providential epistemology promoted in the Scriptures, Isabella decides to pursue 
her transgressive desires. It is an act that eventually transforms Isabella into a criminal. 
Unsurprisingly, then, even as the narrator rationalizes Isabella’s transgression, she 
artfully exposes a lacuna in the protagonist’s knowledge. Isabella, the narrator shows, 
confuses belief with knowledge of divine providence. The use of the word “fancy” in the 
passage—a term that the Oxford English Dictionary defines as “to believe without being 
able to prove”—reminds the readers that Isabella lacks knowledge of God’s design.27  
 Isabella’s seemingly opportunistic reasoning—transgressions are predestined; 
therefore, let me follow my desires—is not altogether absurd. She equates self-
knowledge with God’s knowledge. In a text wherein judgment is often presented as the 
prerogative of an omnipotent God, neither Isabella nor the narrator can resist striking a 
providential pose. Aiming for God-like knowledge of actions and events, the narrator at 
times assumes an all-knowing omniscient voice. Quietly, subtly, and in a detached 
manner, she draws attention to various social conditions and their effects on characters’ 
consciences. The narrator draws attention to the socio-cultural forces that shape Isabella’s 
decisions to break her vows: much before Isabella is mature enough to choose an 
                                                
27 Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 20 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Also available at 
http//www.oed.com/.  
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appropriate vocation for herself, her father and Aunt shut her inside a nunnery and 
provide her the rhetorical mode of prayers and devotion; this religious rhetoric constitutes 
her early beliefs. Given that Isabella has always lived inside a nunnery and lacks the 
experience of the real world, the narrator is not surprised that Isabella chooses to become 
a nun at the age of thirteen: “she thought there was no joy out of a nunnery, and no 
satisfactions on the other side of a Grate” (215). Not always restricting herself to 
Isabella’s thoughts, the narrator sensitively and sympathetically tells the readers about 
Henault’s religious inclinations and fears: “yet he had a dread upon him, when he thought 
of [loving Isabella], for he could not hope to accomplish that, without Sacrilege; and he 
was a young Man, very Devout, and even bigoted in Religion” (229). The insight shows 
that the narrator’s knowledge exceeds the bounds of first-hand empirical observations. 
 Whether the narrator actually possesses providential knowledge is debatable. 
Nevertheless, knowledge practices associated with providence affect the narrative style. 
Time and again, providential knowledge materializes as proverbs and dictums, and we 
witness literal interpretation of the Biblical idea that proverbs are divine instructions, or 
rules of holy living. Consider, for example, the opening assertion concerning God’s 
punishments for the violation of sacred vows, or the statement made immediately after 
Isabella has killed Henault: “when Fate begins to afflict, she goes through-stitch with her 
Black Work” (253). While I will discuss the vivid image of through-stitch later, I want to 
pause on the notion of causation present in the maxim about destiny: when fate wills it, 
one crime leads to other crimes. The narrator of Behn’s fiction acknowledges that a 
proverb, especially when aligned with providence, can provide quick relief and easy 
solutions to troubled characters like Isabella. When Isabella, for example, fails to 
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conceive children, the narrator commends her virtuous dealings with the poor: “She had 
no Discontent, but because she was not bless'd with a Child; but she submits to the 
pleasure of Heaven, and endeavour'd, by her good Works, and her Charity, to make the 
Poor her Children, and was ever doing Acts of Virtue, to make the Proverb good, That 
more are the Children of the Barren, than the Fruitful Woman” (247). Outward 
occurrence of “Acts of Virtue” coincides with inward performance of coming to terms 
with the lack of children, which affirms the truth of the aforementioned proverb. Even as 
the quotation highlights Isabella’s doing of good deeds, charity, virtuous acts, etc., it 
indicates that her good deeds are contingent on surrendering of her will and desires to 
“the pleasure of Heaven” or to the divine providence. 
 Providential knowledge that materializes as maxims or proverbs, however, risks 
becoming a matter of interpretation. Behn’s narrator often uses proverbs ironically and 
reminds the readers that a proverb is first a rhetorical device and only later an 
embodiment of wisdom. Typically metaphorical in form, proverbs in Behn’s fiction can 
be manipulated, misapplied, and misinterpreted. When Isabella imposes severe penance 
on herself to hide her feelings for Villenoys, the narrator, in an ironic tone, refers to 
Isabella’s life as a proverb: 
But however Diverting she was at the Grate, she was most exemplary Devout in 
the Cloyster, doing more Penance, and imposing a more rigid Severity and Task 
on her self, than was requir'd, giving such rare Examples to all the Nuns that were 
less Devout, that her Life was a Proverb, and a President [precedent], and when 
they would express a very Holy Woman indeed, they would say, She was a very 
ISABELLA (219-220). 
 
By transcribing Isabella’s life as a proverb, the narrator opens her “exemplary” actions to 
interpretation (219). Since proverbs, by definition, convey truths covertly and often 
conceal meaning, the readers are cautioned against a straightforward reading of the 
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passage.28 The narrator admits that Isabella can reconcile paradoxes and lead an active 
public life while cultivating an intense spiritual life of a devout. Yet adjectives such as 
“rare” and “exemplary” and the intensifier “very” indicate exaggeration and skepticism 
on the part of the narrator (219). Rather than referring to Isabella as a very holy woman, 
she refers to every holy woman as “a very Isabella.” Since there is no clear evidence to 
suspect Isabella’s devoutness at this point in the narrative, the narrator’s coinage of the 
proverb, “She was a very ISABELLA” insinuates that either Isabella is so sagacious that 
she can defy the narrator’s initial prophecy or she is so hypocritical that everyone 
(including the narrator and Isabella’s own conscience) is taken in by her conduct (220).29 
   Even as Behn’s narrator shows the limitations of proverbial wisdom, she 
responds to her generation’s demand for empirical observations. Summing up his 
epistemological practice, John Locke indicated that real knowledge required perception 
rather than wisdom contained in proverbs: “Where this perception is, there is Knowledge, 
and where it is not, there, we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of 
Knowledge.”30 Writing for an audience that increasingly craved observable causal 
                                                
28 Roger D. Abrahams and Barbara A. Babcock show that proverbs can “comment on the very code by 
which knowledge is attained and assessed- it says in words not to trust words, thus compounding the 
paradox” (416). Roger D. Abrahams and Barbara A. Babcock. “The Literary Use of Proverbs” in The 
Journal of American Folklore 90, no. 358 (Oct. - Dec., 1977): 414-429. Kenneth Burke argues that 
proverbs are “strategies” designed for “dealing with situations”—for “consolation or vengeance, for 
admonition or exhortation, for foretelling” (293).  Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). 
 
29 Behn’s ironic application of proverbs, at times, is, at times, reminiscent of Chaucer’s and Shakespeare’s 
use of proverbs in their versions of Troilus and Cressida. If she is false, Cressida says in Shakespeare’s 
Troilus and Cressida, then “as false as Cressid” can become a proverb. The proverb is parodied by 
Pandarus who claims that if their love does not last “all pitiful goers-between be called to the worlds’ end 
after my name: call them all Pandars” (III.ii, 195-7). Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, edited by David 
Bevington (New York: Arden, 1998).  
 
30 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), 4.1.2, p. 525. 
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relations and empirically driven eyewitness accounts, Behn puts forth a narrator who not 
only expounds providential theories but also shares her observations and experiences to 
help readers make sense of Isabella’s crimes. Temporarily abandoning her initial 
providential pose and claim to omniscient knowledge, the narrator introduces herself as 
someone who has firsthand knowledge of the lives of nuns: she was destined to join a 
convent, but could not abide by its suffocating rules. Her knowledge and power, she 
confesses, are limited: “since I cannot alter Custom, nor shall ever be allow’d to make 
new Laws, or rectify the old ones, I must leave the Young Nuns inclos’d to their best 
Endeavors, or making a Virtue of Necessity” (212-13).  It is the narrator’s current 
observations and past experiences that constitute empirical knowledge and give her the 
confidence to narrate Isabella’s story. 
  On its own, the rhetorical trope of an eyewitness or firsthand testimony is 
commonplace in Behn’s fiction. For example, we hear the narrator of The Fair Jilt (1688) 
claim that “to the great part of the Main, I my self was an Eye-witness; and what I did not 
see, I was confirm’d of by Actors in the Intrigue, holy men, of the order of St Francis.”31 
Similarly, the narrator of Behn’s famous novel Oroonoko, or The Royal Slave (1688) 
insists that she witnessed the protagonist’s heroic actions, and painstakingly gathered the 
details of his life, primarily through personal interviews, while she was in Surinam.32 But 
The History of the Nun puts the trope of the eyewitness to the test: an eyewitness-
narrator, it shows, only provides one individual perspective, and such testimonies serve 
specific purposes. The narrator concedes the impossibility of being an eyewitness to 
                                                
31 Aphra Behn, The Fair Jilt: or, The History of Prince Tarquin and Miranda (1688), The Fair Jilt and 
Other Stories, vol. 3 of The Works of Aphra Behn, ed. Janet Todd. (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1995), 9.  
 
32 Aphra Behn, Oroonoko, or The Royal Slave (1688). The Fair Jilt and Other Stories, vol. 3 of The Works 
of Aphra Behn. Ed. Janet Todd. (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1995), 57.  
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events happening in different places at the same time. When Henault, Isabella’s first 
husband, joins the War against the Turks, the narrator refuses to follow him to the 
battlefield and divulge the details of the battle. Her lack of knowledge of military jargon 
and circumstances further precludes her from narrating Henault’s story: “it is not my 
business to relate the History of the War, being wholly unacquainted with the Terms of 
Battels” (243). Although some details of Henault’s life are worthy of the narrator’s 
attention, her limited knowledge of military operations obliges her to share hearsay with 
readers. One such piece of hearsay is that Henault fell from his horse and presumably 
died during battle. The information motivates Isabella to marry another suitor of her 
youth, Villenoys, and thereby unintentionally commit adultery. 
 As someone with limited knowledge and restricted mobility, the female narrator 
takes recourse to believable conjectures: if a man with wounds falls from his horse and 
nobody sees him escape, it is highly probable that he died in battle. The highest degree of 
probability, according to John Locke, was so near certainty that it could “govern our 
thoughts absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most evident 
demonstration.”33 Torn between the demands of God-like providential knowledge and 
practically achievable empirical knowledge, the narrator finds respite in the adequate 
certainty offered by the probabilistic view of knowledge. This certainty, however, proves 
unfounded in the light of subsequent developments. 
      
Conjectures on Guilty Conscience 
                                                
33 John Locke, Essay, 4.15.1, p. 654 and 4.16.6, p. 662.  
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Although the probabilistic view of knowledge offered positive assurance, it was 
often viewed with skepticism in the seventeenth century. Thomas Hobbes for one was 
certain that probability bred epistemological uncertainty. Frequent experiences that 
inform probabilistic conjectures, Hobbes insists in Elements of Law (1640), do not prove 
anything conclusively: “Experience concludeth nothing universally. If the signs hit 
twenty times for once missing, a man may lay a wager of twenty to one of the event; but 
may not conclude it for a truth.”34 Probability, in other words, might shape one’s 
expectations of the future and prompt one to take risks, but it should never be confused 
with truth. In The History of the Nun, Aphra Behn identifies another problem with 
knowledge based on probabilities: it is hard to distinguish between probable truths and 
mere opinions. The novel raises the question whether it is possible to judge crimes 
correctly if one has access to probable truths only. The tonal shifts in Behn’s novel 
indicate that there is no clear answer to this question and that judgments of sacred and 
secular authorities might not depend on truth at all. 
The narrator increasingly replaces truths with conjectures and opinions after 
Isabella kills her first husband, Henault, who has unexpectedly—or, rather, 
miraculously—returned to town after being in exile for eight years. The passage that 
registers Isabella’s inner turmoil at the return of Henault culminates with the line on fate 
that I first quoted on page 16 of this chapter:   
Isabella all this while said but little, but, fill'd with Thoughts all Black and 
Hellish, she ponder'd within, while the Fond and Passionate Villenoys was 
endeavouring to hide her Shame, and to make this an absolute Secret: She 
imagin'd, that she could live after a Deed so black [sic], Villenoys would be 
eternal reproaching her, if not with his Tongue, at least with his Heart, and 
                                                
34  See Part I of Thomas Hobbes’s Human Nature in The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic: Human 
Nature and De Corpore Politico with Three Lives, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin. (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 33.  
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embolden'd by one Wickedness, she was the readier for another, and another of 
such a Nature; as has, in my Opinion, far less Excuse, than the first; but when 
Fate begins to afflict, she goes through-stitch with her Black Work (253). 
 
In an omniscient voice, the narrator begins with a seemingly objective account of 
Isabella’s thoughts that motivate her to commit another murder. Thrown into a state of 
intense fear and desperation, Isabella cannot think logically or rationally. Although the 
narrator indicates that Isabella has only “imagin’d” Villenoys’s disdain, and perhaps even 
misjudged the entire situation, she refrains from passing a moral judgment. The narrator, 
in fact, swaps moral certainty for moral relativity: she insists that her knowledge is 
subjective, or a matter of opinion, and suggests that Isabella’s second murder is less 
justifiable only in comparison to her first crime. A quick glance at Behn’s Oroonoko 
(1688) indicates that her narrators often step away from moral Manichaeism to expose 
political ideologies that underlie various crimes. When an English captain deceptively 
kidnaps Prince Oroonoko, the narrator satirically suggests that readers should form their 
own judgments of this deed: “Some have commended this act, as brave, in the Captain; 
but I will spare my Sense of it, and leave it to my Reader, to judge as he pleases.”35 The 
narrator’s sympathies lie with Oroonoko; still, instead of offering a straightforward 
condemnation of the Captain’s deed, she invites readers to notice the discrepancy 
between the Captain’s political rhetoric and his actions. In her astute analysis of lying in 
Oroonoko, Corrinne Harol observes that “partially detached from the situation and 
partially implicated,” Behn’s narrator exercises “a different moral standard from the one 
depicted.”36 This narrator is peculiar to a political landscape in which “only a certain kind 
                                                
35 Behn, Oroonoko, 83.  
 
36 Corrinne Harol, “The Passion of Oroonoko,” 467.  
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of inaction—the compromised and contingent witnessing…is consonant with a discursive 
practice devoted to justice.”37 When the narrator of The History of the Nun remarks that 
Isabella has “far less Excuse” for killing Villenoys, she undermines moral standards that 
were integral not only to the emergent political system, but also to a seventeenth-century 
religious culture which, historians suggest, boasted of “more sophisticated, spiritualised, 
protestant notions of providence or conscience.”38 At the end of the passage, the 
narrator’s opinion merges into a pithy proverbial statement about fate, a term used more 
or less synonymously with providence in Behn’s text: human will, it indicates, cannot 
stop the wheels of fate. The conflation of classical pagan belief in fate with the Christian 
concept of providence might seem odd to us; however, Behn’s narrator, as if merely 
rehearsing a religious dictum, does not seem to care about the distinctions, and 
deterministic “fate” acquires the connotation of providence working itself out in human 
affairs.  
 Apart from blurring lines between classical and Christian notions of destiny, The 
History of the Nun interrogates the Protestant hypothesis that providence works internally 
through the bad conscience of the murderer. Isabella, after killing Henault, imagines that 
the phantom of her husband pursues her. Apparitions of the dead and inability to sleep 
were signs of a guilt-stricken conscience in the seventeenth-century protestant 
literature.39 In addition to treatises on conscience by theologians like William Perkins and 
Jeremy Taylor that foreground Protestant casuistry or the art of resolving ethical conflicts 
                                                
37 Ibid., 468.  
 
38 See Peter Lake and Michael Questier, The Antichrist’s Lewd Hat: Protestants, Papists & Players in Post-
Reformation England  (New Haven: Yale UP, 2002), 179; Keith Thomas, “Cases of Conscience in 
Seventeenth Century England” in John Morrell, Paul Slack and Daniel Wolff, ed. Public Duty and Private 
Conscience in Seventeenth Century England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
 
39 The scene also brings to mind Shakespeare’s tragedies like Macbeth (1611) and Richard III (1633). 
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by adapting general rules of religion to specific circumstances, the seventeenth-century 
literary marketplace was flooded with protestantised providential murder pamphlets and 
crime ballads that emphasized conscience’s role in maintaining “the social and political 
order.”40 In ballads such as “The Murtherer’s Moan” (1691) and “The Dorsetshire 
Tragedy” (ca.1680) pangs of conscience and semi-supernatural entities such as bleeding 
ghosts, which torment murderous wives and husbands, anticipate the English judicial 
process.41 Confessional female subjects, in particular, cite guilty conscience as the 
motivating force behind their acceptance of divine punishments, and repetitively dissuade 
other women from following their examples.42 For example, in “The Lamentation of 
Master Page’s wife of Pimmouth”(1591), a ballad that was reprinted throughout the 
seventeenth century, the confessional female subject draws attention to her tormented 
conscience and accepts her punishment: “Me thinkes that heaven cries vengeance for my 
fact;/ Me thinkes the world condemnes my monstrous act;/ Me thinks, within, my 
conscience tells me true, /That for that deed Hell fire is my due.” As providence 
increasingly works “internally through the bad conscience of the murderer,” we see a 
range of self-condemnatory criminals who “blurt out incriminating remarks,” cry in their 
sleep, or unexpectedly confess their crimes in murder pamphlets such as Henry 
                                                
40 Keith Thomas, 29. See William Perkins’s Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience (1608) and Jeremy 
Taylor’s Ductor Dubitantium; or The Rule of Conscience (1660). For the argument that conscience became 
the basis of political subjectivity because of Elizabethan Protestant dogma, see Richard L. Greaves, 
“Concepts of Political Obedience in Late Tudor England,” Journal of British Studies 22 (1982): 23-34.  
 
41 “The Dorsetshire Tragedy” (ca. 1680), Pepys 5.303, English Broadside Ballad Archive, hereafter EBBA, 
(http://ebba.english.ucsb.edu). “The Murtherer’s Moan” (1691), Pepys 5.13, EBBA. For an extended 
discussion of these ballads, see Ballads and Broadsides in Britain, 1500-1800, ed. Patricia Fumerton, Anita 
Guerrini, and Kris McAbee (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 79, 179.  
 
42 See Roxburghe Ballads, 1.555-8 (London: Reeves and Turner, 1874), 193. 
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Goodcole’s London’s Cry Ascended to God…For Revenge against Bloodshedders 
(1620).43 
The trend in providential murder narratives, especially those anthologized in 
Thomas Beard’s The Theatre of God’s Judgments (1537) and John Reynolds’s The 
Triumph of God’s Revenge against the Crying and Execrable Sinne of Murther (1621), is 
to present detection and judgment of crimes as God’s prerogative and identify human 
conscience as an inward judge that punishes crimes even when God is seemingly absent. 
For example, Reynolds narrates the story of two daughters, Fidelia and Caelistina, who 
suffer several misfortunes after plotting their father’s death. Tormented by her 
conscience, Fidelia eventually hangs herself, and thereby prove Reynolds’s claim that 
providence will not let murderers to go unpunished: “she never sees a Knife in the hands 
of another, but she wisheth it in her own heart: her conscience doth so terribly accuse her, 
and her thoughts give in such bloody evidence against her conscience and her self, for 
occasioning her Father’s murther, that she resolves she must die, and therefore disdains to 
live.” 44 Although Behn’s fiction does not openly refer to conscience’s power to enforce 
divine will or to preserve social order, the phantom that pursues Isabella signifies a guilt-
ridden conscience and captures her real and imaginary fears. 
Even though The History of the Nun draws attention to Isabella’s tormented 
conscience, it indicates that conscience might not be able to carry out any miraculous 
detection. Although horrid spectacles of Henault’s dead body haunt Isabella, her 
                                                
43 See Peter Lake’s “Deeds Against Nature: Cheap Print, Protestantism and Murder in Early Seventeenth-
Century England,” in Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake, eds., Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993), 272; and Alexandra Walsham’s analysis of providential murder pamphlets 
in Providence in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), 65-116. 
 
44 See the 1679 edition of John Reynolds’s The Triumphs of God’s Revenge Against the Crying and 
Execrable Sinne of Murther, 11, 194. Thomas Beard. The Theatre of God’s Judgments (1597).   
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conscience fails to make her confess her crimes in front of Villenoys or the Officers of 
Justice. Conscience, moreover, fails to never accurately identify the criminal’s primary 
motivation for committing the crime: “She finds, by his Return, she is not only expos'd to 
all the Shame imaginable; to all the Upbraiding, on his part, when he shall know she is 
marry'd  to another; but all the Fury and Rage of Villenoys, and the Scorn of the Town, 
who will look on her as an Adulteress: She sees Henault poor, and knew, she must fall 
from all the Glory.”45 Rather than pinpointing the reason for murder, the guilty 
conscience gives rise to a list of conjectures regarding why Isabella might have killed 
Henault: Isabella fears Henault’s reproaches even as she worries about communal 
punishment involving shame and alienation. She also fears a life of drudgery and poverty 
with Henault. While each of these motives, at some level, can theoretically instigate 
murder, it is left to the readers to take one of them as the actual motive for murder. When 
neither prayers nor reason comfort Isabella’s conscience, she decides to kill Henault. 
Unexpectedly, conscience that fails to resolve Isabella’s dilemmas regarding suicide or 
murder, offers her several means to discreetly commit murder. Instead of cutting 
Henault’s throat, she decides to smother him with a pillow so that she does not have to 
conceal blood.  
The shift from Isabella’s conscience to the narrator’s conjectures hints at the 
opportunistic use of providential view of knowledge in Behn’s fiction. Indeed, The 
History of the Nun, by and large, does not support any religious truth.  Abrupt shifts in 
tone and tenses in Behn’s fiction are symptomatic of epistemological plurality and moral 
relativity. In addition to offering a relativist understanding of conscience, Behn indicates 
                                                
45 Behn 249.  
 50 
that there is a thin line between providential persecution, psychological terrors, and 
superstition. An illustration of such a point is given below: 
But when she had done this dreadful Deed, and saw the dead Corps of her once-
loved Lord, lye Smiling (as it were) upon her, she fell into a Swound with the 
Horror of the Deed, and it had been well for her she had there dy’d; but she 
reviv’d again, and awaken’d to more and new Horrors, she flyes all frighted from 
the Chamber, and fancies, the Phantom of her dead Lord pursues her; she runs 
from Room to Room, and starts and stares, as if she saw him continually before 
her (251-52).  
 
The “dreadful Deed” is over; Henault is dead: it is an event that has already taken place 
and it therefore demands past tense narration. Yet the narration oscillates between past 
and present tense (“she runs from Room to Room”). The passage conveys an intentional 
fallacy, for it imputes motive to a being without agency—a dead man, after all, can never 
smile. Enclosed in parenthesis, the phrase “as it were” indicates that Isabella only fancies 
a smile on her dead husband’s face. As if the shifts in tense and mood were not 
disconcerting enough, we also see tonal contrasts within the passage. The generally 
sympathetic tone stands in contrast to a stark moral verdict: given the nature of Isabella’s 
crime, it would have been better if she had died after killing Henault. To live with the 
guilt of committing murder is to wage an endless battle with one’s conscience. Escalating 
by the minute, the “new Horrors” inflicted by Isabella’s conscience are represented as 
worse than death (251). 
Still, instead of citing readily available providential dictums about conscience, the 
narrator turns to first-hand observations to make evident Isabella’s fractured interiority. 
In the final few sentences of the passage cited above, Behn uses active verb forms and the 
present tense to describe Isabella’s harrowing experiences—flies, fancies, runs, starts, 
and stares—and strategically positions the narrator as an eyewitness who records the 
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events as they happen. The style of live commentary shows the narrator’s proximity to 
and minute observations of the criminal. It also gives a certain degree of credibility to 
what otherwise might seem like a superstitious belief in providential judgment. The 
lingering, albeit illusory, smile on dead man’s face foreshadows the sudden opening of 
Villenoys’s eyes after Isabella kills him. On the one hand, such phantasmagoric images 
indicate that sooner or later, directly or indirectly, whether through spectres or via 
conscience, God punishes crimes. On the other hand, the use of word “phantom” implies 
an appearance or illusion without material substance. Whether Isabella sees an apparition, 
a dream, or an optical illusion remains unclear. 
Since Isabella’s conscience does not furnish material evidence to prove her 
crimes, the narrator turns her attention to the evidence of perception. The term 
“evidence,” as Douglas Patey points out, “never lost its etymological connection with 
seeing…Newer senses of the term mingled with old [as] evidence in our sense entered the 
lexicon of jurisprudence.”46 In the seventeenth-century philosophy, legal documents, and 
scientific treatises, there was an understanding that judgment required empirical 
evidence, or sense experiences involving observations and experimentation. 
Unsurprisingly, then, once Isabella decides to kill Henault, empirical evidence becomes 
the focus of the narrator’s attention. This evidence appears in the form of minute and 
precise details carefully recorded by the observant narrator. In a detached tone, the 
narrator informs us that Isabella had sewn the sack containing Henault’s body to the 
collar of Villenoys’s coat in order to kill him: “she cry'd, Stay, my Dear, some of 
[Henault’s] Clothes hang out, which I will put in; and, with that, taking the Pack-needle 
with the Thread, sew'd the Sack, with several strong Stitches, to the Coller of Villenoy's 
                                                
46 Patey, 31.  
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Coat, without his perceiving it” (254). Sense perception is the source of the narrator’s 
knowledge here: she is able to see, retain, recall and describe fleeting and slight details 
such as the pack-needle with the thread and the strong enduring stitches to implicate 
Isabella in Villenoy’s killing.47 At one level, the scene re-conjures the image of fate’s 
thorough-stitch—Isabella has carried out fate’s “Black Work” (257). But what truly 
establishes the guilt of Isabella is the additional empirical evidence that manifests in the 
form of minute details stitched on Villenoy’s coat. The narrator privileges an 
observation-based scientific method that became popular with the emergence of new 
instruments of natural philosophy such as the compound microscope, telescope, air-
pump, and barometer in the seventeenth century. For natural philosophers and scientific 
inquirers such as Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke, according to Shapin and Schaffer, the 
power of new scientific instruments lay in their ability to impose “both a correction and a 
discipline upon the senses” and thereby expand the scope of empiricist knowledge: 
“Things would be seen that were previously invisible: the rings of Saturn, the mosaic 
structure of the fly’s eye, spots on the sun. And other things, essentially invisible, would 
be given visual manifestations: the pressure of the air, aqueous and terrestrial effluvia.”48 
To cite an example, in his masterpiece, Micrographia (1665), published by the Royal 
Society, Hooke places everyday items like the edge of a razor and the points of a needle 
under a microscope to reveal the workings of otherwise undetectable natural phenomena. 
Unlike Hooke, Behn’s narrator might not be interested in explaining the mysteries of the 
universe; however, she metaphorically places Villenoy’s shirt and the sack under the 
microscope and reveals the stitches that implicate Isabella in her husband’s death. 
                                                
 
48 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 36-37.  
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The empirical evidence in the form of stitches affects readers’ understanding of 
the tale, especially when competing accounts of Villenoys’s death become available 
(257). Although the townsmen find a sack sewn to Villenoys’s dead body, they wrongly 
conclude that the two men “were both first murder’d and then drawn to the River, and 
thrown in” (255). The conspicuous stitches on Villenoys’s collar expose the 
improbability of the conjecture: it is unlikely that someone would first murder two adult 
men, sew their bodies together, carry them to a bridge, and then throw them into a river. 
Despite its usefulness in gathering concrete evidence, the narrator vacillates 
between endorsing and doubting empirical knowledge rooted in sense perceptions and 
past experiences. Unlike other characters in the novel who fail to impute lying, deception, 
and murders to Isabella because in the past “she never could be charg’d with an Untruth, 
or an Equivocation,” the narrator critically examines Isabella’s actions (228). Her 
skepticism concerning perception-based knowledge and its power to detect problems or 
predict future actions is nowhere more evident than in her doubts about the efficacy of 
empirically driven physiognomical investigations. From the late sixteenth century 
onwards, physiognomy, or the study of a person’s character from his or her outer 
appearance, acquired an increasingly empiricist bent. Even though physiognomy’s status 
as a science became questionable during the eighteenth century, physiognomists had 
largely abandoned astrological interpretations of the body in favour of observation-based 
empirical method. 49 In Behn’s The History of the Nun, all theories of knowledge that 
privilege information derived from senses have serious limitations. When Henault’s sister 
                                                
49 See Douglas Lane Patey, Probability and Literary Form, 42. Melissa Percival, The Appearance of 
Character: Physiognomy and Facial Expression in Eighteenth Century France (London: W.S. Maney & 
Son Ltd, 1999), 16; Graeme Tytler, Physiognomy in the European Novel: Faces and Fortunes (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1982).  
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Katteriena attempts to infer Isabella’s secret passion for her brother from her looks, the 
narrator exposes the shortcomings of physiognomical investigations that privilege sight: 
“[Katteriena] fix’d her Eyes on Isabella, to see what alteration [news of Henault’s love] 
would make in her Heart and Looks; but the Master-piece of this young Maid’s Art was 
shewn in this minute, for she commanded her self so well, that her very Looks 
dissembled…but it was, what she was prepar’d for, or else I question her Fortitude” 
(229). Behn’s narrator clearly mistrusts inferences drawn from external signs such as 
facial expressions and body language. According to the narrator, no matter how keenly 
Katteriena observes her friend, she cannot foil Isabella’s plot of dissimulation. It turns out 
that the narrator is right: incorrectly inferring Isabella’s feelings from her calm exterior, 
Katteriena sees no future harm in discovering Henault’s passion for her. Since characters 
interested in physiognomy tend to trace effects from causes and inclinations from 
outward actions, their diagnoses and prognoses turn out to be unreliable. Empathy, in 
contrast, helps the narrator understand Isabella’s dissimulations: since nuns cannot 
openly express their feelings, they are forced to dissemble. Softening her critical tone, the 
narrator nonetheless admits that empirical approaches often foster intuitive knowledge of 
someone’s character: had Isabella not practiced and mastered the art of dissimulation, she 
would not have been able to fake signs of fortitude and repose; consequently, Katteriena 
would have discovered her tumultuous and transgressive passion for Henault.  
Given the limitations of empirical and physiognomical investigations, the narrator 
turns her attention to various probabilistic conjectures concerning Isabella’s crimes. She 
reports these conjectures in a fairly objective tone, leaving them open to interpretation. 
After hearing the news of Villenoys’s unnatural death, his valet draws attention to the 
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improbability of his master leaving the house without his knowledge: “If his Lord were 
gone out, he should have been call’d to Dress him” (255). More serious accusations and 
concerns crop up when the townsmen hear about Villenoys’s death and the sudden 
opening of his eyes: “Different Opinions and Discourses were made, concerning the 
opening of the Eyes of the Dead Man, and viewing Isabella; but she was a Woman of so 
admirable a Life and Conversation, of so undoubted a Piety and Sanctity of Living, that 
not the least Conjecture could be made, of her having a hand it, besides the improbability 
of it, yet the whole thing was a Mystery, which, they thought, they ought to look into” 
(256). The reference to the plural nouns “opinions and discourses” indicates that mystery 
and uncertainty are breeding grounds for probabilistic conjecture: each of these opinions 
offers a likely truth, but none pinpoints the actual cause of Villenoys’s death (256). In the 
passage, the narrator carefully reviews the strengths and limitations of the townsmen’s 
speculations: they rightly infer that there is something mysterious about Villenoys’s 
death, but their previous assessments of Isabella’s character prevent them from 
identifying her as the criminal. Past experiences and observations in this case negatively 
influence the outcome of probability calculations: the most obvious conjecture—Isabella 
killed Villenoys—is not even “the least conjecture” (256). A highly probable explanation 
is dismissed as improbable; consequently, Isabella’s crimes remain enveloped in mystery 
at this juncture in the novel.  
When it comes to identifying causes, probabilistic conjectures rely heavily on 
human reason, which in The History of the Nun can never establish absolute truths. At 
regular intervals, the narrator herself proposes several hypotheses to explain why Isabella 
killed her husbands: bad examples, “Customs of Countries,” lack of maturity, and 
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religious repression are invoked by the narrator at various times in her quest to explain 
Isabella’s actions and motivations (212). As conjectures and reasons multiply, instead of 
feeling more confident, the narrator feels less certain about her account of bigamy and 
brutal murder.  
 
Open Eyes: Providential Detection and Plot Resolution 
The epistemological uncertainties that prevail even after the narrator has proposed 
several rational and probabilistic conjectures explain the renewal of interest in 
providential knowledge and God’s judgment that so strongly characterizes the second 
half of the novel. The reader learns that Isabella and her first husband, Henault, are 
malignantly pursued by providence for their violations of sacred vows: “he found nothing 
of his Industry thrive, his Cattel [sic] still dy’d in the midst of those that were in full 
Vigour and Health of other Peoples; his Crops of Wheat and Barly, and other Grain, tho’ 
manag’d by able and knowing Husbandmen, were all, either Mildew’d, or Blasted, or 
some Misfortune still arriv’d to him; his Coach-Horses would fight and kill one another, 
his Barns sometimes be fir’d” (239-40). Henault and Isabella lose all the material 
possessions that in the seventeenth century would have been perceived as signs of 
prosperity: they have no cattle, crops, coach-horses, or barns. In short, the passage builds 
the expectation that the couple neither has nor can ever find happiness or success. The 
theological overtones of Behn’s novel become clearer when the eyes of Villenoys’s 
corpse miraculously open up to stare at his murderer: “the Body, whose Eyes were before 
shut, now open’d themselves wide, and fix’d them on Isabella” (256). There is no joke 
about the dead man watching his murderer, no parody of providential accounts here. 
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There is, however, a sense of irony as open eyes—being an eyewitness—no longer 
signify empirical knowledge, or for that matter, even human knowledge. Instead, open 
eyes now signify God’s knowledge of human crimes. Such inexplicable opening of eyes 
was common in the early modern crime ballads and murder pamphlets that emphasized 
providence’s role in the detection of various crimes. In a pamphlet titled “Sundrye 
strange and inhumaine murthers, lately committed,” the corpse of a young man opens its 
eyes to look at the murderer. The anonymous writer claims that “if there were nobody to 
accuse the murtherer, the murthered corpse wold give evidence against him.”50 
Paradoxically, miraculous providential interventions potentially protect the guiltless from 
unjust sentences. Before writing The History of the Nun, Behn experimented in 
supernatural interventions to prevent injustice in The Fair Jilt. In this text, the failure of 
the headsman to sever Prince Tarquin’s head is regarded as a “strange Miracle” that 
proves the Prince’s innocence.51 God, in other words, punishes criminals and protects the 
innocent. As John Reynolds put it, nothing can be concealed from “the eyes of his Sacred 
Power and divine Providence”: “for our hearts and actions, and our most retired thoughts, 
and secret daring sins, are conspicuous and transparent to God’s eyes, as his decrees and 
resolutions are visible to ours, sith he sees all things, and see nothing when we do not see 
him.” 52 God, Reynolds shows, both sees and makes his decrees visible to man; however, 
without faith man cannot see and understand God’s design or justice. Reynolds was not 
alone in praising God’s testimony. Bridging the gaps between knowledge and belief, faith 
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and reason, John Locke asserted, “whatever God hath revealed is certainly true; no doubt 
can be made of it.”53 
Faith in divine providence, which Reynolds saw as critical to understanding 
God’s decrees and justice, however, seems to be absent from the “different opinions and 
discourses” that circulate after dead Villenoys opens his eyes to stare at Isabella (256). 
Neither the narrator nor the townsmen abandon their probabilistic conjectures, and there 
are indications that their judgments might be as arbitrary as those of God. The clash 
between different epistemological modes creates moral ambiguities in the abrupt ending 
of The History of the Nun. The resolution of the plot comes to rest on improbabilities and 
contingencies, which in seventeenth-century crime ballads and murder pamphlets were 
typically attributed to divine providence. These episodes encapsulate a providential 
epistemology that culminates in the arrest and execution of the protagonist. The formal 
mechanism of third-person narration, however, prevents the readers from seeing 
Isabella’s execution as an instance of absolute or providential justice. In the concluding 
paragraphs of The History of the Nun, Behn’s narrator disassociates the material act of 
justice from patriarchal morality and providence. One effect of the neutral and 
impersonal style of narration, I would argue, is to undermine late seventeenth-century 
epistemological and ethical practices that incite harsh moral judgments when women act 
on their own knowledge and pursue their desires. 
The ending of The History of the Nun severs judgment and justice from 
knowledge. At first glance, the ending appears to be hasty and abrupt, for it comprises not 
one but several improbable and extraordinary occurrences. The opening of Villenoys’s 
                                                
53 Locke, Essay 4.18.10. For a comprehensive review of different meanings of the term “belief” in John 
Locke’s works, see Nicholas Wolterstorff’s John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 124.  
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eyes is rapidly followed by another exceptional and remarkable event: a French 
gentleman who was Henault’s fellow slave and acquaintance in Turkey suddenly arrives 
in the town and undertakes an enquiry that concludes in the identification of the dead 
body in the sack. While critics who find theories of probability more convincing than 
providential explanations can attribute the French friend’s arrival to chance, the novel as 
such blurs the boundary between probable and providential occurrences and outcomes.54 
The consequence remains the same: the Magistrate of Justice summons Isabella and 
condemns her to death. Interestingly, the most concrete evidence of Isabella’s crimes 
comes from her own confession: “she confess’d the whole Matter of Fact, and, without 
any Disorder, deliver’d her self in the Hands of Justice, as the Murderess of two 
Husbands (both belov’d) in one Night” (257). Without Isabella’s confession, the so-
called “Matter of Fact”—an erstwhile nun had killed her two husbands—would have 
remained an ordinary conjecture in the eyes of the magistrate (257). Even as the 
confession proves Isabella’s guilt, the narratorial aside “both belov’d” somewhat 
exculpates the female protagonist (257). 
 By providing concrete evidence, Isabella’s confession overcomes the limitations 
of providential and probabilistic modes of knowledge; yet, it is not the most empowering 
model of female knowledge present in The History of the Nun. Through the rhetorical 
posture of a neutral and objective observer, the narrator of Behn’s fiction eventually 
emerges as a significant voice of female knowledge.  Instead of a first-person narrator 
who is never certain of her knowledge, we hear a third-person voice objectively reporting 
                                                
54 Jesse Molesworth, for instance, questions critical accounts of eighteenth-century novels wherein chance 
is “more notable for its absence than its presence.” He, however, underplays the significance of 
providentialism that featured regularly in the literature of the period. Chance and the Eighteenth-Century 
Novel. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),152.   
 60 
the sentence carried out in the name of common law and criminal justice: “she was Try’d, 
and Condemn’d to lose her Head; which Sentence, she joyfully receiv’d, and said, 
Heaven, and her Judges, were too Merciful to her, and that her Sins had deserv’d much 
more” (257). The juxtaposition of heaven and judges, the conflation of crimes with sins, 
and the acceptance of legal punishment as a form of providential punishment, draw 
attention to overlaps between different forms of judgment in Behn’s fiction.  
What is important to note is the narrator’s refusal to comment on Isabella’s 
crimes: she never endorses judgments derived from either providential or empirical 
theories of knowledge. The narrator, who at the beginning of the text discussed divine 
vengeance, zooms out of the trial and leaves the moral lesson fuzzy. There is no guiding 
voice that tells the readers whether Isabella’s crimes have been adequately punished in 
this world.55 Withholding moral judgment, the narrator ends Isabella’s trial with a neutral 
summary of spectators’ responses: “The whole World stood amaz’d at this, who knew her 
Life a Holy and Charitable Life, and how dearly and well she had liv’d with her 
Husbands, and every one bewail’d her Misfortune (257). The townsmen judge Isabella on 
the basis of religious and patriarchal demands of conduct: she led a holy life as well as a 
happily married life. On the basis of their knowledge, they conclude that Isabella is 
blameless: she is a victim of misfortune.  
                                                
55 Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko provides the readers a clearer stand on providential justice. In an important 
scene in Oroonoko, Prince Oroonoko undermines the notion of providential justice that defers punishment 
to the next world. The English captain who deceptively kidnaps the Prince claims that God punishes 
violations of vows by inflicting “eternal Torment[s] in the World to come” (84). Oroonoko, however, 
strongly objects to the mystery surrounding God’s judgments: “punishments hereafter are suffer’d by ones 
self; and the World takes no Cognizance whether this God has reveng’d ’em or not; ‘tis done so secretly 
and deferr’d so long” (84-5). Oroonoko’s objection is clear: it is difficult to care about forms of justice that 
no one can witness in the world. He thus prefers worldly punishments involving the contempt and disdain 
of fellow men. 
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The admiration of townsmen, as Corrinne Harol notes, comes at a great price: 
“Isabella becomes a sociopath” when she tries to become a virtuous nun and wife and 
aligns “her will and her actions to be in accord with the desire of the figures to which she 
vows devotion.”56 Harol rightly observes that Behn’s story is morally ambiguous, but she 
de-emphasizes the extent to which The History of the Nun presents Isabella as both 
admirable and liable for her actions.57 In the final paragraphs of Behn’s fiction, Isabella 
derives comfort from taking responsibility for her actions: “While she was in Prison, she 
was always at Prayers, and very Chearful and Easie, distributing all she had amongst, and 
for the Use of, the Poor of the Town, especially to the Poor Widows; exhorting daily, the 
Young, and the Fair, that came perpetually to visit her, never to break a Vow, for that was 
first the Ruine of her, and she never since prosper’d, do whatever other good Deeds she 
could” (257). By emphasizing Isabella’s fault (she broke her sacred vows), Behn’s fiction 
pre-empts the kind of sceptical, anti-sentimental, and proto-feminist ethics that Sandra 
Macpherson sees as a hallmark of eighteenth-century “realist” novels by Daniel Defoe, 
Samuel Richardson, and Henry Fielding.58 In her provocative book Harm’s Way, 
Macpherson suggests that the popularity of the legal concept of “strict liability” had 
implications for characterization: “the person is individuated solely by responsibility, and 
responsibility conceived against the criteria by which we tend to define individuals—
against interiority, against intentionality, even, paradoxically, against agency itself.” 59 
Unlike Macpherson’s “person,” Isabella is not simply causal but also agentive. The 
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injuries that Isabella inflicts on her husbands are not unintended; she gains heroic stature 
by taking responsibility for her horrific crimes. 
Whereas Macpherson establishes the formal category of characterization as the 
site where justice is contested, I have identified the ways in which the narrator and the 
style of narration complicate notions of knowledge and judgment in Behn’s fiction. In the 
resounding last lines of The History of the Nun, it is the narrator’s past-tense objective 
narration and melancholic tone that restores Isabella’s honor and thereby guarantees 
justice: “After she had done with the help of Maria, she put off her Mourning Vail [sic.], 
and without anything over her Face, she kneel’d down, and the Executioner, at one Blow, 
sever’d her Beautiful Head from her Delicate Body, being then in her Seven and 
Twentieth year. She was generally Lamented, and Honourably Bury’d” (258). By 
magnifying the detail of a beautiful head being severed from an exquisite body, the 
narrator aestheticizes the otherwise horrific spectacle of punishment and rescues Isabella 
from oblivion. The formal traits of The History of the Nun, no matter how odd for 
present-day readers, turn out to be both stylistically and ethically as at least purposeful. 
Even as these formal characteristics challenge epistemologies and ethics rooted in reason 
and providence, they introduce the style of the female writer as a form of knowledge. 







Undetected Crimes: Supernatural Phenomena and Roxana’s Inconclusive Ending 
 
“Crime” is the final word of Daniel Defoe’s last novel Roxana, The Fortunate 
Mistress (1724).1 In the final passage, the first-person narrator no longer considers herself 
fortunate and claims that she and her faithful maid Amy have been punished adequately 
for their past crimes: 
Here, after some few Years of flourishing, and outwardly happy Circumstances, I  
fell into a dreadful Course of Calamities, and Amy also; the very Reverse of our  
former Good Days; the Blast of Heaven seem’d to follow the Injury done the poor  
Girl, by us both; and I was brought so low again, that my Repentance seem’d to  
be only the Consequence of my Misery, as my Misery was of my Crime (329- 
330).  
 
Roxana, who breaks divine laws throughout Defoe’s fiction and barely seems to register 
the effects of these transgressions, now presents herself a victim of providential justice 
that is unleashed in the form of “the Blast of Heaven” (330). She steers attention away 
from her “outwardly happy Circumstances” to her calamities, and indicates that the 
readers might have been misreading her life story so far. Despite her liaisons with rich 
and powerful men, Roxana admits that she has been miserable and repents the “injury 
done” to her daughter Susan (330). Readers finally learn that Roxana and Amy are 
responsible for harming Susan; however, the exact nature and the seriousness of their 
crime remain unknown.  
 The ending fails to satiate the reader’s appetite for the details of the crime 
committed by Roxana. What’s more, the conclusion of Roxana does not seem to support 
                                                
1 Daniel Defoe, Roxana, The Fortunate Mistress, ed. John Mullan (New York: Oxford UP, 1996). All 
references are to this edition.  
 
 64 
its own warnings regarding conscience’s ability to “gnaw a Hole in the [offender’s] 
heart” (264). Roxana’s repentance is the result of the “misery” that follows the crime 
rather than a crisis of conscience, and her punishment seems arbitrary. Unsurprisingly, 
then, commentators variously regard this conclusion as abrupt, unsatisfactory, 
“inconclusive” and “truncated.”2 Treating Roxana as an unfinished fiction, eighteenth-
century hacks and publishers rewrote the ending several times: they either erased the final 
passage and gave the work a happy ending, or tried to preserve poetic justice by sending 
Roxana to jail or by afflicting her with an incurable sickness.3 David Marshall’s general 
frustration with the ending is typical of twentieth-century responses to Defoe’s fiction: 
Roxana, he claims, has “one of the most abrupt endings to a completed work in the 
history of the English prose fiction.4  
 Why does Defoe’s Roxana end in a way that frustrated its eighteenth-century 
readers and continues to generate controversy and confusion? William Beatty Warner 
offers one persuasive answer to this question when he suggests that “the failure of closure 
comes not as an ambitious choice but as a kind of short-circuit;” it is a symptom of 
Defoe’s failure to rewrite and moralize the novels of amorous intrigue as exemplified by 
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Aphra Behn, Delarivier Manley, and Eliza Haywood.5 Although Warner avoids the pitfall 
of seeing the ending of Roxana as “a failure of authorial design or novelistic ‘structure,’” 
he paradoxically preserves the idea that there is something unusual, if not wrong, about 
Roxana’s ending.6 The seemingly abrupt or hasty ending of Roxana, I suggest, is a 
typical narrative symptom of fictions that explore philosophical and theological problems 
concerning knowledge while delineating investigation and judgment of crimes. The 
endings of fictions about detection of crimes by Aphra Behn, Samuel Richardson, and 
William Godwin that I examine in this project are unsatisfactory or inconclusive in one 
way or the other. Roxana’s ending, however, stands out in this group because it conceals 
more information than it reveals: it not only refuses to tell the readers how the crime was 
committed but also fails to state unambiguously whether Roxana or Amy murdered Susan. 
Put another way, rather than resolving the mystery of Susan’s disappearance, the 
perplexing ending raises more questions than solutions about the fate of Roxana’s 
daughter.  
 Susan’s unanticipated appearance and equally sudden disappearance are critical 
for understanding why Defoe’s Roxana, despite its refusal to resolve mysteries, is an 
important narrative about the detection and punishment of crimes. Variously referred to 
as a memoir or history, Roxana, in fact, begins as a picaresque tale: left penniless with 
five children, Roxana learns to survive and thrive by using her wit and sexuality to her 
advantage.7 The female protagonist’s financial prudence and judgment of self-interest, 
                                                
5 William Beatty Warner, Licensing Entertainment: The Elevation of Novel Reading in Britain, 1684-1750. 




7 In this respect, Roxana is similar to Defoe’s other picaresque fictions Moll Flanders (1722) and Colonel 
Jack (1722), which track the economic mobility of their protagonists.  
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rather than a belief in God’s providence, transform her into a “fortunate mistress.” The 
unexpected appearance of Susan, Roxana’s daughter from her first marriage, who 
undertakes a systematic inquiry to identify and reunite with her mother, triggers a generic 
shift in the novel: Roxana is no longer simply a memoir or picaresque; instead, it is a 
narrative about investigation.  
Once Susan enters the narrative, critics observe, Roxana begins to acquire the 
suspense of a detective story.8 Susan is a detective-like figure who wants to solve the 
mystery of her birth. Although Susan successfully identifies her mother, she fails to 
convince others regarding her findings and disappears from the narrative. The 
disappearance of the detective-like figure that can potentially expose Roxana’s earlier 
offenses, I suggest, weighs heavily on the closure of Defoe’s fiction. There are no 
constables or watchmen who can apprehend the culprits responsible for “the Injury done 
[to] the poor Girl” and guarantee justice for the victim at the end of the novel (330).  
Rather than human laws, which, according to Defoe, are “the worst executed” in 
England, Roxana examines the efficacy of divine providence in detecting and punishing 
crimes.9 At the same time, the novel undermines any simplistic belief in providential 
detection by tacitly raising the question: Can providence actually govern “all the affairs 
of men” and detect “the most secrete crimes…by the most unforeseen accidents” (297)? 
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If the novel is a “glorious testimony to the justice of Providence,” then why does Susan’s 
fate remain a secret? Why does providence fail to detect the culprit responsible for 
Susan’s disappearance? 
 Popular responses to such questions include dismissal of providential utterances 
and supernatural phenomena in Defoe’s narratives as irrelevant to the plots of his 
fictions.10 Ian Watt in his reading of Robinson Crusoe sums up this set of responses and 
concludes that “otherworldly concerns” are merely occasions for “comminatory codas” 
and that they “demonstrate a lifetime of somewhat mechanical practice.”11 Recent 
criticism continues to uphold Ian Watt’s point of view. Jesse Molesworth, in his 
remarkable book Chance and the Eighteenth-century Novel, suggests that Roxana has 
little interest in divine laws and only “retrospectively work[s] all events into a 
Providential scheme.”12  
An alternative to the Wattsian strand of criticism regarding Daniel Defoe’s 
evocations of providence is found in Rodney M. Baine’s book, Daniel Defoe and the 
Supernatural (1968). Baine depicts Defoe as a “sincere Puritan” interested in 
accumulating “all meaningful and credible evidence of Providence, or an invisible world 
of spirits, and of communion thereby with God.”13 Critics such as Peter Earle and 
Ricarrdo Capoferro build upon Baine’s argument by illustrating the coexistence of 
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rational and irrational elements in Defoe’s works.14 Defoe, according to Capoferro, was 
equally interested in the new science and demonology.15 The puritanical author knew the 
principles of empiricism and deistic theology, which transformed the new science, the 
divine providence and the devil into influential forces in human lives. My reading of 
Roxana supplements this strand of criticism and highlights the poetic coordination 
between natural and supernatural, rational and religious forms of knowledge in Daniel 
Defoe’s Roxana. 
The conflicts between different modes of knowledge first surface when Roxana 
and Susan struggle to hide or disclose information regarding the life of the female 
protagonist. Even as Susan takes recourse to empirical observations and makes 
conjectures on the basis of circumstantial evidence, she overlooks economic 
considerations that have implications for the outcome of her investigations. Roxana, 
unlike Susan, is extremely prudent and capable of evaluating risks; however, she is also 
susceptible to seeing supernatural phenomena such as premonitions, specters, and second 
sight as cryptic forms of providential knowledge. Defoe’s fiction Christianizes as well as 
psychologizes the supernatural through the metaphor of conscience.  
Roxana’s conscience, I next suggest, is the binding force that gives shape to the 
narrative otherwise seemingly disjointed episodes. In representing conscience as the site 
where God’s knowledge and judgment of crimes become visible and ethical quandaries 
are resolved through an inner hermeneutics, Roxana draws on the seventeenth-century 
manuals of casuistry. As casuistry gets associated with moral equivocation and laxity, 
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conscience emerges as an unreliable source of knowledge in Roxana. Defoe’s fiction 
encourages a hermeneutical practice that is rooted simultaneously in reason and religion, 
and which becomes a characteristic feature of eighteenth-fictions about detection of 
crimes. Roxana shows that rational and irrational beliefs, premonitions and providential 
beliefs are buried in the inner recesses of characters’ and readers’ minds; they can be 
deftly brought forth by rhetoric rooted in the Scriptures. 
The hermeneutical practice that brings together religious and non-religious forms 
of knowledge, I suggest in the conclusion, has implications for how we understand the 
controversial ending of Roxana: Roxana’s crimes might go undetected, but it is highly 
unlikely that her providence-inflicted calamities will come to an end. 
 
Spying Sagaciously 
 From the very beginning, Roxana invites its readers to think carefully about the 
relationship between form and epistemology. The “relator” and the editor of Roxana’s 
story insists in the Preface that “this Story differs from most of the Modern Performances 
of this kind…It differs from them in this Great and Essential Article, Namely, That the 
Foundation of This is laid in Truth of Fact; and so the Work is not a Story, but a History” 
(1). Unlike the narrator of Aphra Behn’s The History of the Nun, Defoe’s relator does not 
claim to be omniscient or prophetic.16 He, however, promises the “Truth of Fact,” and 
indicates that a commitment to empiricism transforms his narrative into a history.17 
                                                
16 See Aphra Behn, The History of the Nun; or, the Fair Vow-Breaker. The Fair Jilt and Other Stories, Vol. 
3 of The Works of Aphra Behn, ed. Janet Todd (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1995). 
 
17 According to Michael McKeon, Defoe’s fiction manifests “naïve empiricism” by asserting the truth of its 
narrative. See “Generic Transformation and Social Change: Rethinking the Rise of the Novel,” in Theory of 
the Novel: A Historical Approach (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2000), 386.  
 70 
Qualifying his first assertion, the editor soon after claims that he only knows the “first 
part of the Story to be Truth” (2). Although the editor regards direct testimony as more 
reliable than mediated narratives, he points out that the readers have no option but to trust 
Roxana’s first-person account to understand the second half of her story: “the Latter Part 
of her History lay Abroad, and cou’d not so well be vouch’d as the First; yet, as she has 
told it herself, we have the less Reason to question the Truth of that Part also” (2). While 
the readers need not be outright skeptical of the second part of Roxana’s story, the editor 
cautions them from conflating her first-person narrative with facts. If the first part of the 
story conveys facts, then the second part, the editor hints, provides probable truths. 
To an extent, the editor is right, for the probabilistic view of knowledge does 
seem to dominate the second half of Roxana. Midway through the novel, Roxana 
abruptly introduces her daughter Susan who relies on conjectures or probable inferences 
to resolve the mystery around her mother’s identity. The conjectures of Susan, I suggest 
in this section, threaten to undermine the truths that Roxana has constructed for herself by 
managing her finances and by calculating risks. By juxtaposing Susan’s investigations 
with Roxana’s and Amy’s inquiries and espionage, Defoe’s fiction proposes a form of 
detection that draws on the probabilistic view of knowledge, or an epistemological theory 
that promises the probability of deriving truth claims akin to those of empirically driven 
natural sciences. This form of detection calls for the detective-like figures to be sagacious 
and discreet, especially when they are trying to find evidence or proofs. 
To be sagacious and discreet in Roxana is to read signs well and to communicate 
probable inferences prudently. The first notion of sagacity as the ability to read skills 
well, according to Douglas Lane Patey, was prominent in the works of eighteenth-century 
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logicians, lawyers, medical practitioners, rhetoricians, and theologians. The consensus 
was that sagacity required quick insights into men as well as understanding of moral 
truths.18 Using James Harris’s insight that poetry provides clues to understand characters, 
enabling the readers to conjecture what a given character “will do in the future, from 
what already he has done in the past,” Patey usefully distinguishes between eighteenth-
century conjectures and sagacity in the following manner: “sagacity is the capacity for 
reading signs well, especially those outward signs that ‘discover’ the ‘secret’ of 
character; conjecture is the name for probable inference.”19 
When Susan undertakes the quest to find her mother, her sagacity manifests as the 
capacity to “put all things together” and create a narrative out of “broken Fragments” on 
the basis of conjectures or probable inferences (269). She pieces together circumstantial 
evidence, and in the process becomes a detective-like figure (269). To use Jesse 
Molesworth’s words, “Susan is a very sophisticated reader of texts…She has the 
curiosity…of a detective searching for clues.”20 Susan, according to Molesworth, 
evaluates all narrative scenarios on the basis of their probability, and gives “more weight 
to circumstantial evidence” than other characters.21  Having been informed that her 
mother became the landlord’s mistress and left England for France, Susan conjectures 
that Amy, who came from France, is her mother. Once Susan is convinced that Amy is 
not her mother, she relies on past observations and probable inferences to identify her 
mother: since “Mrs. Amy and her Lady Roxana had been in France together; so she put 
                                                
18 Douglas Lane Patey, Probability and Literary Form: Philosophic Theory and Literary Practice in the 
Augustan Age (New York: Cambridge, 1984), 62. 
 
19 Patey, Probability and Literary Form, 85-86.   
 
20 Molesworth, Jesse, Chance and the Eighteenth-Century Novel, 121. 
 
21 Ibid.  
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all these things together…if she was not her Mother, Madam Roxana was her Mother 
then, for one of them, she was sure, was her Mother” (270). Through a series of 
conjectures, Susan solves the mystery around her parentage: Roxana and Amy were in 
France together; Amy is really kind to her; Amy works for Roxana; Amy came in 
Roxana’s coach and could have helped her financially only on her mistress’s orders; 
therefore, if Amy is not her mother, then Roxana is her mother.  
 Susan has no demonstrative proof that Roxana is her mother, but she steadily 
accumulates circumstantial or indirect evidence that gives her conjectures the status of 
moral certainty. The efficacy of Susan’s probable inferences or conjectures comes to rest 
upon her physical and metaphorical proximity to Roxana. Susan works as Roxana’s 
cook-maid and holds Roxana-like aspirations for material prosperity. Despite the social 
distance between Roxana and Susan, Defoe’s fiction registers moments when a servant 
can observe her patron’s actions and behavior carefully. Susan, for instance, is present 
with other servants at the masquerade wherein Roxana dons the garb of a Turkish 
princess to entice a foreign prince. With the help of her fellow servants, Susan manages 
to memorize the details of the event that even Roxana eventually forgets: “we that were 
Servants, stood by ourselves in a corner, but so, as we cou’d see more than some 
Strangers; besides…it was all our Conversation for several Days in the Family, and what 
one did not observe another did” (289). This costume is the most emblematic material-
object that the characters and readers associate with Roxana, and can function as real 
evidence to prove that the Dutch merchant’s wife is in fact the notorious Roxana. The 
collective observations and memories of servants ensure that Roxana’s scandalous life 
cannot remain a secret forever.  
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The extraordinary potential of Susan to make accurate conjectures and expose 
Roxana to public scrutiny is conveyed through an imagery of hunt: “this Girl…hunted 
me, as if, like a Hound, she had a hot Scent” (italics in the original, 317). Susan is ready 
to follow Roxana to Tunbridge, Epsom, Barnet, Newmarket, and even Holland. Her 
relentless pursuit of her mistress, however, is not accompanied by the prudence and 
caution that finally come to define sagacity in Roxana. She cannot “hold her Tongue” 
even when she knows that her inquisitive garrulousness would have negative 
ramifications for her and her siblings’ fortunes: “the Girl was such a Fool for—all 
that…her Sister begg’d and intreated her not to play the Fool, for that it wou’d ruin her 
too” (274). Susan’s initial sagacity, in other words, is belied by her lack of discretion.  
What’s more, Susan’s imprudent investigations endanger the plot of Roxana’s 
prosperity.  In contrast to Susan, Roxana and her companions Amy and the Quaker 
undertake inquires only when they are prudential and pertinent for their survival. While 
Roxana never negates the importance of conjectures or probable inferences, she prefers 
prudence-inflected probabilistic view of knowledge. In her discussion of “classical 
probability,” Lorraine J. Daston notes that prudence or “good sense,” partially codified in 
jurisprudence and political economy, supplied the eighteenth-century probabilists with 
“the data which the calculus of probabilities was to systematize and explain.”22 The 
mathematicians who applied the maxims of prudence while calculating expectations and 
outcomes “weighed individual possibilities for profit or loss with an eye toward securing 
an advantage, as in a commercial investment.”23 Even before Roxana undertakes any 
                                                
22 Daston, Lorraine, “Probabilistic Expectation and Rationality in classical probability theory,” in Historia 
Mathematica 7, no. 3 (August 1980): 255.  
 
23 Ibid., 237. 
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investigation, she weighs probabilities to anticipate outcomes of various financial 
investments. Roxana foresees the consequences of her husband’s reckless attitude 
towards his business: “I foresaw the Consequence…and attempted to perswade him to 
apply himself to his Business” (10). Unlike her husband, Roxana prudently applies 
herself to her business to secure her finances. She seeks the assistance of Sir Robert 
Clayton to procure an estate and mortgage for herself.  Unsurprisingly, then, when it 
comes to investigations, Roxana’s underlying maxim is “That Secrets shou’d never be 
open’d, without evident Utility” (326). The business of spying and detection, Roxana 
understands, needs to be conducted with secrecy and discretion, and only when it is 
economically advantageous. Roxana refuses to spy over the Prince’s activities to detect 
his other amours because she does not see such an enterprise as profitable: it was, she 
declares, “no Business of mine to enquire” (84). Amy, like Roxana, engages in detective 
work only to ensure that she and her mistress lead a comfortable and prosperous life. 
When Roxana sends her to the continent, she makes inquiries to figure out whether 
Roxana’s first husband or the Jew can harm her mistress’s financial interests.  
Both prudence and sagacity demand that Roxana’s own spies and agents of 
detection, Amy and the Quaker, regard with suspicion any piece of information that can 
destabilize hierarchies. The Quaker, in fact, gains the status of Roxana’s “faithful SPY” 
“upon the meer foot of her own Sagacity” (309). In Roxana’s perspective, the Quaker is 
sagacious as she knows the class-based limits of detective business: “she thought if it was 
a Secret, [Roxana] ought to have the telling it [herself]; and if it was not, it might as well 
be publick afterwards, as now; and that, at least, she ought to leave it where she found it, 
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and not hand it forwards to any-body without [Roxana’s] consent” (308-9). Roxana 
alone, the Quaker believes, has the authority to reveal her secrets.  
There is yet another reason why the Quaker refuses to believe Susan’s account of 
Roxana’s secret. Susan cites the improbability of a maid named Amy working for Roxana 
and the Quaker’s landlady. However, as far as the Quaker is concerned, the fact that 
Roxana and her landlady both employ a servant called Amy does not prove Susan’s 
theory that Roxana is her mother. She perceives Susan’s assertion—“I know her; and I 
know that she is my Mother”—not as a statement of fact but as a conjecture. Conjectures, 
according to the Quaker, furnish insufficient evidence and cannot resolve mysteries 
completely: “She insisted upon the slender Evidence she had of the Fact itself, and the 
Rudeness of claiming so near a Relation of one so much above her, and of whose 
Concern in it she had no Knowledge, at least, no sufficient Proof” (306). Without 
sufficient proof, the Quaker has the right to doubt Susan’s testimony. 
Susan discovers the identity of her mother, yet she fails to convince others that 
she has solved the case. She takes for granted a uniform socio-linguistic world and a 
shared horizon of understanding between different characters and readers. Her 
expectation is based on the assumption that language is a fairly unproblematic medium of 
communication: if she is able to speak two words to her mother, then her quest will come 
to an end. What she considers to be key evidence—the fact that she knows Roxana’s 
name—is considered “slender Evidence” or insufficient proof by the Quaker (306). 
Calling someone by a particular name, however, is a performative act that can never 
provide sufficient proof for any hypothesis in Roxana. Roxana’s parenthetical remark 
indicates how easily her husband changes Amy’s name to Cherry: “My Husband gave her 
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that Name in jest, on our Wedding-Day, and we had call’d her by it ever after; so that she 
spoke literally true at that time” (305). Moreover, even Roxana’s name is a product of her 
scintillating dance performance in a Turkish costume: “I had the Name of Roxana 
presently fix’d upon me all over the Court End of Town, as effectually as if I had been 
Christen’d Roxana” (276). Only shared context can ensure that the Quaker understands 
Susan’s conjectures; otherwise, they are just words that can be easily modified, 
miscommunicated, and misinterpreted. Since words often obscure truth, I will suggest in 
the following section that Defoe’s fiction aspires to providential knowledge or absolute 
certainty. In a 1723 tract, Defoe suggests that there are some mysteries, including what 
happens in the human mind, which can be detected by God alone: “words…do not 
necessarily convey the true Sentiment of Man’s Mind; which is therefore, to every Man 
upon Earth but himself, absolutely Undiscoverable and certainly known to God alone.”24 
Words, Defoe indicates, are deceptive; they conceal mysteries that can be known by God 
alone; however, God, as I will show next, makes his providence known to men through 
signs that get materialized as specters or premonitions in Roxana.  
 
Second Sight and Premonitions 
Although Susan fails to convince the Quaker that Roxana is her mother, she is 
convinced that she has found her mother. Her conviction preys upon her mind—this 
conviction can be compared to Roxana’s unshakeable belief that Amy murdered Susan: 
Amy “had a more fatal and wicked Design in her Head, against [Susan]; which indeed, I 
never knew till after it was executed, nor durst Amy ever communicate it to me” (311). 
                                                
24 From Daniel Defoe, The Wickedness of a Disregard to Oaths (London, 1723), cited in Maximillian 
Novak’s “Crime and Punishment in Defoe’s “Roxana.” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology 
65, no. 3 (Jul., 1966): 11. 
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Without concrete evidence or certain proof, Roxana concludes that Amy has killed Susan. 
Amy, as Roxana admits, never communicates this information to anyone either before or 
after Susan’s disappearance. Instead of direct observations and experiences, Roxana’s 
conclusion, I suggest in this section, stems from secret forebodings and premonitions that 
the female protagonist occasionally regards as providential signs. Like the rainbow for 
Noah in Genesis, or celestial lights and bloody suns in the apocalyptic books of Daniel 
and Revelation, Roxana presents her premonitions as providential signs and warnings of 
impending ruin and destruction. She thereby anticipates a tragic end for herself and 
prepares readers for a conclusion that involves the “Blast of Heaven”(330). 
 Although Susan the storyteller disappears from the narrative of Roxana, 
fragments of her body continue to haunt Defoe’s titular character: 
As for the poor Girl herself, she was ever before my Eyes; I saw her by-Night, 
and by-Day; she haunted my imagination, if she did not haunt the House; my 
Fancy show’d her me in a hundred Shapes and Postures; sleeping or waking she 
was with me. Sometimes I thought I saw her with her Throat cut; sometimes with 
her Head cut, and her Brains knocked out; other times hang’d upon a Beam; 
another time drown’d in the Great Pond at Camberwell (325).  
 
Roxana’s visions of Susan’s mutilated specter are reminiscent of the imaginary 
apparitions of Henault that haunt Isabella in Aphra Behn’s The History of the Nun: they 
encourage readers to see the female protagonist as guilty of either killing her daughter or 
getting her killed. Roxana draws attention to her eyes and what she “saw,” but her 
knowledge of Susan’s death escapes the bounds of empiricism. Even as Roxana 
psychologizes the apparition—it was her fancy or imagination that gave rise to the 
disjointed spirit—she flirts with the idea that supernatural phenomena might assist the 
victim of the crime to give evidence against the criminal: there is a subtle hint that Susan 
might haunt Roxana’s imagination as well as her house.  
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Defoe, as Maximillian Novak observes, knew a lot about the supernatural or the 
occult. He did not dismiss the “likelihood of spirit;” however, he wanted “every seeming 
example of the supernatural…to stand the test of reason.”25 Even as Defoe attempts to 
undermine the notion that occult forces such as specters and spirits actually act upon 
human beings, according to Novak, he is still attracted to the occult for it provides him “a 
grand and mysterious stage on which he could act a variety of roles.”26 Taking my cue 
from Novak, I suggest that in seemingly supernatural phenomena in Roxana, Defoe finds 
opportunities to revive interest in providential forms of knowledge, and to explore the 
possibility of God solving a crime for which there is limited evidence.  
One of the best examples of an apparition giving evidence of a crime appears in 
Defoe’s Essay on the History and Reality of Apparitions (1727).  Published a few years 
after Roxana, the essay on apparitions contains the story of a man on trial who sees the 
ghost of the victim at the trial and insists that “no man [should] be allowed to be Witness 
in his own Case.”27 The vision of the dead man assists the judge to wrangle a confession 
out of the murderer.  
Even though Roxana imagines a specter of her daughter chopped mysteriously 
into  “hundreds [of] Shapes and Postures,” the apparition never forces her to 
acknowledge her hand in Susan’s death (325). Roxana interprets this vision in the same 
way that she construes other premonitions: she suggests that apparitions and 
                                                
25 Maximillian Novak, “Defoe’s Spirits, Apparitions, and the Occult,” Digital Defoe: Studies in Defoe & 
His Contemporaries 2, no.1 (Fall 2010), 11. 
 
26 Novak, “Defoe’s Spirits,” 12. 
 
27 Daniel Defoe, An Essay on the History and Reality of Apparitions (1727), Satire, Fantasy and Writings 
on the Supernatural. vol. 8, ed. G.A. Starr. The Works of Daniel Defoe. Gen. Ed. W.R. Owens and P.N. 
Furbank (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2005),113. 
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premonitions may arise from natural causes. When a series of premonitions help Roxana 
to predict the arrival of the Dutch Merchant and the robbery and murder of the Jeweler, 
she casually mentions that “naturalists” can explain how forebodings help one to predict 
ordinary and extraordinary events: “I was a little surpriz’d, even before I knew anything 
of who it was, my Mind foreboding the thing as it happen’d; (whence that arises, let the 
Naturalists explain to us)” (222). A “naturalist” in the eighteenth-century could refer to a 
student of natural science or a person who examined natural, as opposed to supernatural, 
phenomena, and believed that only natural laws operate in the world.28 By suggesting that 
a naturalist can explain her strange forebodings, Roxana indicates that there might be 
natural causes underlying seemingly supernatural phenomena. She, however, is no 
naturalist, and wants the reader to look for such explanations.  
When naturalists are missing from Defoe’s fictions, providence becomes the 
natural cause of mysterious events. In Serious Reflections on Robinson Crusoe (1720), 
Defoe stipulates that premonitions, no matter how imperfect and broken, are intimations 
sent by God to allow prudent men to “foresee Evil.”29 The roots of all premonitions, 
miraculous detections, and extraordinary events lie in divine providence. Moll Flanders, 
for instance, cites the example of a criminal, “a Night-Flyer,” who recounts his thefts 
step-by-step in his sleep, and gives away not only what he had stolen but also from where 
he had stolen it. Moll acknowledges the magnificence of divine justice and contends that 
                                                
28 See the Oxford English Dictionary Online.  
 
29 Daniel Defoe, Serious Reflections during the Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1720), 
Vol. 3 of The Works of Daniel Defoe. The Novels of Daniel Defoe (London: Pickering & Chatto), 184. 
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providence makes use of “Natural Causes to produce…extraordinary effects” in order to 
discover such crimes.30  
While Roxana can dismiss her first premonition as a consequence of “a strange 
Terror upon [her] mind,” the accuracy of her premonition makes it difficult for her to 
reject its connection to some secret providential power:  
 Then the Manner of his Death was terrible and frightful to me, and above all, the 
 strange Notices I had of it; I had never pretended to the Second Sight, or any thing 
 of that Kind; but certainly, if any one ever had such a thing, I had it at this time; 
 for I saw him as plainly in all those terrible Shapes, as above, First, as a Skeleton, 
 not Dead only, but rotten and wasted; Secondly, as kill’d, and his Face bloody; 
 and Thirdly, his Cloathes bloody; and all within the Space of one Minute, or 
 indeed, of a very few Moments (55). 
 
Roxana foresees the Jeweler’s wasted body along with his bloody clothes and face even 
before he is robbed and murdered. The premonition as such defies rational explanations, 
and Roxana’s first impulse is to resist the idea that she has “second sight” or psychic 
powers because such phenomena are inexplicable by natural laws.  She reluctantly admits 
that her experience is beyond the scope of rational forms of knowledge, and comes to 
accept her premonitions as signs of providential knowledge (325). 
Based upon her premonitions, Roxana can comfortably predict that she will never 
see the Jeweler again. Her premonitions and “second sight” emerge as fairly reliable 
sources of knowledge. This follows Defoe’s general belief that second sight can offer 
“inexplicable evidence of the communication between visible and invisible worlds.”31 
Second sight, for Defoe and his contemporaries, was a God-given gift that enabled one to 
interpret the “Signs in the Heavens, and in the Earth” and explain mysterious occurrences 
                                                
30 Daniel Defoe, Moll Flanders, ed. G.A. Starr (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), 271. 
31 Rodney Baine, Daniel Defoe and the Supernatural, 159. 
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that could not be explained adequately by “natural Causes.”32 As such, Defoe’s characters 
such as Robinson Crusoe in Robinson Crusoe (1719) and H.F. in A Journal of the Plague 
Year (1722) remind the readers that premonitions and other seemingly supernatural 
phenomena provide glimpses into divine direction and the only knowledge worth 
hankering after is providential knowledge; the gist of this knowledge is that providence 
governs all causes and consequences.33 Unsurprisingly, then, rather than an instance of 
the occult or magic, Defoe suggests in his writings on the supernatural that “second 
sight” is a manifestation of heavenly spirits that “warn [us] of approaching Mischief, 
Death, or Danger.”34   
Unlike Robinson Crusoe and H.F., Roxana, at first glance, does not seem to trace 
the patterns of providence in her premonitions. Yet, time and again, Roxana enters into 
moral reflections on “the Blast of a just Providence” (260). After she marries the Dutch 
merchant, she casts a retrospective glance at her “gay and wicked” life: “I began to look 
back with that Horror, and that Detestation, which is the certain Companion, if not the 
Forerunner of Repentance” (261). It is these moral reflections or “excursions” that the 
editor or the “relator” of Roxana considers to be more interesting than the causal 
                                                
32 Daniel Defoe, The Second-Sighted Highlander. Being Four Visions of the Eclypse, and Something of 
what may Follow (London, 1715), 43. P.N. Furbank and W.R. Owens list the pamphlet as “probably” 
authored by Defoe. A Critical Bibliography of Daniel Defoe (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1998).  
 
33 J. Paul Hunter has noticed Defoe’s preoccupation with the providential design in Robinson Crusoe. He 
draws attention to Defoe’s indebtedness to the seventeenth-century providential narratives such as William 
Turner’s A Compleat History of the Most Remarkable Providences: Both of Judgment and Mercy, Which 
Have Hapn’d in This Present Age.  He also cites Defoe’s providential pamphlet The Storm, which was 
written in order to “preserve the Remembrance of Divine Vengeance,” to illustrate the author’s familiarity 
with the “ideas and conventions” of providential literature. See J. Paul Hunter, The Reluctant Pilgrim: 
Defoe’s Emblematic Method and Quest for Form in Robinson Crusoe (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1966), 
60-61; 73. 
 
34 Daniel Defoe, A System of Magick (1727), in Part II of Satire, Fantasy and Writings on the Supernatural, 
vol. 7, The Works of Daniel Defoe, Gen. Ed. W.R. Owens and P.N. Furbank (London: Pickering & Chatto, 
2005), 234.  
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connections between different episodes of Roxana’s life. In other words, the editor 
downplays sequence in favor of annexes of reflection: he wishes to draw the readers’ 
attention to Roxana’s interpolations on providence and moral maxims to guide them “to 
just Reflections in the like Cases” (2). In particular, the editor recommends that we read 
Roxana’s story as a confession revolving around at least two moral principles: 
“Wickedness [is] not worth the Repentance,” and wealth can never “abate the Reproaches 
of [the] Conscience, or procure [one] an Hour’s sleep” (2). By drawing attention to the 
mature protagonist’s tormented conscience, the editor indicates that even when Roxana 
does not acknowledge providence’s role in her life, her conscience registers the 
providential punishment reserved for offenders. The apparitions, premonitions, and 
horrors that plague Roxana, the editor hints, are signs of a guilty conscience. By focusing 
on the reproaches of Roxana’s conscience, the editor tames the supernatural and the 
sensational elements of her story.35  
 
Tormented Conscience and Casuistry  
 As supernatural phenomena are explained away as signs of a tormented mind or a 
guilty conscience in Roxana, the narrative cannot easily be categorized as a providential 
narrative. Without clear providential control or other causal connections, Defoe’s fiction 
threatens to disperse into a series of disjointed episodes or short novellas.36 One may then 
ask what it is that unifies Roxana’s various adventures and gives coherence and 
                                                
35 Warner suggests that Defoe developed the editorial retrospective voice in order to prevent the novel from 
disintegrating into disparate episodes, “and in order to prevent the reader from becoming absorbed in mere 
entertainment,” Licensing Entertainment, 151. 
 
36 Warner reads Roxana as a “serial” that combines five novels of amorous intrigue, an unsuccessful novel 
of courtship and a novel of intrigue, 152-53. Similarly, G.A. Starr suggests that the emphasis on “the 
casuistical method [in Roxana] tends to dissolve [its] narrative into a series of discrete episodes.” Defoe 
and Casuistry (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971), 32.  
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momentum to the plot of the novel. In this section, I argue that in the absence of a clear 
providential design, Roxana’s conscience emerges as a unifying force in Defoe’s novel: 
the periodic awakening and lulling of the protagonist’s conscience gives momentum to 
the plot of the novel. As long as Roxana’s conscience is alive, the novel’s ethical 
quandaries cannot be resolved completely, and the story cannot come to an end. In 
representing Roxana’s conscience as the site at which ethical questions are debated, 
Defoe’s fiction, I suggest, draws on the post-Reformation theology and casuistry of 
English Protestant authors. Casuistry in Roxana depends on analyzing and articulating 
sentiments and economic circumstances. Since it encourages moral equivocations, the 
truth regarding Roxana’s crime remains concealed.  
Every time Roxana performs a morally dubious action, she acknowledges her fear 
of “the Justice of Heaven” (260). Despite all appearances, Roxana insists that she had 
“such a constant Terror upon [her] Mind,” that she expected something “very frightful 
upon every Accident of Life” (260). The operation of providence,” to use Lincoln B. 
Faller’s words, becomes “an increasingly psychological phenomena” in Defoe’s fiction, 
whereby Roxana’s mental agitation resembles “involuntary operation of conscience 
itself.”37 The fluctuations in Roxana’s conscience indicate that unless and until she 
confesses her crimes, she cannot achieve repose. As Roxana is reluctant to acknowledge 
her mistakes, her troubled conscience frequently gives rise to iconic images of the hell 
and the devil: “[I] dream’d continually of the most frightful and terrible things 
imaginable: Nothing but Apparitions of Devils and Monsters; falling into Gulphs, and off 
                                                
37 Faller examines Defoe’s criminal biographies, but his comment is useful for understanding Roxana’s 
mental agitations as well. See Lincoln B. Faller, Crime and Defoe: A New Kind of Writing (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1993), 113.  
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from the steep and high Precipices, and the like” (264). Unable to ignore these 
phantasmagoric images, Roxana grows “sad, heavy, pensive, and melancholy” and 
considers herself to be unsuitable for “conversing with [her] Family or any-one else” 
(264). A tormented conscience affects Roxana’s health and social well being: she cannot 
eat or sleep, and considers herself to be “Hagridden with Frights” (264).  
 By registering conscience’s ability to punish an offender even when concrete 
evidence is missing, Roxana draws upon theories about providence and conscience 
popular among Protestant preachers and theologians in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century England. The new consensus was that God rarely punished criminals directly. 
The seat of God’s judgments was a criminal’s conscience. Seventeenth-century 
clergyman Thomas Adams’s The Gallants Burden (1612) captures this inward shift to the 
criminal’s conscience very well: In “the infancie of the world, Gods blowes were most 
outward; in this ripe (or rather rotten) age of it, they are most inward and spirtuall: We 
have no Beares to devoure the Mockers; no fierie Serpents to strike the Murmurers: 
God’s punishments reach most to the Conscience.”38 Put another way, providence 
controls detection and punishment of crimes not through supernatural interventions but 
by haunting the criminal’s conscience. As the English church leader William Sherlock 
popularly put it, conscience is the “Worm that never dieth.” 39  
 Roxana’s conscience, however, almost dies even before she has committed a 
serious crime. After Roxana prompts Amy into sleeping with the Jeweler, her conscience 
is rendered silent. The transgressive act metaphorically stifles or murders Roxana’s 
                                                
38 Thomas Adams. The Gallants Burden (1612), Early English Books Online, Accessed on 20 June 2013, 5. 
 
39 William Sherlock, Discourse on Divine Providence, 214. Defoe uses the same phrase to describe the 
conscience of murderers in The History of Apparitions, 84.  
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conscience: “Conscience left off speaking, where it found it cou’d not be heard” (44). If 
conscience’s voice is constantly heard, then the narrative takes upon the features of a 
sermon; it disrupts the flow of the story and renders Roxana passive. Every time 
conscience dictates or disrupts Roxana’s conscience, she declares, “But I am not to 
preach, but to relate” the history (49).  Roxana’s subsequent affairs largely take place in 
the absence of any obtrusive or controlling conscience. Consequently, she believes that 
conscience once asleep, “sleeps fast, not be awakened while the tide of pleasure 
continues to flow, or till something dark or dreadful” happens to revive it (69). Murder 
happens to be one such dreadful event that can awaken Roxana’s conscience.  
 The utterance of the word “murder” arouses Roxana’s conscience. The acts of 
pronouncing the word “murder” and acknowledging the intent to kill are equated with the 
acts of committing and confessing murder in Roxana’s conscience. Once Amy has 
“nam[ed] the thing,” she has already transgressed the divine injunction against the 
ultimate sin. Roxana tells Amy, “you are a murderer already, as much as if you had done 
it already” (234). In this belief, Roxana is not alone. Indeed, Defoe, in his early works, 
had frequently declared that the intent to murder was commensurate with the act of 
murdering someone: “the Murther is already committed, and your Guilt determin’d in the 
Intention.”40 Roxana identifies Amy as her daughter’s murderer because Amy announces 
her intention to kill Susan and constantly avoids Roxana after her daughter’s 
disappearance. Amy, Roxana suggests, avoids her mistress because she is guilty of a 
crime: “whatever was done, Amy had done it; and that, in short, Amy had made her away; 
and I believ’d it the more, because Amy came no more near me, but confirm’d her Guilt 
                                                
40 Review, III (Aug 20, 1706), cited in Starr, 122.  
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by her Absence” (325). There is no empirical evidence against Amy, for no one has seen 
her kill Susan. Using a blend of providential and probabilistic views of knowledge, 
Roxana come to believe that Amy has killed Susan. 
Nonetheless, if Roxana is so certain that Amy is a murderer, then why doesn’t she 
get her arrested? The straightforward answer is that she lacks substantial proof to 
prosecute Amy; her conscience is not a reliable witness or evidence for conducting 
criminal proceedings against Amy. Being familiar with the English laws, Roxana would 
have known the importance of direct proofs and circumstantial evidence in criminal 
trials. The fact that Roxana understands the English legal system is evident from her 
interactions with the Jew who threatens to prosecute her for the Jeweler’s murder: “in 
England…[accusers] must prove the Fact, or give just Reason for their Suspicions” (117). 
There are no eyewitnesses nor positive evidence against Amy. Roxana realizes that her 
testimony—considered to be admissible, even reliable evidence in early eighteenth-
century trials—can potentially implicate her in the murder.  In the absence of her 
testimony, there is only strong circumstantial evidence to accuse and incriminate Amy: 
Amy swears several times that she will kill Susan, and Susan is last seen with a woman of 
Amy’s appearance. Roxana, however, finds this circumstantial evidence sufficient to 
condemn Amy; thus, when she receives the Quaker’s letter indicating that Amy has been 
able to persuade Susan to be “quiet and easie,” she immediately infers that Amy has 
murdered her daughter” (323). Roxana’s interpretation of the letter demonstrates that the 
proposition or the idea need not be true in itself for someone to be convinced of it. 
Roxana’s conscience reads Amy’s angry outbursts as confessions of crime. The 
acknowledgment of intent, or even a slip of tongue, is enough to impeach Amy in 
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Defoe’s narrative about criminal investigation.41 The alternative explanation that 
identifies an unknown robber as the true culprit (“they believ’d Amy had carry’d her to 
pay her a Sum of Money, and that somebody had watch’d her after her having receiv’d it, 
and had Robb’d and Murther’d her”) is quickly dismissed, and the readers are encouraged 
to behold Amy as Susan’s murderer (325).  
 The more complex answer as to why Roxana cannot use the evidence furnished 
by her conscience to ensure punishment for Amy lies in Roxana’s complex relationship 
to casuistry or the art of resolving difficult cases of conscience by adapting general rules 
of religion and morality to specific circumstances. Rules of conscience rather than being 
fixed are open to interpretation. Casuistry reached its zenith in the seventeenth-century 
with the publication of treatises such as William Perkins’s Whole Treatise of the Cases of 
Conscience (1608), William Ames’s De Conscientia (1630), and Jeremy Taylor’s Ductor 
Dubitantium; or The Rule of Conscience (1660), which foreground the need for reading 
and examining one’s sentiments to resolve difficult ethical problems.42 Conscience, as 
referred to by these casuists, is a moral faculty that makes men cognizant of right and 
wrong; it is often synonymous with a man’s heart, mind, or his inmost feelings. These 
works typically establish conscience as an inward judge, capable of detecting crime and 
                                                
41 A year before Defoe published Roxana, he wrote the story of a man who admits committing murder by a 
slip of tongue. Maxmillian E. Novak draws attention to this case in his article, “Crime and Punishment in 
Defoe’s “Roxana,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 65, no. 3 (Jul., 1966): 445- 465.  
 
42 Jeremy Taylor’s vivid rhetoric, in particular, influenced Daniel Defoe’s prose. Maxmillian E. Novak. 
Daniel Defoe: Master of Fictions: His Life and Ideas (New York: Oxford UP, 2001), 679. The relationship 
between eighteenth-century novel and casuistic literature has also been explored in G.A. Starr’s Defoe and 
Casuistry and Tom Keymer’s Richardson’s “Clarissa” and the Eighteenth-Century Reader (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1992).  
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maintaining the social and political status quo.43 Above all, they affirm that conscience is 
a witness and prosecutor of the divine will, and God’s plan can be deduced if one 
examines one’s conscience seriously. Defoe’s protagonist Robinson Crusoe voices this 
idea when he suggests that the conscience is a divine and a moral faculty because “upon 
all occasions [it] tells [wrongdoers] plainly what their conditions are.”44 
There was, however, considerable cultural resistance to the practical approach to 
morality present in the works on the casuistry. Many seventeenth-century thinkers were 
unwilling to put conscience on a divine pedestal. In Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes 
succinctly equates conscience with erroneous judgments and opinions: “[P]rivate 
Consciences (…) are but private opinions.”45 Hobbes indicates that the term conscience 
no longer signifies shared knowledge; instead, it refers to personal awareness and 
opinions. Conscience, according to Hobbes, is first and foremost a word, which is 
consistently misapplied by both Catholics and Protestants: rather than being a gatekeeper 
of God’s commandments, conscience only rhetorically performs the function of “a 
thousand witnesses,” and, in general, it is a metaphor for men’s opinions and secret 
thoughts.46 At best, as Edward G. Andrew suggests, conscience for Hobbes occupies the 
position between a judge and a legislator; “it interprets law and thus participates in the 
                                                
43 Keith Thomas, “Cases of Conscience in Seventeenth Century England” in Public Duty and Private 
Conscience in Seventeenth Century England, edited by John Morrell, Paul Slack and Daniel Wolff (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1993), 29.  
 
44 Daniel Defoe, Serious Reflections of Robinson Crusoe, 166. 
 
45 Hobbes. Leviathan Parts I and II, ed. A.P. Martinich and Brian Battiste (Ontario: Broadview Press, 
2011), 276 
 
46 Hobbes, 78.   
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construction of new law (rather than merely meting out guilt and punishment.”47 It 
neither adds to the public knowledge of the criminal’s intentions nor provides sufficient 
evidence to punish his crimes. With Hobbes, the emphasis shifts away from conscience 
as the embodiment of moral law to conscience as rhetorical ploy to share one’s opinions.  
Defoe’s fiction flirts with Hobbes’s idea that conscience is merely a metaphor for 
private opinions. Even as Roxana directly evokes casuistry, it often invites readers to 
consider religious vocabulary as rhetorical word play that lacks sincerity and meaningful 
content. Roxana finds casuistry attractive for it promises “the Repose of…Mind” (68). In 
the wake of her liaisons with the Landlord and the Prince, she contemplates approaching 
“Casuists to resolve…Doubt” (68). Casuistry allows Roxana to justify her liaisons and 
temporarily quell the pangs of her conscience: “as it was all irresistible, so it was all 
lawful; for that Heaven would not suffer us to be punish’d for that which it was not 
possible for us to avoid; and with these Absurdities I kept Conscience from giving me 
any considerable Disturbance…I was as perfectly easie as to the Lawfulness of it ”(69). 
By suggesting that heaven would not punish her for an unavoidable temptation, Roxana 
attempts to abnegate responsibility for her extramarital affairs. Her actions, she indicates, 
neither defy God’s providence nor the natural law. At the same time, the reference to 
“absurdities” indicates that Roxana is aware of the self-serving nature of her line of 
reasoning.  
That Roxana can adapt religious rhetoric to appease her conscience is further 
evident from the way she evokes the devil to explain or to justify her transgressive 
                                                
47Edward G. Andrew, Conscience and Its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason, and 
Modern Subjectivity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 78.   
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actions. She points out that she cannot be blamed for whoredom because the devil 
prompted her to enter this  “new Game” (68): 
I had strong Natural aversions to the Crime at first, partly owing to a virtuous 
Education, and partly to the Sence [sic.] of Religion; but the Devil, and that 
greater Devil of Poverty, prevail’d…the Devil manag’d, not only to bring me to 
comply, but he continued them as Arguments to fortifie my Mind against all 
Reflection, and to keep me in that horrid Course I had engag’d in, as if it were 
honest and lawful (201) 
 
Roxana initially presents her religious education as an obstacle to sins and crimes. Yet 
neither education nor inclination, she suggests, can stand the design of the devil. By using 
the rhetoric of the devil, Roxana puts forth an idea of causality that exculpates her of any 
crime: the devil creates unfavorable circumstances and controls Roxana’s reflections 
whereby she has no choice but to follow the “horrid Course” (201). According to Roxana, 
the devil, although personified differently, interferes in human affairs like divine 
providence. What is distinct about devil’s intervention is that it is never benevolent. 
Rather than preventing or exposing crimes, the devil, in fact, assists crimes. 
 More than religious devils and demons, Roxana fears and respects the “greater 
Devil of Poverty” (201). She appropriates religious rhetoric to articulate non-religious 
economic concerns. Poverty and distress emerge as stronger causative agents than even 
God and devil in Roxana. As Roxana puts it, even when her religious or ethical 
“Judgment [is] right…[her] circumstances [are her] Temptation” (43).  
 Indeed, one of the charms of casuistry for Roxana and Amy is that it allows these 
women to modify their moral responses according to their economic circumstances. To 
cite one example, Amy appeals to Roxana’s prudence and draws attention to her material 
circumstances to encourage her to become the landlord’s mistress: “Poverty is the 
strongest incentive; a Temptation, against which no Virtue is powerful to stand out…it 
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would not be Lawful for anything else, but for Bread…why nobody can starve, there’s no 
bearing that” (27-28). Certain seemingly immoral actions, Amy insists, are morally 
justifiable when one is poor or destitute. Amy contends that Roxana’s circumstances, and 
not her conscience, should dictate her actions: “Comply and live; deny and starve” (110). 
Religious and moral knowledge, Amy insists, cannot put bread on Roxana’s table. 
Even though the reader is meant to hear the hollowness of Amy’s rhetoric, she 
argues rather passionately that distress and poverty affect one’s sense of moral or 
religious justice: “Distress removes from the Soul, all R[e]lation, Affection, Sense of 
Justice, and all the Obligations, either moral or Religious.”48 The problem with casuistry, 
Defoe indicates, is that it blurs the boundaries between truth and falsehood, good and 
evil, moral right and moral wrong. Moreover, it encourages moral equivocations if not 
outright hypocrisy. Defoe’s Roxana is a mistress of rhetoric and can use the rules of 
conscience to alternatively conceal, withhold, and reveal information: Come what may, 
Roxana needs to “go on with [her] own Story” (265). Indeed, Roxana describes herself as 
someone capable of doing things with words: “smart in Discourse; apt to be Satyrical; 
full of Repartee, and a little too forward in Conversation; or, as we call it in English, 
Bold” (6). Her eloquence differentiates her from her foolish husband who lacks the art of 
rhetoric and indulges in “empty rattling”: “when he came to defend what he had said by 
Argument and Reason, he would do it so weakly, so emptily, and so nothing to the 
Purpose, that it was enough to make any-body that heard him, sick and asham’d of him” 
(8). While her husband can never deploy persuasive rhetoric, Roxana acquires mastery in 
several languages. She even learns to talk like the Quakers when she wishes to redirect 
                                                
48 Defoe. The Review, 15 September 1711. 
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her plot and refashion her identity as a pious gentlewoman: “I had not only learn’d to 
dress like a QUAKER, but so us’d myself to THEE and THOU, that I talk’d like a 
QUAKER too, as readily and naturally as if I had been born among them; and, in a word, 
I pass’d for a QUAKER among all People that did not know me” (213). Ironically, by 
appropriating the rhetoric of a Quaker, Roxana exposes herself to the charge of 
hypocrisy.49 The apparently polite and elevated rhetoric of a Quaker, with its “THEE and 
THOU,” conceals Roxana’s licentious behavior (213). 
The more sincere religious characters like the Dutch merchant see through 
Roxana’s manipulation of rhetoric and identify its moral fallacies. When Roxana argues 
in favor of absolute liberty, he directly confronts her claim by pointing out its moral 
shortcomings:  “you argue for Liberty at the same time that you restrain yourself from 
that Liberty, which God and Nature has directed you to take; and to supply the 
Deficiency, propose a vicious Liberty, which is neither honorable or religious” (157). The 
Dutch merchant identifies Roxana’s rhetoric as deceptive and hypocritical, at least from 
the perspective of the social and religious codes of her milieu, for it extrapolates the word 
“liberty” from its natural and theological contexts, and fails to reinforce reason, faith, and 
morality.  
The Dutch merchant reminds Roxana that reason, religion, virtue, and honor all 
disapprove of “a vicious liberty” (157). Roxana later admits that she would have come to 
the same conclusion regarding her affair with the Jeweler if she had consulted conscience 
or reason or virtue. Ideally, she should have repelled Amy “as a Viper and Engine of the 
                                                
49 Being a Quaker in eighteenth-century fiction comes to stand for perfect sincerity and perfect hypocrisy. 
See Jenny Davidson’s useful discussion of radical religious sects like Quakers and insincerity in Hypocrisy 
and the Politics of Politeness: Manners and Morals from Locke to Austen (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2004), 94. 
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Devil,” and “look’d upon all the Good this Man [i.e. the Jeweler] had done for me, to 
have been the particular Work of the Goodness of Heaven, and that Goodness shou’d 
have mov’d me to a Return of Duty and humble Obedience” (38). She indicates that 
Amy’s skillful use of rhetoric of necessity and circumstances only temporarily sways her 
opinion in favor of leading an adulterous life.  
Defoe’s fiction refuses to endorse unequivocally the Hobbesian idea that 
conscience is just a rhetorical figure, and instead presents it as a religious and rational 
faculty: Roxana claims that conscience breaks upon the wicked ever so often, “let them 
do what they can to prevent it” (49). Unsurprisingly, then, Roxana’s conscience often 
controls her choice of words; her conscience does not allow her to refer to the Landlord 
as her husband: “nor could I ever frame my mouth to call him Husband, or to say my 
Husband, when I was speaking of him” (45). While the Jeweler “argue[s] himself” into 
believing that he could “lawfully marry,” Roxana acknowledges that conscience cannot 
be convinced easily by religiously unsound rhetoric. She admits that she sins with her 
“eyes open” and her conscience awake (45). By ignoring the voice of her conscience, 
Roxana invites the curse of “double Guilt,” which makes her prone to committing serious 
crimes (43).50 
 
Evoking Scriptures and the Sense of an Ending 
  Roxana’s use of casuistry and religious rhetoric enables her to conceal her role in 
Susan’s disappearance and displace blame and responsibility on a list of others—Amy, 
the Devil, her poverty and circumstances. Even as Roxana gives readers a taste of 
                                                
50 According to Maximillian Novak, “it is this very sense of guilt which drives Roxana to commit further 
sins,” “Crime and Punishment,” 449.  
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rhetorical subterfuge, it makes a case for a hermeneutical practice involving an empiricist 
bent and an awareness of providential design. Roxana and Amy’s biblicisms, I suggest in 
this concluding section, encourage this seemingly paradoxical hermeneutical practice that 
is alive to the demands of reason as well as religion. John Locke’s writings on the 
reasonableness of Christianity show that the hermeneutics encouraged by Roxana is 
typical of the eighteenth-century intellectual milieu. I argue that evocations and analogies 
from the Bible are similar to performative utterances for they generate significant 
episodes and the dénouement of Roxana. Readers attentive to Roxana’s use of the 
Christian scriptures can predict the appearance of the “blast of Heaven” at the end of the 
novel (330). 
 Roxana presents its readers with a character who acts as a Christian, examines 
Roxana’s rhetoric critically, and seems to have access to superhuman and supernatural 
knowledge; this character is none other than the Dutch merchant who questions Roxana’s 
understanding of liberty. The Dutch merchant’s letter to Roxana contains elements of 
admonition, exhortation, lamentation and prediction, which, in retrospect, give it the 
status of a prophetic document: 
I cou’d not think it possible for any-one, that had not dealt with the Devil, to write  
such a Letter; for he spoke of some particular things which afterwards were to  
befal me, with such an Assurance, that it frightened me before-hand; and when 
 those things did come to pass, I was perswaded he had some more than humane 
 knowledge; in a word, his Advices to me to repent, were very affectionate; his  
Warnings of Evil to happen to me, were very kind; and his Promise of Assistance, 
 if I wanted him, were so generous, that I have seldom seen the like; and tho’ I did  
not first set much by that Part, because, I look’d upon them as what might not 
 happen, as what was improbable to happen at that time; yet all the rest of his 
 Letter was so moving that it left me very melancholy (160). 
 
When Roxana first reads this passage in the letter, she dismisses the Dutch merchant’s 
warning as improbable and irrelevant to her immediate future. Yet, she later recognizes 
 95 
how closely her life followed the pattern inscribed in the Dutch merchant’s letter. The 
Dutch merchant predicts accurately that Roxana will confront “some fatal things,” 
whereby Roxana believes that he possesses “more than humane [sic.] knowledge” (160). 
The prophecy about Roxana’s distress rests upon the Biblical pattern of transgression and 
divine judgment, which the female protagonist eventually learns to recognize on her own:  
 “Sin and Shame follow one-another so constantly at the Heels, that they are not like 
Attendants only, but like Cause and Consequence, necessarily connected one with 
another; that the Crime going before, the Scandal is certain to follow; and that ’tis not in 
the Power of humane Nature to conceal the first, or avoid the last” (my emphasis, 298). 
Roxana identifies a uniform relation of cause and effect between sin and shame, or crime 
and its punishment. This scriptural view of causality minimizes human agency in 
concealing or exposing crimes and necessarily connects a character’s sinful past with a 
future providential judgment.  
The Scriptures provide Defoe’s protagonists and his readers a glimpse into the 
providential design and God’s knowledge. In Colonel Jack, for instance, the titular hero 
claims that God, the first mover, controls all causes and consequences: “he guided, and 
had even made the Chain of Causes, and Consequences, which Nature in general strictly 
obey’d, so to him should be given the Honour of all Events, the Consequences of those 
Causes, as the first Mover, and maker of all Things (308).51 Daniel Defoe, like most 
eighteenth-century dissenters and philosophers, believed that the “affairs of men” 
followed the paradigms set up in the Christian Scriptures. Scriptural stories, according to 
Paula R. Backscheider, held a significant place in Defoe’s consciousness: “He could use 
                                                
51 See Colonel Jack (London and New York: Oxford UP, 1965), 308.  
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Scriptural references as an acceptable way to express his emotions, to give importance to 
experience, and to communicate both motive and implication.”52 Defoe’s characters 
frequently discover the Bible and biblical wisdom during the course of their lives: 
Robinson Crusoe reads the Bible virtually every day, H.F. decides to stay in the plague-
ridden London after reading the 91st Psalm from the Bible, Robert Knox finds a Bible 
even in a remote corner of the world, and Colonel Jack learns the significance of the 
Bible from his Tutor.53 The ghost in The History of Apparitions gives impetus to the man 
on trial to acknowledge his crimes, but it is the judge who elicits a confession from him 
after reading aloud verse 19, chapter 7 from the Book of Joshua: “And Joshua said unto 
Achan, my Son, give, I pray thee, Glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make Confession 
unto him, and tell me now what thou hast done, hide it not from me.”54 The scriptural 
rhetoric convinces the criminal that providence will punish his crimes. 
It is not surprising, then, that Roxana and Amy frequently evoke the Holy 
Scriptures to give meaning and significance to their experiences. After Roxana’s first 
husband abandons her, she compares herself to Job and ominously quotes Lamentations 
to evoke the readers’ sympathy: “little, remain’d, unless, like one of the pitiful Women of 
Jerusalem, I should eat up my very Children themselves” (18). Similarly, Amy evokes 
the biblical analogy “as Rachel did to Jacob” and promises to sleep with her master (39). 
At first glance, these references seem to be ritualistic and secular uses of the Scriptures 
meant to highlight Roxana’s destitution and Amy’s complex relationship with her 
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mistress. However, these evocations and analogies are akin to performative utterances of 
a magician. By saying or in saying these words, Amy and Roxana, generate significant 
episodes of the novel. In the dénouement of the novel, the penitent Roxana 
metaphorically eats her daughter and laments her death. On Roxana’s violent and 
persuasive insistence, Amy lies with her master several times until she becomes pregnant 
with his child.55 Like Rachel’s handmaid (Bilhah), Amy becomes her mistress’s problem-
solving surrogate, and eventually bears the responsibility for safeguarding her mistress’s 
prosperity. As the plot progresses, Amy transforms from Roxana’s understudy to her 
friend, and from her friend to her substitute, whereby she perceives each threat to Roxana 
as a threat to her own existence. Amy’s identification with Roxana explains her 
motivation to murder Susan.  
 Despite their skillful use of biblicisms, both Roxana and Amy frequently 
decontextualize scriptural expressions and use them to justify their actions.56 The novel 
critiques self-serving use of the Scriptures for such use undermines their ethical import. 
When Amy leaves Roxana’s children outside her sister-in-law’s house, she refuses to 
help them and justifies her action by decontexualizing Paul’s advice in I Tim. 5:4. 
“Charity begins at home” becomes the rationale to refuse help to the poor and the needy. 
Her husband questions her treatment of her brother’s destitute children by accurately 
quoting the Scriptures: “remember that dreadful Scripture is directly against us, Prov. 
21.13. Whoso stoppeth his Ears at the Cry of the Poor, he also shall cry himself, but shall 
                                                
55 Backscheider reads this Biblical allusion as an example of master-servant relationship gone awry, 
“Personality and Biblical Allusion,”16.   
 
56  The decontextualized use of the Scripures was a subject of controversy from the sixteenth century 
onwards. To use Paula R. Backscheider words, “the Scriptures offered types, and men were to find 
parallels, not duplicates, of their emotions and situations,” “Personality and Biblical Allusion,” 7. 
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not be heard” (italics in the original 23). He indicates that his wife’s uncharitable act will 
not only influence heavenly judgment but also tarnish their reputation in the 
neighborhood. He is aware of the literary context of the Biblical saying; moreover, his 
literal interpretation of the Proverb appeals to both reason and common sense.57His 
hermeneutics is endorsed in the novel as it is attentive to both divine and human laws. 
Even as he appeals to the authority of the Biblical Proverbs, he points out to his wife that 
if she sends the children away, they will be brought back by the Justice’s Warrant as they 
were born in their parish.  
 Although Defoe’s fiction questions self-serving interpretations of the Scriptures, it 
also makes a case for an empirical and tolerant hermeneutics that allows readers to 
comprehend divine laws to the best of their abilities. More importantly, it enables readers 
and characters to find faith and come to their own conclusions regarding God and his 
providence. Defoe, like John Locke, emphasized the need for rescuing the Bible from 
orthodox clergy. John Locke summarizes the dangers of doctrinal understandings of the 
Scriptures in A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity (1697):  
If the reading and study of Scripture were more pressed than it is, and men were 
fairly sent to the Bible to find their religion; and not the Bible put into their hands, 
only to find the opinions of their peculiar sect or party; Christendom would have 
more Christians, and those that are would be more knowing and more in right 
than they are now. That which hinders this, is that select bundle of doctrines, 
which it has pleased every sect to draw out of the Scriptures, or their own 
inventions, with an omission…of all the rest.58 
 
                                                
57 His literal interpretation can be compared to Robinson Crusoe’s straightforward application of biblical 
sayings to his own situation: “I open’d the Bible upon these Words, I will never, never leave thee, nor 
forsake thee,” 113 
 
58 John Locke. A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity. The Works of John Locke in 
Nine Volumes. Vol. VI (London: 1697), 294. 
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Locke wants people to apply their common sense and reason to the Bible, and reject 
ready-made or allegorical interpretations that encourage “ignorance, laziness, and neglect 
of the Scriptures.”59 He thus makes a case for literal and empirical readings of the Bible. 
In the Lockean world of Defoe’s novel, getting among the priests and conforming to the 
opinions of a “peculiar sect or party” are looked down upon with disdain. If Roxana has 
to become a more righteous Christian, then she needs to come to terms with the 
Scriptures.60 
 Given the Lockean emphasis on scriptural exegesis as an apt means for 
comprehending divine laws and detecting belief, it is not surprising that Roxana’s 
evocation and literal interpretation of Daniel 5:1-31 reveals the impending divine 
punishment for her ill-gotten riches:  “I trembled every Joint of me, worse for ought I 
know, than ever Belshazzer did at the Hand-Writing on the Wall, and the Occasion was 
every way as just” (259). Roxana, like Belshazzar, fearfully admits that she failed to 
comprehend the divine Word until it was too late. The explicit reference to the book of 
Daniel is particularly appropriate, given the relevance of reading and interpretation in 
Defoe’s novel. God’s message cannot be read and understood by Belshazzar or his 
advisors. Belshazzar has forgotten that God controls his life and actions; consequently, he 
cannot read and interpret the inscription communicating the divine judgment passed 
against his life and reign.61 Like Belshazzar, Roxana imagines herself as a passive victim 
of providential judgment and fails to heed the divine warning. Defoe’s Crusoe would 
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61 The inscription in Daniel is “MENE, MENE, TEKEL, PARSIN.” Daniel interprets Mene as “God has 
numbered the days of your reign and brought it to an end” and Tekel as “You have been weighed on the 
scales and found wanting,” Daniel 5:25-27. 
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have recommended Roxana to study her visions and reflections and “obey their secret 
Dictates, as far as Reason directs, without an over superstitious Regard to them.”62 
 Defoe’s plot, thus, entreats Roxana to carefully read the warnings, instructions, 
and directions that are implicit in her premonitions and explicit in the Scriptures, and 
discourages her from being “supinely and unconcernedly passive.”63 Along the same 
lines, the readers are encouraged to actively engage with Roxana’s rhetoric to perceive 
her role in Susan’s disappearance. Roxana’s opposition to Amy’s decision to kill Susan is 
often feeble and unconvincing: “I was not for killing the Girl yet” (298). Roxana 
concedes that her business is to conceal her past, and her conversations and rhetoric are 
frequently unreliable: Her “whole Conversation for twenty five Years had been black as 
Hell” (301). Although Roxana insists, “Amy effected all afterwards, without [her] 
knowledge,” her rhetoric implicates her in Susan’s disappearance (302). Susan has to 
literally disappear or die for Roxana to go on with her story. It is only when the readers 
read between the lines that they can discern the secret of Roxana’s identity: “(for she was 
my own Name)” (205). Roxana is unmasked as Susan; the truth literally and visually 
lurks between the lines of the text.  
When readers learn to read between the lines, they begin to see the final passage 
about the “Blast of Heaven” not as a grotesque imposition or an abrupt end, but as 
exemplary of a well-integrated idea of providential punishment (330). The logic of 
providential punishment in Roxana is as follows: even if God temporarily supports the 
criminal, he or she is eventually punished in this world or in the world hereafter. That 
                                                
62 Defoe, Serious Reflections on Robinson Crusoe,185. 
 
63 Ibid.  
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Roxana understands the different ways in which providence might punish her is clear 
from the ends that she imagines for herself every time she commits a sin or a crime: “it 
never Lightn’d or Thunder’d, but I expected the next Flash wou’d pentrate my Vitals, and 
melt the Sword (Soul) in this Scabbord of Flesh; it never blew a Storm of Wind, but I 
expected the Fall of some Stack of Chimneys, or some Part of the House wou’d bury me 
in its Ruins; and so of other things” (260). The passage marks the return of direct 
providential interventions for punishment of crimes. Roxana’s end resists the transition 
from providential interventions to a private individual’s conscience for judgment of 
crimes.64 In doing so, Defoe’s fiction hinders any straightforward march towards 
secularism. The novel, however, does make a move toward naturalizing the supernatural.  
Providential punishments, Roxana indicates, operate via natural causes and ensure justice 
for the victim of the crime: lightening, thunder, and storm, are natural interventions rather 
than supernatural ones.  Rather than presenting providential punishment as pre-given or 
certain, Roxana indicates that there is a high probability that God will punish her for her 
crimes: “the Justice of Heaven, I had reason to expect would sometime or other still fall 
upon me or my Effects, for the dreadful Life I had liv’d” (260). By using the language of 
expectation, Roxana indicates that there is a high likelihood of something bad happening 
to her in the future. Put another way, Roxana does not expect a favorable outcome or a 
happy ending for her own story.  
Even if they wanted to, most hacks and publishers who rewrote the novel’s ending 
could not have corrected the providential disposition of Roxana by deleting the passage 
                                                
64 According to Charles Taylor, the shift from the supernatural and the providential to the private 
conscience is an important milestone in the rise of secularism. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP), 427. 
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that I cited at the beginning of this chapter. The denouement and the closure mark a 
return of the providential theories that indicate characters’ lack of control over the plots 
of their lives.65 Providence that manifests itself as coincidence, contingency or accident 
hinders Roxana from exercising authority over her narrative as well as her life. Susan, of 
all the people in England, happens to work as a cook-maid in Roxana’s house. By a twist 
of fate, Amy visits Roxana’s son at the same time as his sisters, whereby they 
unknowingly discover the identity of their benefactress. Rather than rational deductions, 
discovery frequently turns out to be a consequence of coincidence or accident: “both the 
Girls were there, meerly by accident, at the same time; and the other Girl unawares 
discover[s] the Secret, namely, that this was the Lady that had done all this for them” 
(266). Furthermore, Roxana’s husband happens to hire a Captain whose wife went to the 
same boarding school as Susan. It is easy for modern readers to dismiss these episodes as 
random contingencies or chance encounters. After all, these improbable accidents seem 
to defy the rules of causality and logic. However, Roxana suggests that such “unforeseen 
accidents” come within the purview of providence: she reflects, “What a glorious 
Testimony it is to the Justice of Providence and to the Concern Providence has in guiding 
all the Affairs of Men, (even the least, as well as the greatest) that the most secret Crimes 
are, by the most unforeseen Accidents, [are] brought to light, and discover’d.” (297). 
Here, Roxana summarizes the providential law of detection, according to which the 
divine laws detect and punish all crimes. In a Crusoesque manner, Roxana represents 
                                                
65 Alternative readings of Roxana’s closure can be found in Everett Zimmerman, Defoe and the Novel 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 189; John Richetti, Defoe’s Narratives: Situations and 
Structures. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 222; Novak, “Crime and Punishment,” 465; James 
Sutherland, “The Conclusion of Roxana,” in Max Byrd, ed., Daniel Defoe: A Collection of Critical Essays 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976), 256; David Marshall, The Figure of Theater, 154; Warner, 
Licensing Entertainment, 173; Molesworth, Chance and the Eighteenth-Century Novel, 116. 
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luck, chance, and accidents as instruments or dependent entities; the evocation of chance 
or accident merely signifies the rhetorician’s failure to acknowledge the power of divine 
providence (198). The novel problematizes but never completely dismisses providential 
detection and providential punishment.  
Although the voice of providence is silenced or opportunistically appropriated by 
Roxana, the novel’s conclusion makes us think critically about the relationship between 
providence, plot, and eschatology. The emphasis on plot in the novel, metonymically 
indicated through the repetition of the phrase, “But of that hereafter,” ensures that 
providential judgment can take place outside the text.  “The blast of Heaven” follows 
Amy and Roxana not only within the text, but presumably in the “next world” as well 
(330). This “blast” compels the readers to re-read the novel in order to discover Amy’s 
and Roxana’s motivations and the moral choices leading to Susan’s mysterious 
disappearance.   
Re-reading the novel enables the readers to see the shift away from providential 
detection to providential punishment. Written a few years after Roxana, the story of a 
man on trial in Defoe’s An Essay on the History and Reality of Apparitions, revises the 
maxim of providential detection. At the end of the trial, the narrator insists that “ if 
instead of saying Murther very seldom goes undiscover’d, they had said seldom goes 
unpunish’d, I believe it might have been universally true.” 66 Detection, in Defoe’s 
perspective, could be carried out by “earthly means.”67 By using empirical and 
probabilistic theories of knowledge, Susan comes quite close to exposing Roxana’s 
                                                
66 Defoe, History of Apparitions, 85. 
 
67 In Augusta triumphans: or, The way to make London the most flourishing city in the Universe (1728), 
Defoe distinguishes between earthly and heavenly means of preventing crime. “Earthly means” include 
practical measures such as employing “able-bodied men” as watchmen for “every forty houses,” 52.  
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secrets. However, reformation, judgment and punishment remain heavenly prerogatives. 
The readers are assured that Susan’s murder may go undiscovered, but her murderers will 
certainly be punished. Roxana registers the failure of providential detection only to 
reinforce the power of providential judgment and punishment.  
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                  Chapter 3 
Exegesis for Detection: Probability and the Experimental Letters of Samuel  
     Richardson’s Clarissa 
 
“Richardson is very tedious,” complains a frustrated reader to Samuel Johnson in 
James Boswell’s Life of Johnson (1791).1 Containing over a million words, Samuel 
Richardson’s Clarissa (1748) can easily be accused of being too long.2  To overcome the 
fear of its enormous length, Dr. Johnson recommends that we avoid getting entangled in 
Clarissa’s plot, for if we were to read Richardson’s novel for its story, we would hang 
ourselves.3 Still, Johnson highly recommended that we read Richardson “for the 
sentiment.”4 Taking my cue from Johnson, I suggest in this chapter that we read 
Richardson’s story of investigation and punishment of crimes, ranging from minor 
misdemeanors to rape and felony murder, not just for its plot but for its engagement with 
philosophical and theological questions of knowledge in the presence of epistemological 
relativism. The subject of detection raises a few obvious questions about knowledge that 
force readers to keep reading Richardson’s story: Will Clarissa foil Lovelace’s criminal 
plans in time to prevent the rape? Does the knowledge of Lovelace’s crimes guarantee 
justice for Clarissa? Richardson’s fiction, however, encourages readers to go beyond 
“will she/ won’t she” questions, and instead ask fundamental questions that constitute the 
                                                
1 James Boswell, Life of Johnson, edited by R.W. Chapman (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 1980), 
480. 
 
2 Samuel Richardson, Clarissa or the History of a Young Lady, edited by Angus Ross (London and New 
York, 1985). Ross’s text follows that of the first edition and is preferred mostly for convenience by some 
scholars. All references are to this edition. Henceforth, Clarissa.  
 
3 James Boswell, Life of Johnson, 480. 
 
4 Ibid.  
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problem of knowledge: How can one know anything? How can one be certain of what 
one knows? To respond to these questions, Richardson’s epistolary fiction orchestrates 
competing theories of knowledge in letters succeeding the rape of Clarissa. The myriad 
juxtapositions of Clarissa’s probable conjectures, empirical observations, and prophetic 
dreams, this chapter suggests, cannot be contained in a teleological plot: they demand 
proliferating letters containing multiple points of view—letters in which questions of 
knowledge are staged and debated. 
To be exact, two hundred and eighty letters are written and exchanged among the 
novel’s four narrators—Clarissa Harlowe, Robert Lovelace, Anna Howe, and John 
Belford—after Lovelace indirectly admits that he has raped Clarissa at the climax of 
Richardson’s fiction: “the affair is over. Clarissa lives” (883). If both the crime and the 
criminal are known, then how does Clarissa qualify as a narrative about detection of 
crimes? Clarissa would answer that she wants to detect and unravel Lovelace’s 
“complicated villainy,” composed of a web of falsehoods, forgeries, counterfeits and 
impersonations (1016). Clarissa needs to disentangle effects from causes to restore logic 
and credibility to her narrative: “I know not by what means several of [Lovelace’s] 
machinations to ruin me were brought about; so that some material parts of my sad story 
must be defective if I were to sit down to write it” (1163). Partial knowledge, Clarissa 
indicates, would have a direct impact on her writing style: if she were to write her story 
without complete knowledge of Lovelace’s stratagems, her story would appear defective 
or inconsistent. Unlike Clarissa, readers of Richardson’s fiction want to detect and punish 
the malefactor responsible for the protagonist’s death: they want to figure out whether 
Lovelace can be rightfully charged with raping as well as murdering Clarissa. Even as 
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Clarissa invites readers to think carefully about whom to blame for Clarissa’s death, it 
indicates that such a reading is partial and limited, and educates them about a mode of 
interpretation that takes into account religious as well as rational forms of knowledge.   
To the casual eye, it might seem that Clarissa and the novel’s readers undertake 
two different types of investigations. Readers’ investigations are forward-oriented: they 
take for granted that Clarissa has been raped and are curious to know about what will 
happen to Richardson’s heroine and to her persecutor. Clarissa, in contrast, is the victim 
of a crime and undertakes a retrospective investigation: she wants to retrace the steps by 
which she was deceived and undone; she cares little about the next episode in her story. 
As readers follow Clarissa’s investigations to find out what happened, Richardson’s 
fiction teaches them not only to anticipate what will happen but also to care about the 
distinctions between truth and conjecture, knowledge and belief.  
As Lovelace meticulously plans his crimes, he leads the readers to believe that 
Clarissa can never detect or foil his devious stratagems. Clarissa’s insular existence and 
lack of experience as a young woman, Lovelace believes, prevent her from making 
correct inferences before the fact: “Yet, what can be expected of an angel under 
twenty?—She has a world of knowledge; knowledge speculative, as I may say; but no 
experience! How should she?—Knowledge by theory only is a vague uncertain light: a 
will o’ the wisp, which as often misleads the doubting mind as puts it right” (emphasis in 
the original, 789). By characterizing Clarissa’s knowledge as “speculative,” Lovelace 
hints that the female protagonist is inclined to theorize and indulge in conjectural 
reasoning.5 In other words, she is likely to evaluate evidence, weigh claims, and assess 
                                                
5 See the Oxford English Dictionary definitions of speculative and speculation <www.oed.com>. 
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them as mere opinions, conjectures, or highly probable propositions.6 For Lovelace, 
speculative knowledge is similar to the will o’ the wisp or atmospheric ghost lights (often 
associated with mischievous spirits or supernatural entities) that delude and mislead 
travelers.7 Rather than putting doubts to rest, according to Lovelace, a conjectural 
consideration, like the will o’ the wisp, literally “misleads” or leads one to the wrong 
way. Lovelace questions and undermines Clarissa’s attempts to ascertain or anticipate 
events by probabilistic reasoning. He himself privileges empiricism, or a theory that 
emphasizes knowledge drawn from sensory experiences.  In the struggle between 
empiricism and probabilistic modes of knowledge, Lovelace roots for the victory of 
empiricism. 
Lovelace’s empiricism, however, does not always trump Clarissa’s probabilistic 
reasoning. Clarissa encourages readers to adopt an exegetical practice that brings 
together different modes of knowing without clearly privileging one over the other. 
Besides empiricism and the probabilistic view of knowledge—associated with statistics, 
games of chance, experimental sciences, logic, and rhetoric, this theory of knowledge 
replaces certainty with degrees of belief and support—Clarissa manifests symptoms of 
providential knowledge. Mediated by the Christian scriptures, providential knowledge is 
often encoded as meditations, prophetic dreams, and curses in Clarissa. In Richardson’s 
fiction about detection of crimes, I argue, the language of probability (indicated by the 
frequent use of words such as “conjecture,” “probable,” “possible,” and “expect” 
throughout the novel) alternatively supplements and substitutes for empirical 
                                                
6 See Barbara Shapiro’s discussion of probabilistic reasoning in Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-
Century England: A Study of the Relationships between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and 
Literature (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983). 
 
7 See the Oxford English Dictionary entries on “ignis fatuus” and “will o’ the wisp.”  
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observations and the doctrines of providence to help Clarissa and her readers infer causes 
from effects and effects from causes.8 
Clarissa’s epistolary form per se invites exegesis or critical interpretations of the 
text; after all, Richardson’s fiction embodies various acts of reading and misreading in 
letters that are exchanged, intercepted, or publicly read. Moreover, Clarissa demands 
close reading of various letters by insisting that unlawful uses of language, “willful 
falsehoods, repeated forgeries, and numberless perjuries” are responsible for her fall 
(130). The need for careful exegesis, as I will show in this chapter, is nowhere more 
apparent than in a set of letters that though not identical in terms of style or content 
present interpretative problems for Clarissa’s audience both within and outside the novel.  
The letters, I suggest, exemplify the problem of distinguishing between facts and beliefs 
when competing theories of knowledge assume similar cultural significance. The opening 
section of the chapter examines letters that contain Clarissa’s “mad papers” and 
Lovelace’s notations in the form of typographically distinct marginal hands. These 
visually striking letters, I suggest, clue us into Lovelace’s crimes, and manifest an 
aesthetic that registers tensions between empiricism, the pseudoscience of physiognomy, 
and probabilistic views of knowledge. In the second section, I examine Lovelace’s letter, 
which seems to be very different from Clarissa’s “mad papers” insofar it takes the form 
of a unique fable about two misers. Yet this letter is significant in that it enables readers 
to see the nuances within epistemological theories that emphasize probability. By 
drawing on a probabilistic view of knowledge, Lovelace defends himself against the 
charge of rape: the fable aligns conjecture or probable inference with a venture involving 
                                                
8 A few exemplary references to “probable,” “possible,” “conjecture,” and “expect” appear on pages 389, 
391, 462, 735, 747, 775, 904, 1145, and 1073 of Angus Ross’s edition of Clarissa. 
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risk and clarifies the limits of inductive reasoning, statistical analysis, and mathematical 
probability. Lovelace’s mock-defense embodies distrust of induction and probabilistic 
knowledge, and raises the question of what counts as good evidence during investigation 
and judgment of crimes. Clarissa’s “meditations” and allegorical letters, which I examine 
in the third section of the chapter, indicate that the language of dreams and the Bible 
might supply the evidence that the senses and the mind fail to register in the first two 
letters. Through the allegorical letter about Clarissa’s “father’s house,” Richardson’s 
fiction aligns detection with a mode of reading that is attentive to the precepts of 
probability and providence.  
In the final section of the chapter, I examine the tragic conclusion of Clarissa, 
involving Clarissa’s and Lovelace’s deaths, in light of the exegetical practices prompted 
by the novel’s experimental letters. The conclusion frustrated many eighteenth-century 
readers who expected poetic justice (wherein virtue is rewarded and vice punished) or a 
happy ending: Lovelace never really repents or reforms and Clarissa’s death shatters the 
possibility of their union. By consistently evoking a prophetic curse, Richardson prepares 
his readers for the novel’s troubling end. Even though Richardson refuses to endorse the 
logic of poetic justice, his fiction does not sever detection from justice. In her 
posthumous letters, which lend Clarissa a unique ability to speak beyond the grave, 
Clarissa paraphrases and transcribes passages from the Book of Job to clarify that 
Lovelace will be punished for his crimes in the world hereafter. Richardson’s conclusion 
reconciles the orthodox notions of the Christian afterlife with the rules of probability. As 
Richardson points out in the postscript to Clarissa, if any regard is paid to “the Christian 
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system on which [Clarissa] is formed,” readers will learn that there is a high probability 
of heaven rewarding its female protagonist for her meekness and resignation (1498). 
 
Empiricist Aesthetics and the Study of Signs 
As a victim of crime, Clarissa’s first engagement with the chaos around her—
after she has somewhat recovered from the physical and psychological trauma of rape—is 
primarily visual and textual in nature. She first scribbles her unorganized thoughts on 
scraps and fragments that are commonly referred to as “mad papers,” and subsequently 
makes methodical written inquiries to figure out the steps that resulted in her rape. In this 
section, I will show that even though, as a disoriented rape victim, Clarissa cannot rely 
exclusively on her sense-experiences to detect and expose Lovelace’s crimes to the 
public, she still values empirical practices of recording observations and experiences akin 
to those elaborated in the works of seventeenth-century philosophers and natural 
scientists. More specifically, Clarissa’s complex empiricist methodology has a 
philosophical bent reminiscent of John Locke. In the manner of Locke, Clarissa 
increasingly makes inferences on the basis of repeated observations and experiences and 
abandons her earlier reliance on a pseudoscientific theory of physiognomy that prompts 
judgment of characters from their outer appearances. Rather than presenting 
physiognomy as a reliable theory for making assessments regarding criminals, 
Richardson’s fiction endorses a more Lockean empiricism. This mode of empiricism is 
conspicuous in a letter incorporating visual marks like marginal pointing hands that are 
typographically unusual for this period’s fiction.9 By drawing his hand in the margins of 
                                                
9 According to Steven R. Price, Richardson breaks away from the pica roman font and exploits the 
“manuscript motif.” “The Autograph Manuscript in Print: Samuel Richardson’s Type Font Manipulation in 
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Anna’s letter, Lovelace notes the ideas that offend him. Through such marks, I suggest, 
Richardson prescribes a mode of reading that is attentive to the minutiae and guides 
readers’ inferences regarding the seriousness of Lovelace’s crimes. 
Immediately after Clarissa is raped, she writes ten papers that Lovelace preserves 
for “the novelty of the thing” (889). Often regarded as manifestations of Clarissa’s 
fragmented self or evidence of her impaired intellect, these stylistically diverse papers, at 
the most basic level, register Clarissa’s sensory disorientation.10 Paper X, for example, 
with its angled verses and general misalignments, conveys Clarissa’s inability to visualize 
and arrange her ideas in a specific order: the paper literally pushes a quotation from 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, which encapsulates Clarissa’s own tragic tale, to the right margin: 
“I could a tale unfold—Would harrow up thy soul!” (893). The lamentation in Paper II, 
the fable in paper III, and the prophetic vision in paper VII contain several multiple em 
dashes that indicate omission of crucial information and failure to finish and organize 
thoughts. The upshot of this disorientation is that Clarissa often fails to access the most 
basic form of self-knowledge: “—I don’t presume to think you should receive me—no, 
indeed—my name is—I don’t know what my name is!—I never dare to wish to come 
into your family again!—”(890). By inserting visual breaks in Clarissa’s sentences, 
Richardson, who had established himself as a printer by 1723, indicates the importance of 
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memory and the senses for recovery of narrative, identity, and knowledge. The em-
dashes indicate that Clarissa can no longer feel or understand anything.11 
In presenting sense-experiences as sources of knowledge, Lovelace in Clarissa 
adopts the epistemological parameters identified by Thomas Hobbes. Although Hobbes 
was not strictly an empiricist, he did take a step in that direction by making a strong case 
for observing occurrences that take place before, after, or simultaneously with an event; 
these occurrences, according to Hobbes, are “signs” of the event. 12  Put another way, 
signs are like symptoms that assist one in making prognosis and diagnosis.13 Repeated 
observations of signs, according to Hobbes, constitute “experiences” that together form 
the basis of all “expectation[s] or presumption[s] of the future.”14 Past experiences 
furnish men with signs to make more accurate conjectures about the future; or as Hobbes 
says, “they shall conjecture best, that have most experience, because they have most signs 
to conjecture by.”15 Senses, Hobbes indicates, do not furnish certain knowledge; instead, 
they furnish probable signs that influence our inferences.  
During the post-rape investigation that takes place after Clarissa escapes from 
Mrs. Sinclair’s brothel, or the site of the crime, Richardson’s titular heroine undertakes 
empirical inquiries and actively searches for evidence of Lovelace’s fraud. Practically, 
                                                
11 Thomas O. Beebee suggests that the dash appears either a “droll” intonation or a “sneer.” Clarissa and 
the Continent: Translation and Seduction (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania UP, 1990), 143. 
 
12 Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic: Human Nature and De Corpore Politico 
with Three Lives, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 32.  
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diseases. See The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability 
Induction and Statistical Inference (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975), 28. 
 
14 Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, 32. 
 
15 Ibid., 33.  
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the investigation proceeds through exchange and examination of written 
correspondences: Clarissa writes a series of letters to Anna, Mrs. Norton, Lady Betty 
Lawrance, her uncle’s housekeeper and Miss Rawlins of Hampstead to distinguish 
between Lovelace’s truths and falsehoods. Her “particular inquir[ies]” range from finding 
information about Captain Singleton and the recipient of Anna’s letter at Hampstead to 
confirming authorship of Lady Betty Lawrance’s letter (1019). To cite one example, 
Clarissa asks Lady Betty Lawrance to clarify “whether [she] wrote a letter dated, as [she 
has] a memorandum, [on] Wed. June 7, congratulating [her] nephew Lovelace on his 
supposed nuptials” and whether she visited “Hampstead on Monday” from where she 
took “a young creature” to town (981-2). Lady Betty Lawrance’s negative responses to 
these particular queries function as circumstantial evidence from which Clarissa can infer 
that Lovelace hired imposters to deceive her.  
The data for Clarissa’s practical investigation in many instances is furnished by 
Clarissa’s memory. Richardson might not have written Clarissa in the retrospective 
mode; however, Clarissa’s reevaluation of her past to detect Lovelace’s deceptions shows 
that detective business warrants engagement with memories. When mediated by memory, 
perceptions and initial impressions can be subjected to scrutiny. It is only when Clarissa 
examines her memories of the two visitors who misrepresented themselves as Lovelace’s 
aunt and cousin that she can detect a gap between their appearances and their conduct.  
Clarissa pursues various clues supplied by her memories, fully aware of their 
limitations. The two defects of memories that bothered John Locke seem to influence 
Clarissa’s approach towards retention of information. In An Essay Concerning Human 
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Understanding, Locke suggests that memory is ephemeral—it cannot retain all ideas.16 
Moreover, it is difficult to quickly retrieve ideas stored in memory “to serve the Mind 
upon occasions.”17 Clarissa, like Locke, distrusts her memories: rather than simply 
recalling or recollecting events, she refers to the letters and minutes recorded in her 
“book of memoranda” to track down “methods taken to deceive and ruin” her (emphasis 
in the original, 926, 996). At all times, Clarissa shows awareness of the fact that texts, 
particularly letters, can work as material evidence to incriminate Lovelace both within 
and outside the court. She solicits the expertise of John Belford not only in matters of 
law, but also to collect textual evidence of Lovelace’s villainy: “the base arts of this vile 
man,” she conjectures, can “be best collected from those very letters of his” (1163). 
Clarissa adopts an empirical approach toward accumulating data or collecting evidence 
before she can arrive at the knowledge of truth. The letters, Clarissa correctly infers, 
contain a “circumstantial account of all his behavior to [her] and devices against [her]” 
(1173). Still, reluctant to rely exclusively on Lovelace’s epistolary account of events, 
Clarissa, according to the novel’s editor, “made minutes of everything as it passed” (926). 
 By accumulating textual and material evidence against Lovelace, Clarissa rectifies 
the shortcomings of her earlier habit of judging characters from appearances. Clarissa 
initially dabbles in the art of physiognomy hoping to discover temperaments and 
characters via outward appearances. Studies on physiognomy, which had been popular 
since Aristotle, empowered “eyes” (both physical and those of the imagination) with the 
                                                
16 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1979). Bk. II. x. 5, p. 150 and p. 153. 
 
17 Ibid.  
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ability to discover the secrets of man’s soul.18 To use Martin Porter’s words, 
physiognomy promised “a systematized audio-visual scientia” that had implications for 
rhetoric and poetry.19 It proposed that men were not simply characterized by minds and 
souls, but by bodies—it is a simple lesson that becomes increasingly relevant to 
Clarissa’s understanding of herself and others. On the basis of Lovelace’s “honest 
countenance,” Clarissa assumes that Lovelace will reform (545). Similarly, Lovelace 
often operates on the assumption that “we do but hang out a sign in our dress, of what we 
have in the shop of our minds” (1130). In other words, body and dress potentially offer a 
glimpse of someone’s mind and soul.  
The theory of physiognomy helps Clarissa to conclude retrospectively that the 
two women who visited her under the guise of Lady Betty Lawrence and Miss Montague 
were imposters:  
I have been contemplating their behavior, their conversation…their free, yet 
affectedly reserved light manners: and now that the sad event has opened my 
eyes…I have compared facts and passages together…I wonder I could not 
distinguish the behaviour of the unmatron-like jilt whom thou broughtest to betray 
me, from the worthy lady thou hast the honour to call thy aunt: and that I could 
not detect the superficial creature whom thou passedst upon me for the virtuous 
Miss Montague (902). 
 
Clarissa judges the characters of the two strangers differently after the rape because her 
way of looking has literally changed—the “sad event has opened [her] eyes” (902). She 
reexamines the manners and behavior of the two women and negatively judges their 
characters as spurious and superficial; their “light manners” conclusively prove that the 
two women were “jilts” (902). Physiognomical traits thus help Clarissa to discover 
                                                
18 Martin Porter, Windows of the Soul: The Art of Physiognomy in European Culture 1470-1780 (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford UP, 2005), 19. 
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imposture and unravel a significant plot strand involving deception via assumption of 
another person’s name and manners.  
Physiognomy or study of character founded on facial features, dresses or 
manners, however, can be downright misleading in Clarissa. The appearances of 
Lovelace’s fake aunt and cousin—comprising their dresses, jewelry and gestures—
emerge as deceptive signs deliberately produced by Lovelace to delude Clarissa’s eyes. 
Understanding Clarissa’s propensity to judge women’s appearances and manners, he 
trains Lady Barbara and Johanetta Golding to mimic the “genteel air and turn” of 
aristocratic women (875). Lovelace observes that the study of physiognomy encourages 
engagement with outwardly observable signs or appearances, which immediately 
instigate quick and rash inferences. Even though practitioners of physiognomy, like 
empiricists, studied signs and reasoned from what is evident to non-evident, according to 
Douglas Lane Patey, they had to defend the right to call their work science during the 
Augustan period.20 Physiognomics, as Richard Gray notes, was traditionally identified 
with esoteric pursuits such as chiromancy and oneiromancy, and associated with occultist 
prophetic practices; it was not until Johann Casper Lavater published Physiognomishe 
Fragmente (1775-78) that physiognomy began to compete for the status of an empirical 
science.21 Physiognomy as presented in the Richardson’s Clarissa meets the criteria of a 
pseudoscience: claims and judgments based on characters’ appearances are vague, 
exaggerated, and unverifiable. Lovelace, who makes a case for regarding physiognomy as 
                                                
20 See Douglas Lane Patey, Probability and literary form: Philosophic theory and literary practice in the 
Augustan age (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984), 42. Also, see Graeme Tytler’s historical survey on 
physiognomy in “Letters of Recommendation and False Vizors: Physiognomy in the Novels of Henry 
Fielding,” Eighteenth-century Fiction 2, no. 2 (1990) 95-97. 
 
21 See Richard Gray, About Face: Physiognomic Thought from Lavater to Auschwitz (Detroit: Wayne State 
Press, 2004), xix. 
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“the pretended science of reading men,” or a pseudoscience, tells Belford that it can never 
encourage serious and systematic search for proofs (1145). Moreover, physiognomy is 
bound to yield faulty inferences: 
 Thou thyself art an adept in the pretended science of reading of men; and, 
 whenever thou art, wilt study to find some reasons why it was more probable that 
 thou shouldst have been right; and wilt watch every motion and action, and every 
 word and sentiment, in the person thou hast censured, for proofs, in order to help 
 thee to revive and maintain thy first opinion. And indeed, as thou seldom errest on 
 the favorable side, human nature is so vile a thing that thou art likely to be right 
 five times in six on the other: and perhaps it is but guessing of others, by what 
 thou findest in they own heart, to have reason to compliment thyself on thy 
 penetration (1145). 
 
Physiognomy, Lovelace notes, supports one’s predetermined conclusions: it helps to 
“revive and maintain...[one’s] first opinion” (1145). One can discern a Lockean critique 
of flawed inferences in Lovelace’s diatribe against physiognomists who hastily connect 
different ideas to pronounce severe judgments on their opponents. The quality of 
sagacity, Locke suggests, can help an “ingenious Searcher after Truth” to examine either 
agreement or disagreement between different ideas and to find demonstrative proofs.22 
Physiognomists, Lovelace argues in a Lockean manner, lack real sagacity and penetration 
because rather than comparing and examining ideas, they “hunt…for reasons to confirm 
first impressions (1145). Incapable of offering proofs, Lovelace claims, physiognomists 
circulate prejudices and presumptions, which are occasionally true only because human 
nature is marred by corruption and evil.  
Given Lovelace’s account of physiognomy, it is not surprising that Clarissa and 
Belford (who occasionally assists and eventually chronicles Clarissa’s detective work) 
frequently fail to make correct conjectures regarding Lovelace’s plots. In Lovelace’s 
                                                
22 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV.xvii. 4; p. 675, and IV.ii.3, p 532.  
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perspective, they erringly guess of others and read on others’ faces what is present in 
their own hearts. When Clarissa momentarily abandons the poetic language of betrayed 
love in paper VIII of the “mad papers,” she concurs with Lovelace’s analysis of her 
conjectures: “You seemed frank, as well as generous: frankness and generosity ever 
attracted me: whoever kept up those appearances, I judged of their hearts by my own; and 
whatever qualities I wished to find in them, I was ready to find; and, when found, I 
believed them to be natives of the soil” (emphasis in the original, 892). Clarissa judges 
herself harshly for forming hasty judgments on the basis of appearances and emotions; 
yet, the novel indicates that in the absence of worldly experiences, Clarissa has few 
options other than making guesses from appearances.  
One of the upshots of Clarissa’s inexperience is that she fails to detect Lovelace’s 
villainy prior to the rape. The signs that are unavailable to Clarissa, however, are often at 
the readers’ disposal in Richardson’s fiction. Lovelace, for instance, intercepts a letter in 
which Anna exposes Sinclair household to be a brothel, unmasks Lovelace as a “vile, 
contemptible villain,” and his friends as highwaymen and tricksters, and advises Clarissa 
to leave the house immediately (744). Whereas Clarissa never gets to see this letter, 
readers have access to Anna’s conjectures as well as to Lovelace’s unique editorial 
commentary on Anna’s message that takes the form of ninety-two marginal hands or 
indices. Lovelace presents these indices as signs of his violent rage and desire to inflict 
vengeance: “Thou wilt see the margin of this cursed letter crowded with indices. I put 
them to mark the places devoted for vengeance, or requiring animadversion” (743). Like 
Janine Barchas, I see the marginal hands as one of “the graphic instance[s] of printerly 
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mimicry” in Richardson’s fiction. 23  By manipulating print conventions and introducing 
editorial fingers in the margins of the letter, Richardson draws his readers’ attention to 
the very deceptions and impersonations that Lovelace is in fact trying to conceal. Rather 
than reminding readers of Lovelace’s anger, the marginal hands act as signposts that 
provide clues to Lovelace’s complicated villainy. For example, three consecutive pointed 
hands draw readers’ attention to Anna’s attempts to uncover Lovelace’s “inventions and 
contrivances” that otherwise escape “absolute detection”; Lovelace highlights Anna’s 
“conjecture: that Tomlinson, specious as he is, is a machine of Lovelace; and that he is 
employed for some end, which has not yet been answered” (747). Even as the indices 
highlight Anna’s conjecture, they encourage readers to weigh her claim in the light of 
Lovelace’s visual disagreement.  
In recording the male protagonist’s commentary alongside Anna’s conjecture, 
Lovelace’s letter manifests an empiricist aesthetic modeled on Locke’s epistemology. Ian 
Watt famously categorizes this aesthetic as “formal realism,” and connects it explicitly to 
Locke’s empiricist “position that truth can be discovered by the individual through the 
senses.”24 Through minute details and “instantaneous descriptions and reflections,” 
Richardson, according to Watt, mimics life’s actual experience (35). These details or 
minutiae, I suggest, emerge as a repertoire of clues in Clarissa’s investigatory plot.  
Attentive to the details that can foil his plans, Lovelace periodically substitutes for 
Anna’s and Clarissa’s intercepted letters his own forgeries to preserve his plot. As 
                                                
23 See Janine Barchas, Graphic Design, Print Culture, and the Eighteenth-Century Novel (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2003), 132. Also, see Christopher Flint, The Appearance of Print in Eighteenth-Century 
Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011). Flint, like Barchas, reads the indices as indicative of the extent 
to which “fiction is enmeshed in its mode of production,” 127. 
 
24 See Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1957), 12. 
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Lovelace puts it, “in all doubtful matters the minutiae closely attended to and provided 
for are of more service than a thousand oaths, vows and protestations made to supply the 
neglect of them” (emphasis in the original, 473). Here, Lovelace prescribes a mode of 
reading, involving close examination of details, which Richardson frequently urged his 
readers to adopt for understanding his novels: “In the minutiae lie often the unfoldings of 
the Story,” Richardson declared in a letter to Lady Bradshaigh.25 Since Lovelace 
understands the relevance of minutiae, he carefully erases details that can alert Anna or 
Clarissa to his forgeries. Anna laments that Lovelace “omitted everything” from his “vile 
forged letter” that would have threatened his plots (1014). 
 But if erasure of details can assist Lovelace to escape detection, then restoration 
or recontextualization of details can enable Anna and Clarissa to identify literary 
forgeries. Clarissa, as Anna points out, would have discovered the letters forged by 
Lovelace if she had been suspicious of details that seemed incongruous or out of place. In 
particular, Anna calls attention to the details of her handwriting, which, she claims, 
Lovelace failed to properly mimic in the forged letter. Nonetheless, a general 
hermeneutics of suspicion, Anna hesitatingly acknowledges, needs to be accompanied by 
an accurate computation of probabilities: If Clarissa had accurately assessed the 
probability of Lovelace’s “vileness,” she would have paid attention to Anna’s 
handwriting, and thereby detected the forgery (1014). Both Anna and Clarissa learn to 
regard detection as a matter of confirming and corroborating their conjectures. This sort 
of detection is both backward and forward looking for it demands that characters 
anticipate crimes even before they are committed. By judging “the probability of the 
                                                
25 See Samuel Richardson’s letter to Lady Bradshaigh, 14 February 1754. Available in Selected Letters of 
Samuel Richardson, ed. John Carroll (London: Oxford UP, 1964), 289. 
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reformation of a licentious young man,” for example, Clarissa’s cousin Colonel Morden 
accurately predicts that Lovelace is capable of plotting great mischief (563). By 
highlighting a probabilistic view of knowledge and showing that truth cannot be 
discovered simply through the senses, insofar as it requires assessment of probabilities, 
Lovelace in Clarissa, I will show in the next section, adheres to Lockean epistemology 
but parts ways with Watt’s “formal realism.”26 
 
Evaluating Evidence and Computing Probabilities  
 Clarissa’s investment in empiricism, the previous section suggests, results in the 
proliferation of details that are often treated as clues or evidence by the female 
protagonist. Clarissa’s search for clues, however, raises new questions about the 
gradation and evaluation of evidence for readers within and outside the novel. Are 
empirical observations reasonable grounds for proving Lovelace’s crimes? How much 
weight, potency and probative value should one ascribe to handwriting if one wants to 
prove that Lovelace is guilty of raping and potentially killing Clarissa? As far as forged 
handwriting is concerned, handwriting analysis was a crude or underdeveloped craft in 
the eighteenth century.27 Unsurprisingly, then, Clarissa does not consider forged 
handwriting as an absolute or demonstrative proof of Lovelace’s villainy. In the 
eighteenth-century legal parlance, it is “half proof” or insufficient evidence for indicting 
                                                
26 Watt, The Rise of the Novel, 32. 
 
27 John T. Lynch. Deception and Detection in Eighteenth-century Britain (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 
2008), 100 and 135.  
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Lovelace.28 Most evidence, Clarissa realizes, evokes neither absolute doubt nor absolute 
certainty, which is why she needs to weigh proofs, compare circumstances, and calculate 
probabilistic expectations and outcomes. Although probability assists Clarissa and 
Lovelace to make conjectures regarding past and future events respectively, Richardson’s 
fiction warns the readers that probabilistic knowledge should not be confused with 
certainty. The dangers of probability and inductive logic appear in the form of an anti-
mimetic fable about a Miser who steals a “treasure” because he is “unable to live without 
it” in the letter delineating Lovelace’s mock defense. This fable forces us to reconsider 
Watt’s claim that Clarissa is a realist novel (1438).29 
 Richardson’s fiction aligns itself not only with Locke’s empiricist views on 
knowledge and perception but also with his understanding of probability: Clarissa asks 
readers to compare different characters’ claims and circumstances, and to calculate whose 
truth claim is more believable. Most proofs, Locke points out in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, are not sufficient or demonstrative; instead, they are conjectural 
and require measurement of probabilities. Nevertheless, Locke acknowledges that several 
conjectures or probable inferences can culminate into an assertion that is quite close to 
certainty. In fact, the highest degree of probability, according to Locke, is so near 
certainty that it can “govern our thoughts absolutely, and influence all our actions as 
fully, as the most evident demonstration.”30 In other words, Locke admits that proofs and 
evidence offered by probability can be fairly reliable.  
                                                
28 For historical treatment of “half proofs” and probable presumptions, see Barbara J. Shapiro, Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt: Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 166.  
 
29 Watt, The Rise of the Novel, 32. 
 
30 Ibid. Bk. IV. xv. 1, p 654 and Bk IV. xvi. 6, p 662.  
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  Even before Clarissa becomes preoccupied with detection, the novel prompts the 
readers to weigh claims and probable proofs. Clarissa’s family, Lovelace and Clarissa 
make different claims about the chances of her potential marriage with Mr. Solmes. 
Clarissa’s family insists that Clarissa would have faced a “severe trial” on the day 
proposed for her marriage with Solmes; however, “it would probably have been [her] 
last” trial (1259). Lovelace accuses Clarissa of being credulous for believing “against all 
probability… [that she could] have avoided being Solmes’s wife” (392). Clarissa, despite 
Lovelace’s opposing claim, comes to believe that “the probability [of] the dreaded 
Wednesday was more dreaded than it needed to be” (410). To weigh probability, 
according to Locke, an enquirer needs to search for intervening ideas or proofs.31 There is 
no proof or intermediate idea that connects Clarissa’s family’s claims to their actions; 
hence, it is highly probable that her family would have “pushed the matters to the 
threatened extremity” (339). 
 While Locke perceived probability as a means for assessing the quality of an 
argument, probabilities were increasingly quantified and measured by natural 
philosophers and mathematicians during the course of the long eighteenth century. 
Christian Huygens, a Dutch mathematician held in high regard by John Locke, was 
convinced that human beings cannot know anything with absolute certainty; therefore, 
they need to theorize and calculate probabilities: “I do not believe we know anything with 
complete certainty, but everything probably and to different degrees of probability…as 
                                                
31 Ibid., IV.ii. 3, p. 532. 
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100,000 to 1 as in geometrical demonstration.”32 Rules of probability, according to Swiss 
mathematician Jacob Bernoulli, could be applied to most human affairs. Bernoulli 
believed that the “only thing needed for correctly forming conjectures on any matter 
[was] to determine the numbers of these cases accurately and then to determine how 
much more easily some can happen than others.”33 Conjecturing, Bernoulli insisted, was 
not simply synonymous with inferences or hypotheses; it was another term for measuring 
probabilities. Trained in theology, law and mathematics, Bernoulli, however, was 
reluctant to quantify all probabilities: the rules of probability, he believed, could be easily 
applied to resolve civic, moral and economic conundrums.  
Weighing probabilities was not the end, according to Bernoulli; one had to “bring 
together all arguments…that seem[ed] in any way to work toward a proof of the thing.”34  
Bernoulli was not alone in thinking about probabilities with respect to both numbers and 
arguments. Indeed, two complementary notions of probability simultaneously existed in 
the period: the well-established logical or epistemic probability, which represents 
uncertainty about propositions in the absence of certain knowledge of causative 
circumstances, and the emerging aleatory probability, which represents the likelihood of 
future events and uses mathematics to discuss games of chance such as tossing coins or 
spinning a roulette wheel.35 While mathematical probability usually involves quantitative 
                                                
32 Huygens, Treatise on Light, quoted in Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-
Century England, 43. For more information on Locke’s relations with Huygens, see Peter R. Anstey, John 
Locke and Natural Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), 220.  
 
33 Jacob Bernoulli, The Art of Conjecturing, together with Letter to a Friend on Sets in Court Tennis. Trans. 
Edith Dudley Sylla (Baltimore: The John Hopkins UP, 2006), 326. 
 
34 Jacob Bernoulli, The Art of Conjecturing, 319. 
 
35 James Franklin distinguishes between two kinds of probability—logical and stochastic—in his book The 
Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before Pascal (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins UP, 
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analysis and numerical estimates, logical probability attends to the qualitative analysis of 
rhetoric and wrestles with the notions of credibility, certainty, evidence, belief, and 
authority.   
It can be safely suggested that Richardson, who printed books and periodicals 
about law, medicine and science for the House of Commons, the Society for the 
Encouragement of Learning, and the Royal Society, was aware of the works on 
conjecturing and mathematical probability written or translated by many British 
mathematicians and empirical philosophers.36 In particular, Richardson was the official 
printer of the scientific periodical Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
(established in 1665), which frequently used mathematical axioms to explain empirical 
data and was read by seventeenth-century intellectuals such as Robert Boyle and Isaac 
Newton. Although Richardson confessed to Edward Young that he had “little time to read 
any thing that [he] thought controversial or shocking to fundamentals,” it would be 
unreasonable to believe that Richardson was unaware of the popular debates on science 
and mathematics published in the periodicals that came out of his printing press.37 What 
Richardson would have likely known is that eighteenth-century mathematicians such 
Jacob Bernoulli, Abraham De Moivre, and John Arbuthnot frequently applied 
                                                                                                                                            
2001). Also, see Ian Hacking’s canonical work on the topic The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1975). Those interested in various usages of the word “probability” in seventeenth-century 
England should refer to Barbara J. Shapiro’s Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983).  
 
36 Blaise Pascal, Pierre de Fermat, Christiaan Huygens, Jacob Bernoulli, Pierre Rémond de Montmort, and 
Abraham De Moivre were pioneers in the field of mathematical probability; they developed theories of 
probability that directly or indirectly made it to the pages of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London. See Anders Hald, A History of Probability and Statistics and Their Applications before 
1750 (New York: Wiley, 1990). Also see William M. Sale Jr, Samuel Richardson: master printer (Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 1950); Jocelyn Harris, Samuel Richardson (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987). 
 
37 Samuel Richardson to Edward Young (1744). The Correspondence of Samuel Richardson. Vol 2. ed. 
Anna Laetitia Barbauld (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011), 7.  
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mathematical probability to revolutionize the art of reasoning. In the words of De 
Moivre, the purpose of his treatise on probabilities was to teach readers “to distinguish 
Truth from what seems so nearly to resemble it.”38 By calculating probabilities, in other 
words, one could distinguish between truth and falsehood. 
Besides promising access to truth, eighteenth-century mathematicians frequently 
presented mathematical probability as a branch of knowledge that supported Christian 
theories of divine providence. To cite a few examples, in 1710, John Arbuthnot, a 
prominent physician, mathematician, and member of the Scriblerus club, applied the 
mathematics of games of chance and statistical information to answer a vexed theological 
question: Is there an active divine providence that regulates human affairs? Published in 
the Philosophical Transactions, Arbuthnot’s “An Argument for Divine Providence, taken 
from the Constant Regularity observed in the Births of both Sexes” contains sophisticated 
use of probability theorems, calculus, and logarithms for examining data of male and 
female christenings over a period of 82 years (1629-1710). His calculations, Arbuthnot 
claims, prove the existence of divine providence.39 Similarly, Abraham De Moivre’s The 
Doctrine of Chances (1718) reduces randomness and haphazardness associated with 
chance by showing that small probabilities over a period of time mimic the perfection of 
“the Maker’s Design”: “And thus in all Cases it will be found, that altho’ Chance 
produces Irregularities, still the Odds will be infinitely great, that in process of Time, 
                                                
38 See De Moivre dedicated his work to the President of the Royal Society. See Abraham De Moivre, The 
Doctrine of Chances: Or, A Method of Calculating the Probability of Events in Play (London:1738), ii, 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online, accessed 28 Jan. 2013, http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy.cul. 
columbia.edu/ecco/. 
 
39 John Arbuthnot, “An Argument for Divine Providence, taken from the Constant Regularity observed in 
the Births of both Sexes,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 27 (1710), 186-190. 
Reprinted in Studies in the History of Statistics and Probability Volume II, ed. M G Kendall and R L 
Plackett (High Wycombe: Griffin, 1977), 30-34.  
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those Irregularities will bear no proportion to that Order which Naturally results from 
ORIGINAL DESIGN.”40 In other words, a few random outcomes do not negate a 
determined natural order or God’s providence. In mathematical treatises, as I will show 
later, Richardson could well have found a form of knowledge that could assure readers of 
a high probability of crime being detected and justice being preserved. 
Since epistemic and mathematical probability promised an attractive solution to 
the problem of distinguishing between truth and falsehood, it is not surprising that 
Clarissa repeatedly draws attention to conjectures based on calculation of probabilities.41 
Even minor characters like Clarissa’s mother weigh circumstances, evidences, and 
probabilities to discern truth status of various claims: “That [Lovelace] would now marry 
her, or that [Clarissa] would refuse him if she believed him in earnest, as she has 
circumstanced herself is not at all probable; and were I inclined to believe it, nobody else 
here would” (1156). Clarissa’s mother believes that it is highly unlikely that her daughter 
and Lovelace are engaged or married: in the first place, it is improbable that Lovelace 
would ask Clarissa to marry her; however, if he would, she cannot be expected to refuse 
him because of her vulnerable position. In contrast to her mother who deploys the 
language of probability to voice standard opinions against Clarissa, the female 
protagonist uses the concept of probability to understand the ways of providence and “to 
look forward… to the possible as [well as] to the probable” (389). It is not surprising, 
then, that by weighing Dorcas’s (one of Lovelace’s servants) circumstances and her 
                                                
40 See Moivre, The Doctrine of Chances, Second edition (London, 1738), v, 243.  
 
41 It is important to note that probability has little or nothing to do with gambling in Richardson’s novel. 
His protagonists variously express their aversion to different modes of gaming such as dice or card games: 
“Gaming, that great waster of time as well as fortune, is not [Lovelace’s] vice.” Sir Charles Grandison, 
Richardson’s ideal of masculinity, despises gambling for it “put[s] to hazard a certainty.” See Sir Charles 
Grandison, ed. Jocelyn Harris, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986), 2:513. 
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actions, Clarissa is able to detect her loyalty to Lovelace. Clarissa generates what Locke 
calls connections or intermediate ideas and accurately conjectures that “Dorcas may 
betray [her]!...she is still [Lovelace’s] implement!”(927). The intermediate ideas function 
as various arguments, which when brought together prove Dorcas’s treachery: “In her 
agreeing to connive at my escape, she provided not for her own safety if I got away! Yet 
had reason, in that case, to expect his vengeance; and wants not forethought…That this 
chariot should come so opportunely!—So like his many opportune-lies!” (927). That 
Dorcas would let Clarissa escape without caring for her own well-being seems 
improbable and illogical. Defiance of logical probability is presented as a half-proof of 
Dorcas’s villainy in Clarissa’s memorandum.  
Although Clarissa is able to detect Dorcas’s alliance with Lovelace in his 
insidious plots, the novel as such cautions readers against equating probabilities with 
certainties. The probability of any given event is the extent to which that event is likely to 
happen; the likelihood ranges from zero (never) to one (surely). When numbers are 
missing and one mainly encounters the language or rhetoric of probability, as in the case 
of Richardson’s Clarissa, it is nearly impossible to predict accurate outcomes or 
consequences of actions. For example, the success of Lovelace’s stratagems depends 
upon his non-numerical nuances between “the fact…the probable, and…the possible” 
(762).  
 Moreover, an argument that rests on the assessment of probability turns out to be 
a risky argument in Richardson’s novel: it supports inductive logic, wherein particular 
premises yield a general conclusion; thus, occasionally, even though the argument seems 
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convincing, the conclusion is false.42 Despite the fact that mathematics and inductive 
logic could be used to furnish probable proofs, Clarissa warns its readers that such proofs 
are not self-sufficient when it comes to establishing someone’s guilt or innocence.  
The disadvantages and dangers of over-reliance on computation of probabilities to 
make persuasive arguments become evident in a letter wherein Lovelace orchestrates a 
mock trial before his family to “prove demonstrably” that he is only guilty of a minor 
misdemeanor and cannot logically be charged for Clarissa’s death. Written in the form of 
an anti-mimetic fable, the letter about Miser A and Miser B does not fit neatly into 
Watts’s realist framework. Instead of identifiable names or individualized characters, the 
letter presents two test cases: Miser A and Miser B. Made up of a series of propositions, 
the letter plays with possibilities and probabilities, and puts forth risky arguments based 
on inductive logic: particular premises about the two misers yield general conclusions, 
which, Lovelace believes, can be easily applied to his and Clarissa’s case. 
 Suppose A, a Miser, had hid a parcel of gold in a secret place, in order to keep it 
 here, till he could lend it out at extravagant interest.  
 Suppose B in such great want of this treasure, as to be unable to live without it. 
 And suppose A, the Miser, has such an opinion of B, the wanter, that he would 
 rather lend it to him, than to any mortal living; but yet, though he has no other use 
 in the world for it, insists upon very unconscionable terms. 
 …Wherefore guessing (being an arch, penetrating fellow) where the sweet hoard  
 lies, he searches for it, and when the Miser is in a profound sleep, finds it, and  
 runs away with it.  
B, in this case, can only be a Thief, that’s plain, Jack (emphasis in the original, 
1438). 
 
This elaborate example of induction helps Lovelace to supply the missing evidence that 
ostensibly proves his innocence: Miser A is guilty of charging an exorbitant rate of 
interest; Miser B indulges in a trivial theft to avoid this rate of interest; therefore, it is 
                                                
42 Ian Hacking in An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic points out that probability is the 
primary tool for inductive logic (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), 15.  
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possible that anyone who steals from a mercenary miser is only guilty of a trivial theft. 
The inductive inference when applied to Clarissa’s case makes Lovelace guilty of a 
negligible and petty crime. It, moreover, obfuscates the fact that the “treasure” at stake 
comprises Clarissa’s bodily integrity, honor, chastity, self-esteem, and trust. Lovelace 
therefore can confidently assert, “he ought to be acquitted of everything but a common 
theft” (1439). 
In the cited passage, the distinctions between logic and rhetoric, opinion and fact, 
probability and demonstrable knowledge, become hazy and unclear.43 Manipulating the 
language of probability to his own advantage, Lovelace insists that opinions, probable 
hypotheses and suppositional arguments can offer conclusive evidence—especially where 
none exists. After all, B has no material evidence that he would be “undone” if he agrees 
to follow A’s terms and conditions; however, he prefers to follow “his own 
opinion…[which] is every-thing to him” (1438). Opinions and conjectures based on 
probability, Lovelace believes, can furnish valid proofs. Herein, he virtually mimics 
Locke’s confidence in probable proofs and probable truths. In Locke’s perspective, a 
probable truth, which appeared as a matter of fact, was as good as “certain Knowledge”: 
“we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt, as if it [was] perfect demonstration.”44 
Put another way, the probable truth of miser B’s innocence perfectly demonstrates 
Lovelace’s guiltlessness.  
                                                
43 These dichotomies had first come under attack in the seventeenth century in the works of mathematicians 
and philosophers such as John Locke, Isaac Newton, Isaac Barrow, Robert Hooke, etc. For a full list of 
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and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, 27-37.  
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When Miss Montague objects to Lovelace’s construction of rape as an ordinary 
theft, he responds by generating a rhetorical question that functions as a conjecture about 
Clarissa’s death: “Suppose this same miserly A, on awaking and searching for, and 
finding his treasure gone, takes it so much to heart, that he starves himself; Who but 
himself is to blame for that?” (1438). The premise automatically prompts the inference 
that Clarissa alone deserves to be blamed for her death. Lovelace’s immediate audience, 
consisting of his family members, however, hesitates to reach this conclusion, for his 
interpretation, albeit witty, is not legitimate. Lovelace’s argument, after all, is not exactly 
legally accurate. Even though Clarissa was unconscious or “in a profound sleep” when 
Lovelace raped her, according to the eighteenth-century law of rape, Lovelace is guilty of 
a capital crime for he did not have the victim’s consent.45 Instead of referring to the law 
of rape, Miss Montague extends Lovelace’s logic and unsuitable analogy to prove that the 
“theft” is as serious a crime as murder: “a thief…that steals what is and ought to be 
dearer to me than my life, deserves less to be forgiven, than he who murders me” (1438). 
Lovelace quickly dismisses this objection as speculative and ungrounded for it pays little 
heed to the absence of empirical evidence: “But…how knew we, till the theft was 
committed, that the miser did actually set so romantic a value upon the treasure?” (1438). 
Lovelace insists that his knowledge could only have been a posteriori: experience alone 
could let him know how much Clarissa values her chastity and virtue.  
Lovelace proposes that one needs to look at frequency and constancy of 
experience to evaluate the strength of evidence or probabilistic conjecture. He evokes 
                                                
45  See Frances Ferguson, “Rape and the Rise of the Novel,” in Misogyny, Misandry, and Misanthropy, ed. 
R. Howard Bloch and Frances Ferguson (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 
100. According to Ferguson, the eighteenth-century laws of rape specify that “unconsciousness (along with 
states like idiocy, insanity, and sleep) amounted to “negative” consent,” 100. 
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statistical analysis and probability when he asks, “And have there not been, in a million 
cases like this, nine hundred and ninety-thousand that have not ended as this has ended?” 
(1439). The question’s statistical form tentatively asserts that the likelihood of Clarissa’s 
death after her rape was next to zero. Moreover, if frequency of observations controls the 
probability of an event, then Lovelace is not wrong to presume that Clarissa will become 
his wife, if not his mistress, after being raped; after all, “[o]f all the sex” he had “known, 
or heard, or read of, it was once subdued, and always subdued” (904). 
Clarissa’s friend, Anna, however, challenges Lovelace’s confidence in 
probabilistic conjectures involving statistics. She hints that mathematical probability 
relying on frequencies overlooks exceptional or special cases that cannot be mapped on a 
statistical curve. The novel, in this case, endorses Anna’s point of view rather than that of 
Lovelace. In Anna’s opinion, Lovelace and Clarissa frequently err in their judgments 
about each other because they are exceptional beings; after all, “every rake is not a 
LOVELACE, neither is every woman a CLARISSA” (1016). Clarissa’s rape, Anna 
postulates, is a misconceived and violent attempt to transform an exceptional case into an 
accessible statistic: “it is probable that he might have the intolerable presumption to hope 
an easier quest” (1015). By dismissing Lovelace’s judgment based on statistical 
information as an “intolerable presumption,” Anna undermines the idea that 
mathematical probability and inductive reasoning are sources of absolute or certain 
knowledge. At the very least, knowledge derived from probability needs to be supported 
by other epistemological practices.   
Overconfidence in statistics and inductive reasoning is deemed dangerous since 
thinkers in those mode tend to overlook exceptions and are open to manipulation; still, 
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they remain relevant for evaluating evidence in Clarissa. Indeed, the primary attraction of 
statistics and inductive reasoning in Richardson’s novel is that they can provide fairly 
convincing legal proofs. By citing statistics that decouple rape from death during the final 
mock trial, Lovelace attempts to rebut the charge of killing Clarissa. This move is not 
surprising given that legal theories and expressions of mathematical probability mutually 
influenced each other in the long eighteenth century.46 The case of Miser A and Miser B 
simultaneously evokes vocabulary and jargon of mathematical probability and law. 
Lovelace complains that Miser A is willing to enter into an agreement with Miser B only 
“upon very unconscionable terms” and thus defies norms of fair exchange (1438). Even 
worse, Miser A’s proposed contract does not fulfill conditions of equity and is 
consequently a risky financial investment for Miser B: “B would gladly pay common 
interest for it; but would be undone… if he complied with the miser’s terms; since he 
would be sure to be soon thrown into gaol for the debt, and made a prisoner for life” 
(1438). Here, Lovelace points out legal, economic, and social consequences of any future 
commitment to Clarissa. If Lovelace agrees to Clarissa’s terms and conditions, he faces 
the prospect of debt and life imprisonment in the form of marriage. By identifying 
himself as a potential victim of a disadvantageous and unjust contract, Lovelace elicits 
sympathy for his cause. By this logic, the rape becomes a feeble attempt to engage in an 
equitable and fair game with Clarissa. No law, Lovelace hopes, will punish him for his 
attempt to safeguard his interests and redeem an unusual profit.  
                                                
46 Lorraine Daston indicates that the understanding of “degree of probability as degrees of certainty” came 
from “the hierarchy of proofs within Roman and canon law.” See Classical Probability in the 
Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988), 14. Clarissa, however, indicates that eighteenth-century 
non-numerical expressions of probability were indebted not only to legal theories but also to rhetorical and 
theological discourses.  
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The empirical and probabilistic views of knowledge that enable Lovelace to link 
his financial interests and actions, his past experiences and future expectations, also make 
him believe in necessary connections between causes and effects. He points out that 
effects do not necessarily align with causes in the case of Miser A and Miser B or in his 
and Clarissa’s case: death cannot be “the natural consequence of a rape”; thus, a thief 
(even if he has stolen a lady’s honor) cannot be punished for murder (1438). “Natural 
consequence” is a telling phrase in the mock trial—Lovelace clearly wants his audience 
to ignore indirect or circumstantial evidence and to make causal inferences.47 His 
argument indicates a shift away from conjectures based on signs to reasoning grounded in 
causes and effects. An understanding of causality that became particularly influential 
during the eighteenth century came from Scottish empirical philosopher David Hume. 
Causal inferences, Hume suggests in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), are drawn 
from “constant conjunctions” or repetitive relations between two objects; such inferences 
entail mental transitions that allow one to overcome the limitations of evidence furnished 
by memory or senses.48 Lovelace shares Hume’s view of causal inferences; he claims that 
only when rape and death repetitively occur together can the latter can be said to be a 
consequence or effect of the former. Citing statistics, Lovelace argues that in most cases 
rape never leads to death. At best, there exists a spurious or accidental correlation 
between Clarissa’s rape and her death. Unless and until Clarissa and her sympathizers can 
establish a clearer causal connection between her rape and death, and provide evidence 
                                                
47 According to Barbara J. Shapiro, the traditional preference for direct or positive evidence over 
circumstantial evidence was reversed during the course of the eighteenth century. See Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt: Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence, 217. 
 
48 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 1.3.6, p. 61. 
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for the same, Lovelace demands to be acquitted of murder. In the absence of probable 
causes or reasonable grounds for pressing murder charges, Lovelace reserves the right to 
assert, “Were his life to be forfeit to the law, it would not be for murder” (1439).  
Lovelace’s argument is so persuasive that literary critics have consistently ignored 
references to murder in Clarissa. Sandra Macpherson is one of the few critics who 
believes that references to rape as a “capital crime” and the concomitant “specter of 
murder” are relevant for understanding the nexus of agency and responsibility in 
Richardson’s novel.49 In her remarkable book Harm’s Way, Macpherson shows that 
eighteenth-century courts required the crime of murder to be proved by establishing both 
“actus reus and mens rea”—commonly understood as a guilty act and guilty motive.50 
Richardson’s novel, Macpherson believes, avoids the category of “mens rea” by evoking 
felony murder: felony murder, she explains, is “a mechanism for holding persons 
accountable for things they did not mean to do.”51 Given the conflation of acts and agents 
in Macpherson’s reading of Clarissa, one might conclude that Lovelace’s expectations—
rooted in the rules of probability and inductive logic—which frequently motivate his 
actions, are irrelevant. Macpherson’s account of felony murder implies that outcomes 
supersede all actions and expectations; if the outcome is a capital crime, then Lovelace 
deserves capital punishment.  
To give Macpherson credit, Richardson might have been familiar with the laws of 
strict liability and felony murder; however, his protagonists seem to care little about such 
                                                
49 Sandra Macpherson, Harm’s Way: Tragic Responsibility and the Novel Form (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
UP, 2010), 60, 63. 
 
50 Ibid., 60. 
 
51 Ibid. 64.  
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laws and often show outright disdain for the eighteenth-century legal system. Public 
courts, even if they demand empirical evidence and encourage inductive and causal 
reasoning, cannot address personal matters and wrongs against individuals in Clarissa. A 
“man of honor,” Lovelace exclaims, would rather pick up his sword than “go to law for 
verbal abuses” (126). Similarly, when Dr. Lewen exhorts Clarissa to give evidence 
against Lovelace, she, like Lovelace, draws attention to the traumatic and widespread 
verbal abuses in public courts: “Little advantage in a court (perhaps bandied about, and 
jested profligately with) would…pleas in my favour have been, which out of court, and to 
a private and serious audience, would have carried the greatest weight against him” 
(1253). Clarissa’s use of the term “greatest weight” suggests that she believes in 
evaluating and hierarchizing arguments, evidence and proofs. Moreover, Clarissa does 
not think that only courts can govern relationships between arguments, evidence and 
judgments. Realizing that she has neither statistics nor empirical evidence against 
Lovelace, she opts to present her case in front of “a private and serious audience” (1253).  
Outside the public court, she hints, judgments rest on the use of persuasive rhetoric. To 
be judged favorably, both Lovelace and Clarissa need to convince or persuade their 
audience that their claims or pleas are valid.  
But how can one be certain that a claim or plea is valid? Rather than identifying 
valid claims, the case of Miser A and Miser B teaches readers to diagnose invalid claims. 
Lovelace’s propositions and words are remarkably witty; however, that does not 
necessarily make them ethical and true. Lovelace’s false premises are based on flawed 
information; they, therefore, offer forms of evidence and proof that do not accord with 
empirical and established facts. For instance, the proposition that Miser B stole Miser A’s 
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treasure while he was sleeping obfuscates the fact that Lovelace had consciously drugged 
and raped Clarissa.  
Moreover, Lovelace’s method of argumentation and reasoning connects extreme 
ideas—common theft with rape. Even Locke, who admired experimentation in probable 
truths, would have seen Lovelace’s propositions and reasoning as fallacious and 
incapable of establishing truths about his and Clarissa’s case. To use Locke’s words, 
Lovelace’s mode of reasoning is “more adapted to catch and intangle the Mind, than to 
instruct and inform the Understanding.”52 The entangled mind only thinks about the 
validity of the hypothetical proposition—could one blame Miser B if Miser A starves 
himself?—whereby it fails to solve the real problem. Furthermore, Lovelace’s inductive 
inferences, drawn from hypothetical propositions in a far-fetched analogy, are clearly 
ideological and self-serving—they are meant to efface his crimes against Clarissa. 
Although Lovelace’s witty rhetoric gives him an advantage over his family in the mock 
trial—his cousins and Lord M cannot answer his rhetorical questions—his reasoning fails 
to convince them of his innocence. In the final analysis, mastery and misuse of rhetoric 
based on empirical and probabilistic modes of knowledge ensures a temporary victory for 
Lovelace, but it can neither procure a lasting judgment in his favor or against him. An 
alternative solution to the problem of detection and judgment of crimes, as I will show in 
the next section, comes from a providential epistemology akin to that which Arbuthnot 
and De Moivre saw as an ally to knowledge based on probability: rooted in the Bible, this 
religious theory of knowledge encourages readers to pay attention to providential signs 
often concealed in dreams and omens. In Clarissa, such signs work as proleptic devices 
                                                
52 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV. xvii. 4, p. 677.  
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and give readers a clearer glimpse into Lovelace’s crimes than they are able to achieve by 
close observation alone. 
 
Providential Signs and the Search for Reliable Evidence 
 What I have shown so far is that theories of knowledge grounded in senses and 
conjectures supply misleading or unreliable evidence of Lovelace’s crimes. As Lovelace 
constantly manipulates signs and rhetoric, Clarissa and her readers (both within and 
outside the novel) often fail to see through his villainy. Richardson’s fiction, I suggest in 
this section, builds a case against Lovelace by juxtaposing empirical and probabilistic 
views of knowledge with providential signs that are encoded as strange omens and 
prophetic dreams or as paraphrases of the Bible and that provide additional proofs of 
Lovelace’s guilt to the readers. Prophetic dreams and the dense language of the Bible, 
however, invite allegorical readings and are extremely vulnerable to misinterpretation 
within Clarissa. Yet by experimenting in explicitly allegorical letters, Richardson 
instructs readers on how to read providential signs and eventually transforms detection 
into a readerly activity. More specifically, through a puzzling allegorical letter about 
Clarissa’s impending return to her father’s house, Richardson’s fiction successfully puts 
forth a mode of reading that requires readers to engage simultaneously with empirical, 
probabilistic, and providential forms of knowledge.  
 Whereas present-day readers hardly ever associate detection and judgment of 
crimes with dreams, Richardson and several other eighteenth-century writers such as 
John Locke, Daniel Defoe, and William Warburton were less skeptical of knowledge 
drawn from dreams. This is because dreams were often considered as providential signs 
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that allowed readers to infer God’s will and understand the ways of divine providence.53 
In the words of Locke, the only evidence that “cannot deceive, nor be deceived” is the 
one that comes from God himself.54 Providential knowledge present in dreams and 
scriptures, according to Locke, offered “[a]ssurance beyond doubt, Evidence beyond 
Exception.”55 As providential signs, dreams in Clarissa frequently function as proleptic 
devices and metaphorically supply clues that are relevant for solving many puzzling 
mysteries, such as the role played by Lovelace in Clarissa’s death in Richardson’s fiction. 
Consider, for example, Clarissa’s dream about Lovelace’s cruelty and criminal conduct:  
 ‘Methought my brother, my uncle Antony, and Mr Solmes had formed a plot to 
 destroy Mr Lovelace; who discovering it turned all his rage against me, believing  
 I had a hand in it; and afterwards seizing me, carried me into a churchyard; and 
 there, notwithstanding all my prayers and tears, and protestations of innocence, 
 stabbed me to the heart, and then tumbled me into a deep grave ready dug, among 
 two or three half-destroyed carcases; throwing in the dirt and earth upon me with 
 his hands, and trampling it down with his feet’ (342-3). 
 
Long before being kidnapped or raped, Clarissa envisions emotional, sexual and physical 
torture at the hands of Lovelace. According to the dream, despite her piety, “a deep 
grave” awaits Clarissa. The dark and dreadful dream, Clarissa believes, stems from her 
“disturbed imagination” and is a byproduct of her traumatic correspondences with her 
family and Lovelace. The nightmare, as Clarissa points out, regurgitates her 
“apprehensions of the dreaded Wednesday” (343). By blaming her imagination and 
trusting in divine providence, Clarissa carefully avoids the trap of superstition. The dream 
revives probability’s association with prognostication and correctly prefigures many 
                                                
53 See Book IX of William Warburton’s The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated (1737-41). Religious 
wisdom, he suggests, require both man’s efforts and God’s grace. My discussion of Defoe’s Roxana (1724) 
in the previous chapter draws attention to her revelation-like premonitions.  
 
54 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, xvi, 14, p. 667.  
 
55 Ibid.  
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future events. Given Richardson’s commitment to the Christian morality, it emerges as a 
noteworthy providential sign that warns Clarissa about Lovelace’s vengeful spirit.  
 Read as a providential sign, Clarissa’s dream points toward two sets of culprits 
who eventually betray and torture her. Richardson’s readers—both within and outside the 
novel—took sides and blamed either the Harlowe family or Lovelace for Clarissa’s 
hardships and death.56 For eighteenth-century readers such as Lady Bradshaigh and Lady 
Echlin, the dream might as well have been a diagnostic tool or a tool of detection: the 
dream indicates that James, uncle Antony, Mr. Solmes and Mr. Lovelace are equally 
responsible for Clarissa’s death. If Clarissa, as her doctors suggest, dies of a broken heart, 
then the dream identifies the man who literally rips her heart into pieces. Lovelace stabs 
Clarissa’s heart, denies her a Christian burial and hopes for her eternal damnation. Put 
another way, the dream charges Lovelace with the crime of murder.  
  Dreams, however, are notoriously difficult to interpret within Clarissa for they 
read like allegories. In a disquieting dream, Lovelace foresees a duel with Clarissa’s 
cousin Morden, a heavenly reward for Clarissa, and a dreadful bottomless pit for himself: 
“And then…the floor sinking under me, as the ceiling had opened for her, I dropped into 
a hole more frightful than that of Elden and tumbling over and over down it, without 
view of a bottom” (1218). Terrified of the “visionary stuff,” Lovelace momentarily 
wonders if his “dream had been a reality” (1218). The dream, Lovelace rationalizes, is 
capable of representing only one form of “real”—the real state of his mind: “Thou wilt 
see by it only that, sleeping or waking, my Clarissa is always present with me” (1218). 
Belton immediately dismisses Lovelace’s empirical explanation for his dream, and 
                                                
56 See Tom Keymer, Richardson’s “Clarissa” and the Eighteenth-Century Reader (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1992).  
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encourages him to memorize, if not the moral, then the content of the dream: “I would 
have thee lay thine to heart; for I could give thee such an interpretation of it as would 
shock thee” (1232). The dream, Belton indicates, is prophetic, and needs to be read 
allegorically. 57 Lovelace, like Belton, eventually acknowledges that “there is something 
in dreams” that defies surface or literal readings and calls for exegesis, but he refuses to 
read his dream as a vehicle for any moral or providential truth (1234). The dream, in 
Lovelace’s rational mind, is never an allegory of future punishment and suffering.  
 Read through the lens of the Bible, it is impossible to miss the analogy between 
the bottomless pit and hell; Lovelace, however, refuses to read the bottomless pit and the 
open ceiling as fixed or consistent visual emblems. Keeping in mind his worldly 
experiences, he offers the following interpretation of his dream: the open ceiling stands 
for reconciliation, the Cherubims and Seraphims represent his future children, and the 
bottomless hole is a reference to matrimony (1234). At some level, Lovelace satirically 
applies the medieval religious convention of reading dream visions allegorically to 
predict domestic happiness for himself. Nonetheless, as Lovelace frantically searches for 
new meanings of the various visual emblems present in his “prophetic dream,” the 
persistence and persuasiveness of religious meanings of certain signs becomes evident: 
“But then what is my tumbling over and over, through the floor, into a frightful hole 
(descending as she ascends)?” (1234). Lovelace’s probability-based conjectures and 
empirical reasoning thus fail to unveil providential truths.  
                                                
57 Belton here follows the medieval standard of reading dream visions as allegories. Following Cicero, and 
well into the nineteenth-century, it was common to read and remember dreams that seemed “enigmatic, 
prophetic, or oracular.” See Theresa M. Kelley’s Reinventing Allegory (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), 
24.  
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 Having said that, it is important to note that dreams are only secondary sources of 
providential signs. Clarissa reiterates what readers of Defoe’s Roxana already knew: the 
Bible is the original source of providential signs. From the flood in the Genesis to the 
“last days” in Revelations, the Bible is replete with natural and supernatural events which 
function as signs of divine will. For Richardson, the Bible was an authoritative document 
on moral knowledge; it is the only work in which “an example is an example; right is 
right; and wrong is wrong.”58 In the first half of the novel, Clarissa alludes to the Bible 
only a few times; however, after being raped, even as Clarissa undertakes empirical 
investigations, she writes “Meditations” in which she primarily quotes and adapts 
passages from the Old Testament—especially the Book of Job, Ecclesiastes, and the 
Book of Wisdom. Robert Erickson suggests that Richardson turned toward the wisdom 
literature of the Bible, instead of the New Testament, because “these books, especially 
Job—spoke most directly to the willed preservation of the integrity of one’s heart—in 
writing—in the experience of tragic suffering and loss.”59 By latching on to the 
proverbial wisdom of the Old Testament, Clarissa not only preserves her identity in the 
face of loss and suffering, but also makes correct moral inferences during her trials. As 
Belford points out, “on every extraordinary provocation [Clarissa] has recourse to the 
Scriptures”; her actions and behavior are modeled on “sacred precedents” (1206-7). 
   Indeed, by paraphrasing and transcribing passages from the Bible on her 
deathbed, Clarissa learns to interpret providential signs. In a Meditation entitled “Poor 
mortals the cause of their own misery,” Clarissa locates causes of evil exclusively in the 
                                                
58 See Samuel Richardson, Selected Letters of Samuel Richardson, 132.  
 
59 Robert A. Erickson, “‘Written in the Heart’: Clarissa and the Scripture,” in Passion & Virtue: Essays on 
the Novels of Samuel Richardson, ed. David Blewett (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 203-4. 
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material world: “Say not thou, He hath caused me to err; for He hath no need of the sinful 
man. He Himself made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own 
counsel…He hath commanded no man to do wickedly; neither hath He given any man 
license to sin. And now, Lord, what is my hope? Truly my hope is only in Thee” (1189). 
Even as Clarissa’s meditation identifies God as the ultimate arbitrator, it recuperates free 
will—man is free to err and sin; consequently, man is responsible for his crimes and 
transgressions. Locke would have characterized such as an inference as persuasive and 
reasonable. Clarissa’s meditations help her to intuitively grasp providential knowledge, 
which Locke claimed could be logically proven: “Men shall be punished, —God the 
punisher, —just Punishment, —the Punished guilty—could have done otherwise—
Freedom—self-determination.”60 Clarissa encourages the readers to make the same 
inference as Locke: Lovelace will be punished in the next world—this is just 
punishment—Lovelace had the freedom to treat Clarissa differently—he deserves the 
punishment.   
 Even though the “sacred oracles” seem to provide ultimate evidence of 
Lovelace’s wickedness, Clarissa undermines any simplistic use of providential and 
biblical maxims to judge and punish crimes (1427). Richardson, in fact, indicates 
crippling limitations of detection and punishment based solely on decoding providential 
signs embedded in the Bible. On the one hand, by publicizing universal and eternal 
truths, biblical passages and providential maxims jettison ambiguity in Clarissa; on the 
other hand, the obscure and terse language of the Bible makes providential knowledge 
inaccessible to common readers within and outside the novel. More dangerously, the 
allegorical and dense language of the Bible makes it available for distortions, 
                                                
60 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. IV.xvii. 4, p. 673. 
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misrepresentations and misinterpretations. Clarissa’s uncle Antony Harlowe uses the 
Scriptures to identify Clarissa as a culprit who brought dishonor and infamy to her 
family: “Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter (yet no watch could hold you!), 
lest she make thee a laughing-stock to thine enemies (as you have made us all to this 
cursed Lovelace), and a byword in the city, and a reproach among the people, and make 
thee ashamed before the multitude.’ Eccl[esiastic]us xlii. 9, 10” (1196). Uncle Antony 
literally reads and disrupts the Scriptural text with his misogynistic glosses.  He refers to 
his interpretation of the passage as an established truth, “I don’t make the words, mind 
that” (1196). Clarissa, however, sees it as a bigoted and discriminatory reading of the 
passage—a reading that can never prove her culpable or guilty of transgressions against 
her family or God.  
Uncle Antony is not the only character to read the Scriptures in a misogynist and 
self-serving manner; Lovelace frequently quotes biblical passages opportunistically to 
justify his treatment of Clarissa.  For instance, he decontextualizes the Corinthians to 
vindicate simultaneously sexual double-standard and his attitude toward women: “I have 
read in some place that the woman was made for the man, not the man for the woman. 
Virtue then is less to be dispensed with in the woman than in the man” (429). Even 
Clarissa studies individual portions of the Bible and quotes fragments that best mimic her 
own situation. In a crucial scene in the novel, Sally Martin, pretending to be a scriptural 
scholar, picks up Clarissa’s Bible, and highlights the dangers of piecemeal readings of the 
Scriptures: “I make no doubt but you have double down the useful places…Ay, so you 
have—The Book of Job!” (1061). It is true that Sally’s mock admiration and satirical tone 
fail to undermine Clarissa’s authority over biblical texts and language; yet the scene also 
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leaves the impression that Clarissa’s meditations and extractions from the Bible might 
have something to do with her eventual apotheosis in the eyes of the readers.  
The possibility of opportunistic exegesis exists because scriptural evidence is 
open to subjective interpretations. When Uncle Antony passes a severe judgment on 
Clarissa, she implores him to undertake an objective, empirical investigation, involving 
careful analysis of circumstances, before wrongfully condemning her for the crimes that 
she did not commit: “Would to Heaven, however, that I had the circumstances of mine 
inquired into!” (1196). Scriptural evidence, Clarissa suggests, is not the ultimate 
evidence, for it needs to be supported by circumstantial and direct evidence.  
Richardson’s fiction demands the same kind of investigation that the female 
protagonist requests from Uncle Antony: readers need to weigh Clarissa’s and Lovelace’s 
claims, and pay attention to scriptural wisdom as well as concrete evidence of crimes 
implicit in and mediated by language. There is sufficient textual evidence that proves 
Lovelace’s villainy and prepares the readers for Clarissa’s tragic end. Whereas some of 
this evidence is apparent—for example, a detailed description of Lovelace’s intention to 
forge and alter Anna’s letter: “I will draw out from this cursed letter an alphabet…I 
will…gain a mastery of this vixen’s hand”—the other proofs need to be drawn out 
through exegesis or critical interpretation of Richardson’s text (754).  
The explicitly allegorical letters within Richardson’s Clarissa train readers to 
undertake exegesis that helps them to understand not only how and why Lovelace 
committed crimes—rape, impersonations, forgeries—but also envision what will happen 
to Lovelace in the future. The interpretative practice encouraged by Clarissa’s allegorical 
letters calls for an engagement with plural epistemologies and loosely mimics Locke’s 
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approach to biblical exegesis. By the time Richardson was writing Clarissa, Locke had 
made a strong case for empirical, logical, literal and historical-critical interpretation of 
the Bible, which took into account the context (time and place) of writing.61 Apart from 
using reason and common sense to literally read the Bible, Locke encouraged his readers 
to “look into the drift of the Discourse, observe the coherence and connexion of the Parts, 
and see how it is consistent with it self and other parts of the Scripture.”62 Allegorical 
readings, Locke claimed, could never compete with plain or literal interpretations of the 
Bible. As an epistolary fiction, fractured into five hundred thirty seven odd letters, 
Clarissa does not always push its readers to look for coherence and connections between 
parts; it, however, consistently draws readers’ attention to the time and place of events. In 
an anti-Lockean manner, Clarissa also revives interest in figural, allegorical, and 
symbolic readings of the text.63 
A case in point is Clarissa’s allegorical letter about her father’s house that draws 
on the Gospel of John.64 Transcribed within Lovelace’s letter to Belford, Clarissa’s 
allegorical letter initially generates mystery and confusion. Ostensibly, the letter informs 
                                                
61 For more information on John Locke’s hermeneutical method see Kim Ian Parker’s The Biblical Politics 
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Lovelace of Clarissa’s impending reunion with her father and implores him to let her 
make preparations for the reunion peacefully: 
 I have good news to tell you. I am setting out with all diligence for my father’s 
 house. I am bid to hope that he will receive his poor penitent with a goodness 
 peculiar to himself; for I am overjoyed with the assurance of a through 
 reconciliation through the interposition of a dear blessed friend, whom I always 
 loved and honoured…You may in time, possibly, see me at my father’s, at least, if 
 it be not your own fault (1233). 
 
Accustomed to reading Clarissa’s letters literally, Lovelace celebrates the prospect of 
Clarissa’s reconciliation with her father. Readers of Clarissa’s letters, however, have no 
reason to expect any reconciliation or reunion. Indeed, at the level of plot, the letter is an 
intricate riddle that generates bewilderment and confusion. It is this sense of 
bewilderment that compels Belford to indirectly accuse Lovelace of another crime: 
“Surely Lovelace this surprising letter cannot be a forgery of thy own, in order to carry 
on some view, and to impose upon me” (1243). Failing to conjecture probable causes for 
forgery, Belford makes firsthand inquiries to ensure that Clarissa in fact wrote a letter to 
Lovelace. Yet even before Belford finds empirical evidence that proves the authenticity 
of the letter, he is convinced by the style of writing that Lovelace did not author the 
“father’s letter”: “by the style of it, it cannot [be forged]; though thou art a perfect 
Proteus too” (1243). Even Lovelace, a master of deception and forgery, cannot imitate 
Clarissa’s writing style.  
 Lovelace’s reading of Clarissa’s letter is inadequate, if not flawed, because he 
refuses to go beyond the literal, empirical meaning of the words. He pauses briefly to 
reflect on the tone and style of Clarissa’s letter: “There is a solemnity…in the style of her 
letter, which pleases and affects me at the same time” (1235). But he fails to see the 
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solemn style as a rhetorical demand of a grave subject. Moreover, he ignores the 
allegorical and anagogical implications of Clarissa’s letter.  
 Clarissa represents her letter as “an innocent allegory” meant to caution and 
instruct Lovelace, provided he can decipher its meaning (1297). Her rhetoric, she further 
insists, was forced upon her by her circumstances. Lovelace, however, is quick to point 
out that there is nothing “innocent” about the allegory and that Clarissa’s letter was 
disingenuous: it was “design[ed] to mislead and deceive” him (1301). Even Clarissa 
indicates that her allegory embodies complex and obscure ideas, potentially resulting in 
confusion, if not in deceit: her “step,” she admits to Anna, “is not strictly right, 
[especially] if allegory and metaphor be not allowable to one in her circumstances” 
(1265). The novel represents Clarissa’s use of allegory as justifiable and does not hold 
her accountable for any deception; her circumstances, in other words, do allow the use of 
metaphor. Clarissa, moreover, never intends to deceive Lovelace: she sincerely believes 
that Lovelace or, for that matter, any other reader can identify meanings of her metaphors 
through careful reading of her letter. Genuinely surprised at Belford’s literal 
interpretation of her letter, Clarissa remarks, “Yet, ’tis strange too, that neither you nor he 
[Lovelace] found out my meaning on perusal of my letter” (1274). The allegory, in other 
words, seems straightforward to Clarissa.  
 No casual perusal of Clarissa’s letter, however, can reveal the “religious 
meaning…couched under it” (1274). Even Belford, who closely observes Clarissa’s 
behavior, can only identify one mysterious metaphorical reference in the letter: he points 
to Lovelace that the “house” is a synecdoche for the “last house” (1274). If readers, both 
within and outside the novel, wish to resolve the allegorical riddle inscribed in the letter, 
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then they need to observe Clarissa’s letters carefully, evaluate the probability of her 
writing a letter to her father, and understand the impact of the protagonist’s interest in 
religious knowledge on her style of writing. 
 From the very moment Belford receives the letter, he attempts to find empirical 
evidence to ensure that Clarissa wrote the letter. He further makes conjectures based on 
his experience of Clarissa’s circumstances. A critical look at Clarissa’s circumstances—
her ill health, her seclusion, and her family’s repugnance for Lovelace—would make any 
literal reading of the letter null and void. Furthermore, Clarissa’s circumstances stack up 
the odds against familial reconciliation, compelling the readers to ask “what is the 
probability of Clarissa’s father forgiving her after she has been raped and presumably 
abandoned by Lovelace?” Virtually zero! Empirical observations and rational 
considerations of probability draw attention to epistemological and stylistic 
inconsistencies present in the letter and render literal readings of the letter unacceptable.   
Although reading based on empirical and probabilistic epistemologies can reveal 
the context of Clarissa’s letter, it fails to adequately account for Clarissa’s mental state, 
her intentions, and her beliefs, which motivate her to write the “father’s house” letter. 
Clarissa believes that the meaning of the allegory is self-evident; yet, she clearly wants 
the letter to be read in a particular way. To solve the allegorical riddle present in the 
letter, the reader must understand Clarissa’s circumstances, her mental state, and her 
Christian beliefs. When the scriptural mode of reasoning, which is rooted in Clarissa’s 
Christian beliefs and her readings of the Bible, comes together with empirical 
observations about her circumstances, the meaning of the allegorical letter becomes 
ridiculously clear: “Read but for my father’s house, Heaven…and for the interposition of 
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my dear blessed friend, suppose the mediation of my Savior; which I humbly rely upon; 
and all the rest of the letter will be accounted for” (1274). A simple substitution of a few 
words and phrases magically clarifies the message of the letter: Clarissa, it tells the 
readers, can never reunite with her earthly father; she can only hope to be forgiven by 
God. Clarissa’s exegesis then quells the confusion produced by alternative interpretations 
of the letter. Her reading is deemed appropriate, for it conforms to the norms of 
probability (given what has happened, she cannot return to the Harlowe house) as well as 
to the tenets of Christianity. Moreover, it renders her narrative coherent and persuades 
her readers that she can be trusted. Unsurprisingly, then, the reading leaves an indelible 
mark on Belford, who declares “the lady [is] all consistent with herself” (1274). He 
further applauds Clarissa’s ingenuity and skill of exegesis, which marks her superiority or 
ascendancy over inattentive readers, including himself and Lovelace.    
By dissipating unnecessary confusion and enigma, Clarissa’s reading of the 
allegorical letter emerges as the paradigm of appropriate and careful reading, which 
although readers might initially resist, they must eventually practice to understand the 
purpose of the text. Without careful exegesis, Richardson’s fiction suggests, readers are 
likely to form hasty judgments and condemn characters for crimes they might not have 
committed. For example, a quick reading of an allegorical note, which is “wafered on” a 
pre-rape letter and contains Lovelace’s vow that he can “make any woman fear as well as 
love” him, leads the reader to see the male protagonist as a murderer (847): 
 While I was meditating a simple robbery, here have I (in my own defence indeed) 
 been guilty of murder! A bloody murder!—So I believe it will prove—At her 
 gasp!—Poor impertinent opposer! Eternally resisting!—Eternally contradicting! 
 There she lies, weltering in her blood! Her death’s wound have I given her!—But 
 she was a thief, an imposter, as well a tormentor. She had stolen my pen…she 
 152 
 wrote with it, in a hand exactly like my own; and would have faced me down, that 
 it was really my own handwriting (847-8).  
 
Just before this scene, after indulging in a casuistical debate, Lovelace decides that 
Clarissa “must fall” (847). Consequently, when a reader first encounters this allegorical 
passage, he is likely to infer that the “eternally resisting” Clarissa has become a victim of 
Lovelace’s wrath (848). Such a reading presumes that the pen and the handwriting are 
metaphors for the narrative itself: vexed by Clarissa’s attempt to seize his narrative 
Lovelace murdered Clarissa.   
 The use of the feminine pronouns in the passage works as a trap for readers who 
make inferences based on literal, partial, and hasty readings of Lovelace’s letter and 
Richardson’s novel. It is only when the readers re-contextualize the allegorical note and 
critically interpret it that they discover a clever, but misleading, use of personification: 
“Thus far had my conscience written with my pen; and see what a recreant she had made 
me!—I seized her by the throat—There!—There, said I, thou vile impertinent!”(847). The 
“impertinent opposer” who gasps for one final breath is not Clarissa but Lovelace’s 
conscience.  
The allegorical murder of conscience undermines Clarissa’s conjecture that  
Lovelace will be “harassed by the workings of [his] own conscience, till effectual 
repentance take[s] hold of him” (900). Drawing on the casuistical tradition, Clarissa often 
builds the expectation that conscience can disclose crimes and torment the criminal until 
he reforms: “conscience, when it shall please God to touch it, will be sharper than [any] 
sword” (1374).65 In Richardson’s fiction, however, conscience neither brings about any 
                                                
65 See John A. Dussinger, “Conscience and the Pattern of Christian Perfection in Clarissa,” PMLA, 81 
(1966): 236-45. Dussinger reads Clarissa in the light of Richardson’s Anglican affiliation and impressively 
delineates the  significance of seventeenth-century sermons and devotional manuals by Anglican divines 
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miraculous transformation nor ensures justice. Rather than making conscience a medium 
of rendering justice, Clarissa teaches readers to “look to the FUTURE for the reward of 
virtue, and for the punishment of guilt” (1205). Accurate assessment of probability, as I 
will show in the final section, becomes a precondition for understanding providential 
justice as well as the outcome of Richardson’s tragic fiction.  
 
“Probable Certainty” of Providential Justice 
Thus far the chapter shows that Clarissa’s experimental letters require readers to 
be aware of the pulls between empirical, probabilistic and providential forms of 
knowledge. These letters furnish different degrees of evidence of Lovelace’s villainy and 
help readers understand the seriousness of his crimes. The fiction’s allegorical letters 
encourage an exegetical practice that combines empirical method and assessment of 
probabilities with biblical wisdom. By alerting readers to providential maxims as well as 
rules of probability, I will show in this section how Richardson attempted to manage his 
readers’ expectations regarding the novel’s ending. The tragic conclusion that fails to 
rehabilitate its male protagonist and kills its virtuous heroine did not appeal to many 
eighteenth-century readers. By integrating a prophetic curse and paraphrases of the Book 
of Job in his narrative, Richardson’s fiction reminds readers that justice cannot be 
furnished by the poet for it is the prerogative of divine providence. Put another way, the 
novel replaces poetic justice with providential justice. Readers attentive to biblical 
notions of afterlife and theories of probability, Richardson insists, can envisage 
Lovelace’s punishment and accurately predict his fiction’s outcome. 
                                                                                                                                            
like Jeremy Taylor, William Law, Robert South and John Tillotson on the novelist’s understanding of 
conscience and Christian perfection. 
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Capable of murdering his conscience, Lovelace remains unreformed until the 
minute of his death. Killed in a duel with Colonel Morden, Lovelace’s dying words are 
“LET THIS EXPIATE!” (emphasis in the original, 1488). Lovelace, in other words, 
presents his death as atonement for his sins. Even though vice is cursorily punished at the 
end, virtue remains unrewarded, for Clarissa too dies an untimely death. In other words, 
the novel’s end fails to uphold the literary doctrine of poetic justice. Many eighteenth-
century readers, including Henry Fielding, resented this ending: what they really wanted 
was “a happy catastrophe” or future happiness for Clarissa.66 In a strongly worded letter, 
written in 1748, Lady Bradshaigh suggested that Lovelace deserves “hate, contempt” and 
every other punishment, “except the entire loss of Clarissa, and eternal misery: 
one…must be the consequence of the other.”67 She further warned Richardson that such a 
conclusion would traumatize readers’ minds and induce distaste to the author’s works: 
“Terror and commiseration” without “hope of relief…leave the mind in agonies, rather 
than in a pleasing anguish. And when…all is lost, past redemption…must not this 
give…a distaste to the author?”68 Richardson not only rejected Lady Bradshaigh’s 
rationales for a happy ending, he also indicated that another set of inferences could be 
drawn from the novel’s end, which would prove that Clarissa will be rewarded in the 
world hereafter. Richardson’s postscript, in particular, attributes errors of readers like 
                                                
66 See Belfour’s (pseudonym for Lady Bradshaigh) letter to Richardson (December 1748). The 
Correspondence of Samuel Richardson, ed. Anna Laetitia Barbauld Vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2011), 194.  In this letter, Lady Bradshaigh insists  that she is not the only reader to imagine a happy ending 
for Clarissa: “I have been in company with some excellent judges, and had the pleasure to hear them all 
deliver their opinions in favour of a happy catastrophe” (194). Lady Echlin famously rewrote large chunks 
of the novel, preventing Clarissa’s rape as well as death. See Tom Keymer’s Richardson’s “Clarissa” and 
the Eighteenth-Century Reader for readers’ responses to the ending of Clarissa, 214-8. 
 
67 Lady Bradshaigh (Belfour) to Richardson (1748), Barbauld, 4.194. 
 
68 Ibid., 198. 
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Lady Bradshaigh to “a ridiculous doctrine in modern criticism” which makes them think 
that “they are obliged to an equal distribution of rewards and punishments and an 
impartial execution of poetical justice” (emphasis in the original, 1495).69 Poetic justice 
becomes synonymous with “anti-providential” justice in Richardson’s postscript (1205). 
Clarissa’ s tragic conclusion, according to Richardson, simultaneously maintains an “air 
of probability” and affirms the providential dictum “that (in the dispensations of 
PROVIDENCE) good and evil happen to ALL MEN on this side of the grave” (emphasis 
in the original, 1496). The conclusion, in other words, conforms to the rules of 
probability as well as providential maxims, which together necessitate that readers “look 
forward for more equal distribution of [good and evil]” (1495). By urging readers to 
“look forward” to the world hereafter for the dispensation of justice, Clarissa presents 
providential justice (wherein punishment and retribution are God’s prerogatives) as an 
admirable alternative to poetic justice—but only in the afterlife.  
Mrs. Norton, who acts as one of the spokeswomen of providential justice, insists 
that Clarissa will have her “reward[s] hereafter in a greater degree for submitting to the 
dispensation with patience and resignation” (980). Irrespective of their belief in 
providential justice, most of Clarissa’s well-wishers within the novel concur that she did 
not “deserve the evils that [she] met with” (1058). Unsurprisingly, then, Clarissa is 
increasingly perceived as a type of Job who is adversely affected by the inscrutable 
actions of Providence.70 In the Book of Job, however, Clarissa not only finds a model for 
                                                
69 Richardson quotes Addison’s Spectator No 40 here. 
 
70 This idea also inflects many critical studies on Clarissa. Critics such as Tom Keymer and Terry Castle 
perceive Clarissa as a type of Job. See Terry Castle, Clarissa Ciphers: Meaning and Disruption in 
Richardson’s Clarissa (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1982), 130 and Tom Keymer, Richardson’s “Clarissa” and the 
Eighteenth-Century Reader, 209. The empiricist and rationalist bent of Richardson’s novel, I suggest, 
complicates the dynamic between Clarissa and Job. 
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her suffering, but also a medium to instruct Lovelace regarding the operations of 
providential justice. She therefore transcribes passages from the Book of Job not only in 
her “Meditations,” but also in a posthumous letter to Lovelace, which gives her the ability 
to speak beyond the grave. In this letter, Clarissa passes the final verdict on Lovelace’s 
actions by sending him a passage from the Book of Job: “Tremble and reform,” Clarissa 
advises Lovelace, “when you read what is the portion of the wicked man from God…‘The 
triumphing of the wicked is short…He is cast into a net by his own feet—he walketh 
upon a snare…he shall be no more remembered—This is the fate of him that knoweth not 
God’”(1427). The biblical passage serves as a “sacred oracle” that preempts Lovelace’s 
pitiful death and the end of his family line. Lovelace’s triumph is restricted to the 
confines of the world represented in Richardson’s fiction.  
In her endeavors to detect, interpret and resolve Lovelace’s crimes against her, 
Clarissa, however, often distances herself from the biblical Job. Contrary to the popular 
critical opinion, she does not really need Job “to define her wrongs and vent her grief.”71 
She does not even want to understand the “methods of Providence” and its “wise ends;” 
however, she certainly wants to predict providential outcomes of various actions.72 After 
being raped, for instance, Clarissa uses theories of probability to calculate the outcome of 
a potential marriage to Lovelace. Whereas readers such as Lady Bradshaigh saw such a 
marriage as desirable, after evaluating probable outcomes of her union with Lovelace, 
Clarissa concludes that their notional marriage would be bound for disaster:  
                                                
71 The fragmentary quotation is from Tom Keymer’s article, “Richardson’s Meditations: Clarissa’s 
Clarissa,” 94. According to Keymer, Clarissa “discovers in biblical wisdom a form that replaces ‘minute 
particulars’ of circumstantial realism with a luminous and cogent symbolism, and this makes a newly 




 Were I to marry him, what a figure should I make, preaching virtue and morality 
 to a man whom I had trusted with opportunities to seduce me from all my own 
 duties?—supposing I were to have children by such a husband…and think [I] had 
 given them a father destined, without a miracle, to perdition; and whose 
 immoralities propagated among them by his vile example, might too probably 
 bring down a curse upon them (1116). 
 
Skilled in making conjectures based on theories of probability, Clarissa preempts a failed 
marriage with Lovelace: she could never become an efficient helpmate to a man who 
seduced her. The probability-based conjecture has implications for Clarissa’s narrative 
structure: since it is improbable that Clarissa will be happy with Lovelace, a happy 
ending is not the correct outcome of her story. The passage, moreover, interweaves 
probable and providential outcomes: Clarissa infers that her progeny, without a 
miraculous intervention, or, at least, an unforeseen exception, will inherit their father’s 
immoralities, which would eventually doom them to perdition. Accustomed to noticing 
providential as well as probable signs, Clarissa calculates that there is a high probability 
of a scourge or a providential curse haunting Lovelace and her progeny.73  
 But why does Clarissa imagine that a providential curse will haunt her children? 
Why can’t she imagine a different outcome of her marriage to Lovelace? After all, many 
eighteenth-century readers of Clarissa believed that marriage with Lovelace would 
restore Clarissa’s honor and heal her wounds.74 The union of providential and 
probabilistic reasoning occasionally gives the impression that future outcomes are fixed 
and unalterable. Each time Clarissa calculates providential judgment waiting for her or 
for others, she presents probable knowledge as certain knowledge. Providential justice, 
                                                
73 The ‘curse’ in this case could also refer to a venereal disease. However, given Clarissa’s fear of her 
father’s curse in the novel, one cannot dismiss the theological connotations of the term. 
 
74 Edward Moore wrote to Samuel Richardson that “the Wounds of a Lady’s Honor admit of no Cure but 
Marriage.” Cited in Tom Keymer, Richardson’s “Clarissa” and the Eighteenth-Century Reader, 205.  
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Clarissa indicates, is not a variable but a necessary phenomenon: providence will punish 
both Lovelace and his progeny by “bring[ing] down a curse upon them” (1116). 
 For Clarissa, curses, especially if enunciated by parental figures, are threats to her 
future happiness. Hester Mulso, Richardson’s contemporary and a renowned 
bluestocking author, characterized Clarissa’s attitude toward curses as superstitious.75  
Clarissa’s personal piety and knowledge of the Bible, Richardson indicates, increase the 
probability of her taking curses seriously; after all, she is inclined to find and interpret 
providential signs. For Clarissa, even her father’s curse is never simply a rash utterance, 
signifying his “rage and disappointment” (510); it is instead a performative utterance that 
creates the conditions for its fulfillment.76 The curse, Clarissa suggests, correctly predicts 
her ill treatment at the hands of Lovelace and negates the possibility of a happy future for 
the couple.  
 It is important to note that although Richardson made several changes in the third 
edition of the novel to soften the blow of the curse on Clarissa, at no point did he dismiss 
Clarissa’s reaction to the curse as an irrational or superstitious fear. In fact, he seems to 
have defended his representation of the father’s curse in two ways: first, he drew 
attention to the probable causes of Clarissa’s anxiety, primary among which, as Shirley 
Van Marter notes, are, “the special circumstances of [her] estrangement, her suffering 
after leaving home, [and] the delicacy of her sensibilities.”77 Secondly, he used the 
                                                
75 Hester Mulso noted signs of “blind prejudice and superstition” in Clarissa’s attitude towards her father’s 
curse, and asked “[w]hy is Clarissa, who is drawn as a woman of so good an understanding, and who 
reasons so justly on all other subjects, to be so superstitious and weak in her apprehensions of parental 
authority?” Cited in Shirley Van Marter’s “Richardson’s Debt to Hester Mulso Concerning the Curse in 
Clarissa,” Papers on Language and Literature 14 (1978), 23.  
 
76 See J.L. Austin, How to do things with Words (Cambridge and Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1962), 6. 
 
77 Shirley Van Marter, “Richardson’s Debt to Hester Mulso,” 25. 
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rhetoric of probability to explain the likelihood of the materialization of the curse. 
Repeated observations of literal fulfillment of “prophetic blessings and curses of the old 
patriarchs,” Richardson informed Mulso, could explain Clarissa’s concerns about the 
curse.78  
 Given the impact of Mr. Harlowe’s curse and its ultimate efficacy in Clarissa, 
Peter Hynes concludes, “Richardson wanted his readers to take the proleptic force of the 
utterance with at least a degree of seriousness.”79 While Hynes rightly identifies that 
curses like dreams are “proleptic instrument[s]” that demand readers’ attention, he merely 
registers the effects of the curse and fails to explain why the utterance leaves a 
“disturbing impression” on Clarissa and the novel’s readers.80 Mr. Harlowe’s curse is an 
extraordinary proleptic device that enables readers to predict Clarissa’s tragic end. In this 
regard, it is important to note that Arabella, who has technically misunderstood the true 
situation, voices the curse and presents it as a prophetic statement: “that you may meet 
your punishment, both here and hereafter, by means of the very wretch in whom you 
have chosen to place your wicked confidence” (509).  The prophetic prediction, Clarissa 
believes, is bound to come true: “Oh the dreadful weight of a father’s curse, thus in the 
letter of it so likely to be fulfilled!” (729). This is not surprising given the widespread 
belief in probable fulfillment of prophecies in the eighteenth century. Even famous 
mathematician Isaac Newton suggested that fulfillment of a prophecy was a scientific 
                                                
78 Shirley Van Marter, “Richardson’s Debt to Hester Mulso,” 25. 
 
79 Peter Hynes, “Curses, Oaths, and Narrative in Richardson’s Clarissa.” ELH.56, no. 2 (Summer, 1989), 
313.  
 
80 Ibid. 318, 313.  
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proof of the existence of divine providence.81 The connection between prophecies, curses, 
and providence gives Mr. Harlowe’s words their supernatural agency and force.  
The aspect of the father’s curse that most upsets and unsettles Clarissa deals with 
her spiritual interests and the world hereafter. She begs her sister to persuade her father to 
“revoke the heaviest part of the very heavy curse…which relates to HEREAFTER” 
(1122).  An inveterate Bible reader, Clarissa shows keen awareness of the Old Testament 
use of curses to render justice for transgressions of divine laws. Mr. Harlowe’s curse 
triggers Clarissa’s belief in providential causality: her trials and punishments in this 
world fit in “the general course of providence,” wherein the “fault bring[s] on its own 
punishment” (989). When it comes to detecting her own faults, Clarissa readily 
acknowledges that she not only disobeyed her parents, but also presumed that she could 
“be an humble means, in the hand of Providence, to reclaim” Lovelace (985). Clarissa 
clearly conflates patriarchal laws with providential laws, whereby she comes to 
understand defiance of parental authority and vanity as transgressions that deserve 
punishment.82  
Still, in Clarissa’s imagination her father and Lovelace are insignificant 
instruments of temporal or worldly oppression; they can carry out small penalties but not 
render true justice. In her letters to her friends and family, Clarissa locates meaningful 
                                                
81 See James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin (eds), The Millenarian Turn: Millenarian Contexts of 
Science, Politics and Everyday Anglo-American Life in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 95-118.  
 
82 This conflation of patriarchal and providential laws annoyed Hester Mulso so much that she wrote an 
angry letter to Richardson, complaining that “[Clarissa] speaks of her father in more places than one, as if 
he were the arbitrator of her fate in this world and the next. She can neither live nor die under his 
malediction, she cannot go to Heaven without a passport from him—Surely, surely this it [sic] too much! I 




justice and punishment in God’s province. Clarissa quotes the Bible in her letter to James 
Harlowe, and exhorts him to avoid dueling because the Lord said, “Vengeance is mine, 
and I will repay it” (1373). She points out that God can punish a presumptuous innocent 
who initiates a duel and delay the punishment for the truly guilty. No worldly patriarch, 
she insists, should play the role of a judge or jury.83  
Refusing to be an arbitrator of Clarissa’s destiny, Richardson in his postscript to 
the novel urged his readers to believe in the probable certainty of providential justice. 
The need for meaningful justice, if nothing else, Richardson averred, should prevent the 
readers from seeking poetical justice: “God by Revelation teaches us” that true justice 
can only be found in the world hereafter (1495). Providential knowledge, encoded as 
biblical maxims, Richardson concluded, could enable readers to make the leap from 
probability to certainty of providential justice. Through seemingly endless reams of 
letters, Richardson captured the experience of the problem of knowledge in his world, 
and prompted his readers to look for solutions in the eternal world that escapes the 




                                                
83 A similar point appears in Richardson’s moral tract, Six Original Letters Upon Dueling (1765). The 
narrator, Thomas Gilles, rebukes the two duelists, John and Andrew, for opposing “the laws of God and 
man” and for attempting to become their “own judge and jury.” Such arrogance, Gilles points out, 
“deserves punishment here” and in the world hereafter. See Samuel Richardson. Six Original Letters Upon 
Duelling, Samuel Richardson: Early Works. Vol. 1 The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Samuel 




 Skepticism and the Hermeneutics of Detection in William Godwin’s Caleb Williams 
 
 
Tracing causes from effects, the protagonist of William Godwin’s Caleb Williams 
(1794) discovers that his noble patron is in fact a murderer. Godwin casts his protagonist 
as a sort of natural philosopher whose search for knowledge compels him to keep 
investigating his patron’s life.1 Rather than finding solutions to a particular crime, Caleb 
seeks knowledge of truth. Often read as the first detective novel, Godwin’s Caleb 
Williams in fact is one of many eighteenth-century fictions that use the subject of 
detection to delineate the problem of establishing truth when different theories of 
knowledge are culturally available.2 This final chapter in the story about detection and the 
problem of knowledge tracks tensions and overlaps between epistemologies associated 
with the eighteenth-century dissenting traditions and Calvinistic theology, David 
Hartley’s associationism, Joseph Priestley’s scientific empiricism, and David Hume’s 
skepticism.  
The problem of knowledge, especially the problem of self-knowledge, first 
becomes apparent in Godwin’s use of first-person narration. For making causal 
connections, Caleb writes a memoir and narrates his story from the first-person 
                                                
1 William Godwin. Things as They Are: or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams. Collected Novels and 
Memoirs of William Godwin.Vol 3. ed. Pamela Clemit (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1992). Henceforth, 
Caleb Williams. References are to this edition. 
 
2 In his survey of detective fiction, Ian Ousby praises William Godwin for demonstrating “for the first time 
that the detective could become the focus of serious literary interest.”2 Even as Caleb is cast as a detective, 
Godwin’s novel Caleb Williams is canonized as the first novel of crime and detection in English literature. 
See Ian Ousby, Bloodhounds of Heaven: The Detective in English Fiction from Godwin to Doyle 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1976), 44. The preceding chapters of this dissertation undermine such hyperbolic 
assertions in an important way: they identify eighteenth-century fictions that at least partially anticipate and 
antedate nineteenth-century detective stories.  
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perspective. This memoir enables him to collect his experiences, examine his memories, 
and undertake a retrospective analysis whereby he becomes a detective-like figure. 
Caleb’s transformation from a detective-like figure to a metaphorical murderer by the end 
of the novel, instead of being an example of inconsistent characterization, is a 
manifestation of the novel’s vexed relationship to Calvinist epistemology. While it might 
seem that the emphasis on guilt results in the novel’s pessimistic mood, I argue that the 
text’s two bleak endings (only one of which was published) are narrative symptoms of 
extreme empiricism and skepticism, especially as practiced by philosopher David Hume. 
As all knowledge threatens to disintegrate into probability, conjectures or probable 
inferences inform the structure of Caleb Williams. The frequent recourse to conjectures 
severs the association between knowledge and justice. The narrative attempt to preserve 
truth, I suggest, results in a shift away from extreme skepticism to skeptical reading of 
texts. This shift generates a philosophical hermeneutic code that opens narrative truths to 
analysis and investigation. As reading gains primacy in Godwin’s novel, an ordinary 
pamphlet containing the story of the titular hero renders Caleb into an easy target of 
persecution and detection.   
 My method of reading Godwin’s fiction helps us to account for the stylistic 
fluctuations that have been the subject of critical scrutiny since the publication of Caleb 
Williams at the end of the eighteenth century. Godwin’s contemporary Elizabeth 
Inchbald, for instance, suggested that the shifts in style result in a fiction with an uneven 
affect: “ [the] first volume is far inferior to the two last. The second is sublimely 
horrible—captivatingly frightful. [The] third is all a great genius can do to delight a great 
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genius.”3 Inchbald’s influential observation ensures that even now critics read Caleb 
Williams as a disjointed fiction wherein the three volumes are separate units.4 The 
repeated stories of injustice in the first volume of Caleb Williams that Inchbald saw as 
inferior to the tale of pursuit and detection in the final volume, I will show later in this 
chapter, can be seen as an aspect of a narrative technique modeled on the empirical 
experiments of eighteenth-century chemists such as Joseph Priestley. Accumulating a 
number of stories that are curiously similar to each other allows Godwin to support 
Caleb’s claims about detection and punishment of crimes. 
 In identifying the epistemological rifts that shape the narrative of Godwin’s novel, 
I build on John Bender’s observation that Caleb Williams “is conflictual and dynamic at 
its very core, a text most usefully imagined as a residue of intellectual and 
representational struggle, rather than as the embodiment of a single set of purposive 
intentions or the outcome of a teleological development in thought.”5 Even as Bender 
refuses to impose a simplistic or teleological reading on Caleb Williams, he limits the 
“intellectual and representational struggle” to the interactions between “political thought 
and narrative technique.”6 By confining intellectual friction to the domain of politics, 
Bender undermines the extent to which religious thinking and scientific reasoning affect 
the form of Caleb Williams. As Caleb struggles to answer the question, “Was [Mr. 
Falkland] a murderer?,” he is forced to examine the extent and limits of his knowledge. 
                                                
3 Letter from Elizabeth Inchbald to William Godwin, no date. Reprinted in Keagan Paul’s William Godwin: 
His Friends and Contemporaries (London: H.S. King, 1876), 139. 
 
4 Don Locke, A Fantasy of Reason (London: Routledge Library Editions, Political Science Volume 29, 
2013), 67.  
 
5 John Bender. “Impersonal Violence: The Penetrating Gaze and the Field of Narration in Caleb Williams.” 




The problem of detection offers Caleb a fertile ground for exploring competing theories 
about knowledge, causation, and truth. Even as Caleb relies on empirical observations 
and notions of probability to look for circumstantial evidence of the crime, he feels 
certain that his investigation goes forward because of an “unconquerable destiny” (118). 
God’s direct interventions might have disappeared from Caleb Williams, but the project 
of rationalizing the irrational or of abandoning faith for reason remains incomplete. After 
all, Caleb and the novel’s readers fail to understand Mr. Falkland’s motivations and the 
details of his secret remain buried in a mysterious trunk. 
 
First-Person Narration and Self-Knowledge 
Godwin began Caleb Williams as a third-person narrative. Omniscient narration, 
however, gives an impression of authority over questions of knowledge. A story about 
investigation of a crime, especially in the absence of certain knowledge, Godwin felt, 
required the first-person point of view rather than the illusion of omniscience. A first-
person narrative, according to Godwin, could potentially provide readers insights into the 
mind of the person who carries out an investigation and suffers from its consequences: 
I began my narrative… in the third person. But I speedily became dissatisfied. It 
then assumed the first person, making the hero of my tale his own 
historian…[This] was infinitely best adapted…to my vein of delineation, where 
the thing in which my imagination reveled the most freely, was the analysis of the 
private and internal operations of the mind, employing my metaphysical 
dissecting knife in tracing and laying bare the involutions of motive.7 
 
Here, Godwin favors the first-person narrative mode to carry out the kind of analytical 
work that we now associate with the scientific discipline of psychology. In particular, 
                                                
7 See William Godwin, “Preface” to Fleetwood, Collected Novels and Memoirs of William Godwin, vol 3, 
ed. Pamela Clemit (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1992), 10. 
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Godwin presents Caleb Williams as a study of different aspects of human mind and 
behavior, prominent among which are cognition, or mental operations related to 
knowledge, and motivation or reasons for a person’s actions and desires.8 Indeed, for 
Godwin, the study of human mind was akin to an empirical science based on 
observations and experiments as well as a metaphysical, even theological, investigation 
involving intuition. Unlike eighteenth-century philosophers David Hume and Immanuel 
Kant, who attempted to distinguish metaphysics from science, Godwin uses the phrase 
“metaphysical dissecting knife” to describe his narrative technique and indicates the 
extent to which kinship between metaphysics, theology, and science informs the form of 
his fiction. 9 
 The narrator of Caleb Williams shares Godwin’s objective of analyzing the 
private operations of human mind and indicates that such an examination is important for 
establishing Falkland’s guilt or innocence: “I endeavored to remark what passed in the 
mind of one man, and the variety of conjectures into which I was led, appeared as it were 
to render me a competent adept in the different modes in which the human intellect 
displays its secret workings” (111). Caleb sees the examination of “the mind of one man” 
as a stepping-stone for grasping “the different modes” of the human intellect and 
                                                
8 Rather than the empirical science of psychology—which did not emerge as a discipline until the 
nineteenth century—debates about the human mind or psyche were carried out in the interrelated fields of 
philosophy, natural sciences [earlier known as natural philosophy], and Christian anthropology in the 
eighteenth century. See Gary Hartfield’s “Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as Natural Science” 
in Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains (Berkeley and LA: University of California 
Press, 1995), 184-185. Also, see Fernando Vidal, The Sciences of the Soul: The Early Modern Origins of 
Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). Vidal suggests that psychology existed primarily 
as a “physics of the soul,” which belonged natural philosophy as well as Christian anthropology, xi. 
 
9 See Peter Gay’s analysis of the emergence of the distinction between science and philosophy at the end of 
the eighteenth century in The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. The Rise of Modern Paganism (New york: 
Norton, 1967), 132-141. According to David Hume, the “most plausible objection against a considerable 
part of metaphysics [is] that they are not properly a science.” See An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 2007), 7. 
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knowledge (111). The study of the human mind, Caleb indicates, is a transformative 
experience: it enables him to propose conjectures through which he hopes to “arrive at 
the knowledge” of Falkland’s transgressions (111). More importantly, it brings about “a 
very rapid change in [Caleb’s] character” (111). Although the study of the mind begins as 
an enterprise whose target is the person who commits the crime (i.e. Falkland), it ends up 
altering the discoverer’s (i.e. Caleb’s) perception of himself and ultimately has 
implications for his self-knowledge. 
  The first-person perspective, in fact, seems appropriate for Godwin’s novel 
precisely because it draws attention to Caleb’s self-knowledge. Caleb’s understanding of 
his own motives affects his recollection of experiences, influences his interpretation of 
memories, and finally shapes his conjectures regarding Falkland’s actions. Soon after 
Caleb gets a whiff of his master’s secret, he realizes that detection of Falkland’s crime 
would bring him distress and anguish. He decides to write a memoir that readers 
eventually read as the novel Caleb Williams: “one of the motives which induced me to 
the penning of this narrative was to console myself in my insupportable distress” (111). 
By means of a first-person account of his memories, Caleb hopes to recover “consistent 
thinking” and console himself. Subsequently, he wants to make sense of the 
circumstances and incidents that led to the detection of Falkland’s secret and gave rise to 
his own misery: “I had a melancholy consolation in writing, I was…pleased to repass in 
my mind the particulars of calamities that had formerly afflicted me” (258-9). As Caleb 
writes about his past, he learns to organize the thoughts and ideas that exist in his mind. 
The mind as such, according to Caleb, is “freighted with various knowledge” and 
“endowed with powers” that potentially undermine a “tyrant’s vigilance,” but he also 
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makes it clear that only a first-person account can give him access to the knowledge 
present in his mind and fend off distress (165-167). 
 Despite his utmost attempts to secure absolute knowledge and objective truth, 
Caleb, the narrator, can only offer one point of view. More than once, Caleb confesses 
that his narrative is a collection of circulating stories about Falkland and his knowledge 
of his master’s past is mediated, limited, and possibly unreliable. For example, it is from 
Falkland’s steward Collins that Caleb learns about his master’s love of honor, Tyrrel’s 
tyranny, Emily’s victimization, and the execution of farmer Hawkins for murdering 
Tyrrel. Caleb narrates these events in his own voice and freely intersperses Collins’s 
story with information from unidentified sources: 
I have stated the narrative of Mr Collins, interspersed with such other information 
as I was able to collect, with all the exactness that my memory, assisted by certain 
memorandums I made at the time, will afford. I do not pretend to warrant the 
authenticity of any part of these memoirs except so much as fell under my own 
knowledge, and that part shall be stated with the same simplicity and accuracy 
that I would observe towards a court which was to decide in the last resort upon 
every thing dear to me (95). 
 
The passage sheds light on the degrees of mediation between Caleb’s story and actual 
plot occurrences: readers read what Caleb is able to recall of Mr. Colllins’s tale and other 
stories of similar kind using his memory and memorandums. Caleb carefully refuses to 
authenticate this mediated story, and instead associates “simplicity and accuracy” with 
the description of incidents that involved him, or “fell under [his ] own knowledge” (95). 
The phrase “fell under my own knowledge” is particularly interesting not only because it 
draws attention to Caleb’s self-knowledge, but also because it raises questions about the 
ways in which knowledge is acquired in Godwin’s novel: it begs one to ask whether 
Caleb’s knowledge comes from his observations or experiences, or does it providentially 
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or accidentally fall into his hands? While the exact sources of Caleb’s knowledge are not 
named in this passage, it is evident that his knowledge is critical for generating a 
believable testimony that might prove his innocence and Falkland’s guilt to the audience 
within and outside the text. 
 
God’s Knowledge and Guilt 
Caleb characterizes himself as a detective-like figure with an immense appetite 
for knowledge and “youthful curiosity”(273) But instead of celebrating this 
inquisitiveness, the narrator increasingly presents his pursuit of knowledge as a mistake 
or an “offence.” (121). According to Caleb, his knowledge is both limited and 
transgressive: it divides “what may be called the offensive part [of his life], from the 
defensive” (121). In the “offensive” section of his life, Caleb is an active investigator of 
Falkland’s past, whereas in the “defensive” section, he is not only persecuted as a 
criminal but also confesses to be one: “I have been [Falkland’s] murderer…I endure the 
penalty of my crime. His figure is ever in imagination before me” (276). Caleb never 
threatens Falkland with physical harm; yet, he suddenly transforms into a remorse-ridden 
metaphorical murderer. While Caleb’s abrupt transformation into a guilt-stricken 
miscreant might seem like an example of inconsistent characterization, I suggest that it 
sheds light on the novel’s complicated relationship with Calvinist epistemology.10  
 Caleb Williams frequently shows plot events to be determined by mysterious 
forces in a manner that would have been compatible with the Calvinist beliefs of young 
Godwin. Raised as a strict Calvinist and trained as a Dissenting minster, Godwin was 
                                                
10 For the influence of Calvinism on Godwin’s novel, see Rudolf. F. Storch’s “Metaphors of Private Guilt 
and Social Rebellion in Godwin’s Caleb Williams,” ELH 34 no. 2 (Jun., 1967): 188-207. 
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familiar with the emphasis on divine determinism, sin, and damnation in John Calvin’s 
theory of knowledge.  In Godwin’s words, “the first impulse” he “received was from 
Calvinism: the unrighteous shall scarcely be saved &c...[it] infused a solemn tone of 
mind.”11 Language of determinism and persecution appears in Caleb Williams when 
readers expect Caleb to take credit for solving the mystery of squire Tyrrel’s murder. 
Rather than celebrating his feat, Caleb draws attention to the “mysterious fatality” that 
directed his investigation: “It was a kind of a fatal impulse that seemed destined to hurry 
me to my destruction” (110). This irrational impulse, according to Caleb, guides him to 
Falkland’s library and urges him to open the chest that presumably holds material 
evidence of his master’s crime. But even before Caleb finds concrete evidence that links 
Mr. Falkland to Tyrrel’s murder, he feels certain that he has found the real murderer: 
“‘He is guilty! I see it! I am sure of it!’ Thus was I hurried along by an uncontrollable 
destiny” (118). Contrary to his enthusiastic assertion, Caleb hasn’t seen anything. In this 
instance, the source of Caleb’s knowledge is not concrete evidence but an internal, 
subjective realization triggered by an unseen, unconquerable force. Although the word 
“God” is missing from Caleb’s formulations, his language is punctuated by the kind of 
mysticism that one associates with Calvinist epistemology. 
Central to Calvin’s epistemology is the idea that sin corrupts man’s intellect and 
sets limit to his knowledge of God. Calvin famously subordinated scientific knowledge to 
religious knowledge, and insisted that for all his astuteness and curiosity, man can never 
understand God’s will or plan: “a knowledge of all the sciences is mere smoke where the 
heavenly science of Christ is wanting; and man, with all his acuteness, is as stupid for 
                                                
11 Godwin’s note, written on 18 November 1827. Cited in Peter H. Marshall’s William Godwin (New 
Haven and London, Yale UP, 1984), 21-22. 
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obtaining of himself a knowledge of the mysteries of God, as an ass is unqualified for 
understanding musical harmonies.”12 Although man struggles to unravel “the mysteries 
of God,” according to Calvin, he is never completely devoid of self-knowledge for his 
conscience makes him aware of his guilt and misery. For Calvin, conscience is a faculty 
or a feeling that makes man aware of divine judgment and forces him to acknowledge his 
sins: it “does not allow man to suppress within himself what he knows, but pursues him 
to the point of making him acknowledge his guilt.”13 Figuratively speaking, conscience is 
“like a keeper assigned to man, that watches and observes all his secrets so that nothing 
may remain behind in darkness.”14 Put another way, Calvin imagines conscience as a 
disciplinary or penalizing force that enforces divine laws. 
 Calvinist metaphors of guilt and divine justice appear several times in Caleb 
Williams. In Calvin’s obsession with divine persecution, according to Rudolf Storch, 
Godwin found powerful language of guilt, which in turn allowed him to connect social 
criticism with “rebellion against parental authority.”15 Metaphors of guilt, Storch 
suggests, become prominent in Caleb Williams any time a character disobeys or rebels 
against father figures as Godwin had “turned not only against his father [a Calvinist 
minister by profession] but also against his father’s God.”16 By reading Caleb’s curiosity 
as his “Original Sin” and his disobedience of Falkland (“the model father” and “the hated 
                                                
12 John Calvin. The First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book 
House, 2003), 82. 
 
13 John Calvin. Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill  (Philadelphia: The Westminster 




15 Rudolf F. Storch, “Metaphors of Private Guilt,” 189-190. 
 
16 Storch, “Metaphors of Private Guilt,” 204.  
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tyrant”) as defiance of God, Storch simplifies the text’s relationship to Calvinist 
epistemology and limits the scope of Godwin’s social criticism (194, 196). More than 
restrictions on curiosity, Godwin’s novel takes issue with judgments triggered by 
Calvin’s theory of knowledge.  
 Calvinist epistemology, Godwin indicates, prompts unfair scrutiny and severe 
judgments, which often obliterate differences between the innocent and the guilty. In the 
first trial scene of the novel, a poor peasant who accidently kills a brutish bully confesses 
his crime and insists that the punishment inflicted by his conscience is worse than death 
sentence: “He did not know but it would be a kindness in them to hang him out of the 
way; for his conscience would reproach him as long as he lived, and the figure of the 
deceased, as he had laid senseless and without motion at his feet, would perpetually haunt 
him” (116).17 The peasant’s conscience makes him aware of his crime and exacerbates 
his suffering: it poisons “all his hopes, and [makes] life a burden to him” (116). Neither 
the peasant’s unfortunate circumstances nor the accidental nature of his crime mitigate 
the tortures unleashed by his conscience. 
One of the outcomes of the peasant’s confession is that it ties guilt and despair to 
a criminal conscience in Caleb’s imagination. Every odd look or hasty action on Mr. 
Falkland’s part, Caleb believes, betrays his guilt, and thereby unveils the conscience of a 
wrongdoer. Calvinist theories of knowledge hold sway on Caleb’s imagination as they 
promise to divulge the secret workings of Falkland’s conscience, and thereby give him 
access to the hidden truth. The fact that Falkland leaves the peasant’s trial suddenly, 
“with every mark of horror and despair” on his countenance, is sufficient for Caleb to 
                                                
17 The peasant’s trial recalls providential stories published in John Reynolds’ popular anthology The 
Triumphs of God’s Revenge that emphasize the power of conscience to enforce divine laws. See John 
Reynolds’s The Triumphs of God’s Revenge against the Crying and Execrable Sinne of Murther (1621). 
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exclaim, “This is the murderer! the Hawkinses were innocent! I am sure of it! I will 
pledge my life of it! It is out! It is discovered! Guilty upon my soul!” (117). Caleb’s 
conjecture turns out to be right as Falkland, in fact, is a murderer; however, he jumps the 
gun here by presenting his assumption as an established truth. Caleb treats signs of a 
guilty conscience as substitutes for empirical evidence; still, he feels so confident about 
his speculation that he is willing to bet his life on it. In passing his conjecture as certain 
knowledge, Caleb turns out to be very similar to Falkland, whose judgments of others are 
often founded on prejudices and presumptions. For instance, Falkland tells his kinsman 
Mr. Forester that he considers Caleb’s running away “an indication of [his] guilt,” and, 
hence, he feels justified to prosecute his employee for theft (148).  
In Caleb’s defense, he truly believes that countenance is an index to one’s 
conscience, and uses the same paradigm to judge Falkland as himself. Falkland 
corroborates his accusation of theft by producing material evidence in the form of a 
watch and jewels hidden inside Caleb’s trunk; in contrast, Caleb draws attention to his 
looks to prove his innocence to Forester whom he considers to be a “lover of justice”: 
“[Mr. Forester] You are a man of penetration: look at me, do you see any of the marks of 
guilt? …Could a real criminal have shown himself so unabashed, composed and firm as I 
have now done?” (152). In asking Forester to discern “marks of guilt” either in his 
appearance or conduct, Caleb combines different methods of interpreting character from 
external appearances, including those grounded in Calvinism and the pseudoscience of 
physiognomy.18 Ephemeral signs that surface on a person’s face, Caleb indicates, can 
                                                
18 Johann Kasper Lavater, a Swiss theologian, defined physiognomy as “the science of knowledge of the 
correspondence between the external and internal man, the visible superficies, and the invisible contents” in 
his Essays on Physiognomy (1772). See Essays on Physiognomy, vol. 1, trans. T. Holcroft (London, 1804), 
iv. 
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assist others to judge his character. After all, through a study of Jones’s visage, even Mrs. 
Marney, who in Caleb’s words, is “neither philosopher nor physiognomist,” can deduce 
his “malignant cunning and dauntless effrontery” (234). Unsurprisingly, then, in Caleb’s 
perspective, the gradual change in Falkland’s appearance is proof of his guilt and 
“undying remorse”: “His visage was haggard, emaciated and fleshless. His complexion 
was a dun and tarnished red, the colour uniform through every region of the face, and 
suggested the idea of its being burnt and parched by the eternal fire that burned within 
him…His whole figure was thin to a degree that suggested the idea rather of a skeleton 
than a person actually alive” (247). Although Caleb begins with an apparently objective 
account of Falkland’s appearance, he ends up drawing on the Calvinist language of 
eternal fire or inner hell to prove that his patron’s crime has been punished by death 
within life. 
Even though Caleb suggests that an “eternal fire” consumes and tortures Mr. 
Falkland, he only cursorily acknowledges the possibility of retribution in future life. 
While trying to explain his predicament to one of Falkland’s servants, Caleb swears, “the 
great God shall judge [him] another day,” and find him innocent (156). That Caleb’s oath 
is primarily a performative utterance becomes clear when he breaks out of prison and 
evokes the idea of God’s existence in a parenthetical aside: “Oh, God! (if God there be, 
that condescends to record the lonely beatings of an anxious heart) thou only canst tell 
with what delight a prisoner, just broke forth from his dungeon, hugs the blessings of a 
new found liberty” (187). Rather than an expression of religious belief or a traditional 
prayer, the opening exclamatory remark contains a passing reference to God. What’s 
more, the parenthetical qualification of the initial exclamation—“if God there be”— puts 
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in jeopardy the very being of God (189).19 Even if God hypothetically exists, Caleb 
certainly doubts his metaphysical and moral attributes. Instead of associating God with 
benevolence and omnipotence, Caleb draws attention to God’s condescension and limited 
power: he is afraid that God, if such a being exists, might not have been recording his 
tribulations. By the end of the passage, the term “blessing” is no longer associated with 
divine favor; it is instead a characteristic feature of freedom.  
Caleb’s repurposing of the word “blessing” to discuss his recently restored liberty 
is typical of the way religious vocabulary is used in Caleb Williams. Metaphors and 
images that more religious-minded authors used to discuss the attributes of God in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century literature appear in nonreligious contexts in 
Godwin’s novel. Phrases such as “the eye of omniscience” and “mysterious being,” 
conventionally used to describe the characteristics of God, appear in similes that allude to 
tyrannical human beings such as Falkland and his unscrupulous hired hand Jones.20 Each 
time Caleb escapes to a new location, Jones is able to track Caleb’s whereabouts, and 
                                                
19 Caleb’s questioning of God’s existence in this passage is reminiscent of Godwin’s early interrogations of 
the philosophy of religion. In 1778, Godwin wrote a series of letters to his college friend Richard Evans. 
They debated the existence of God and explored both religious and epistemic implications of the topic. 
Finding it difficult to negate God’s existence, Godwin’s letters endorse argument a priori as proposed by 
philosopher and clergyman Samuel Clarke in A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (1704). 
Even though Godwin ultimately takes recourse to the argument a priori, his method is initially closer to 
that of David Hume than that of clergyman Clarke. He hopes to establish the truth of God’s existence via 
contradiction. In his seminal work Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1776), Hume indicates that it is 
impossible to prove God’s existence using the argument a priori. The character Cleanthes suggests that 
arguments a priori are absurd for “Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction, 
Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can 
also conceive as non-existent. There is no Being, whose existence is demonstrable.” As per Hume’s 
reasoning, one cannot establish God’s existence without first conceiving its contrary, i.e., God does not 
exist. Since it is possible to imagine God’s non-existence, the argument a priori is invalid. There is, in 
other words, no necessary proof of God’s existence. See Vol. 1 of The Letters of William Godwin, ed. 
Pamela Clemit (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), 3-12; David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 
ed. Norman Kemp Smith (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1947), 189.  
 




wreak revenge on Falkland’s behalf. Caleb compares the experience of persecution to 
that of a guilty sinner who is tormented by a vengeful God: “It was like what has been 
described as the eye of omniscience pursuing the guilty sinner, and darting a ray that 
awakens him to new sensibility, at every moment when otherwise exhausted nature 
would lull him into a temporary oblivion of the reproaches of his conscience” (261). In 
his preface to Fleetwood, Godwin indicates that this image comes from Reynolds’s The 
Triumph of God’s Revenge, “where the beam of the eye of Omniscience was represented 
as perpetually pursing the guilty, and laying open his most hidden retreats to the light of 
day.”21 Whereas Reynolds suggests that omniscience assists discovery of hidden crimes 
and restores moral order, Godwin’s novel empties God’s knowledge of its providential 
and benevolent connotations, and instead presents it as synonymous with surveillance and 
unrelenting persecution.  
By using religious vocabulary to describe Falkland’s tyranny and Jones’s 
relentless pursuit of Caleb, Godwin’s novel forces readers to reconsider whether God for 
all his omniscience and omnipotence deserves their admiration. In a telling analogy in his 
1818 essay “Of Religion,” Godwin suggests that God’s omniscience and absolute control 
of humans, either directly or through their own consciences, makes him no different from 
a warder who observes the movements of the prisoners without their knowledge in 
Jeremy Betham’s Panopticon: “We have a tyrant perpetually controlling us with his lash, 
with this additional horror, that he is acquainted with all our most secret motions, and sits 
like Jeremy Bentham, perched on the top of his Panopticon to spy into our weaknesses”22 
                                                
21 Godwin, “Preface” to Fleetwood, 11. 
 
22 William Godwin, “Of Religion,” Religious Writings, vol. 7 of Political and Philosophical Writings of 
William Godwin, ed. Mark Philp (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1993), 65. 
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Even as the analogy is reminiscent of Calvin’s description of conscience as a “keeper 
assigned to man, that watches and observes all his secrets,” it is also a political comment 
on the eighteenth-century criminal justice and penal system. Both God and eighteenth-
century penal system isolate the transgressor and threaten him with horrifying 
punishments.23 
The problem with Calvinist religion and criminal law, Godwin indicates, is that 
they promise knowledge; yet, they end up endorsing unwarranted persecution and 
punishment. In his philosophical treatise An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793), 
Godwin insists that punishment is “abhorrent to reason, and arbitrary in its application,” 
and any individual or government that subjects one to torture is in fact despotic.24 Caleb 
presents a similar critique of punishment when he presents his patron as a Calvinist God 
who monitors every movement of his subject: “Did his power reach through all space, 
and his eye penetrate every concealment? Was he like that mysterious being, to protect us 
from whose fierce revenge mountains and hills we are told might fall on us in vain” (214-
5)? Given that Falkland consistently discovers Caleb’s hiding places and makes his life 
miserable, the narrator compares him to an omniscient, omnipotent, jealous God from 
whose revenge no one can escape. The eye that “penetrate[s] every concealment” 
becomes a metaphor for unwanted intrusion, debilitating oppression, and religious 
persecution (214). 
                                                                                                                                            
 
23 John Calvin. Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill  (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1960), 1181, 1182. Like Godwin, Michel Foucault anchors his study of punishment in Jeremy 
Bentham’s architecture of the Panopticon in his remarkable book Discipline and Punish. Whereas Foucault 
presents the law as pervasive and infallible, Godwin draws attention to the arbitrariness of judgment and 
justice. See Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985). 
 
24 William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, vol. 3 of Political and Philosophical 




A Natural Philosopher’s Observations and Experiments 
 Calvinistic theology provides an understanding of causality wherein an 
unconquerable, unseen force controls all choices, judgments, and punishments of crimes. 
In this section of the chapter, I examine the version of necessity that was popular among 
eighteenth-century chemists such as William Nicholson and Joseph Priestley, and that 
reappears in Godwin’s Political Justice: the new doctrine of necessity indicates that 
repeated observations of causal connections control our beliefs. Along with the works of 
chemists, Godwin’s fiction draws on David Hartley’s associationism to develop an 
observation-based associative thinking that manifests as repeated stories about false 
accusations of crimes, misuse of circumstantial evidence, and injustice. The cumulative 
effect of these stories is that Caleb learns two things: first, circumstances transform 
inferences; second, observations need not furnish certain proofs of any crime. 
 Even though Caleb occasionally evokes God, his primary identity is not as a 
religious being. In fact, he represents himself as an enquirer or a seeker of knowledge 
who is “not altogether destitute of observation and talent” (97). By comparing 
observations and establishing causal relations, Caleb becomes a type of natural 
philosopher who finds solutions to existing problems: 
The spring of action which…characterized the whole train of my life, was 
curiosity. It was this that gave me my mechanical turn; I was desirous of tracing 
the variety of effects which might be produced from given causes. It was this that 
made me some sort of natural philosopher; I could not rest till I had acquainted 
myself with the solutions that had been invented for the phenomena of the 
universe (280).25 
 
                                                
25 The passage first appears in the third edition of Caleb Williams that was published in 1797. See 
“Variants” to Caleb Williams, ed. Pamela Clemit. 
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The passage shows that Caleb’s detective-like skills emerge from his engagement with 
natural philosophy. A precursor to natural sciences such as biology, chemistry, physics, 
and geology, seventeenth-century natural philosophy was concerned with predicting and 
understanding the natural and the physical world by means of observations and 
experiments.26 In the words of Sir Isaac Newton, analysis in natural philosophy “consists 
in making experiments and observations, and in drawing general conclusions from them 
by induction, and admitting to no objections against the conclusions, but such as are 
taken from experiments, or other certain truths.”27 Whereas analysis proceeds from 
effects to causes in Newton’s natural philosophy, synthesis requires reasoning from 
causes to effects in the same way as Caleb proclaims to do in the passage cited above. In 
addition, Caleb’s vocabulary seems to be charged by Robert Boyle’s empirically driven 
natural philosophy. Phrases such as “mechanical turn” and “the spring of action” recall 
Boyle’s description of machines and experiments in New Experiments Physico-
Mechanical, Touching the Spring of Air and Its Effects (1660). By emphasizing his 
“mechanical turn,” Caleb appropriates features of Boyle’s scientific air-pump; to use 
Shapin and Shaffer’s formulation, he is able to “factor out human agency” and render his 
observations as impersonal, unbiased, and disinterested.28 
With his curiosity and mechanical bent of mind, Caleb might appear to be another 
Newton or Boyle; however, the phrase “some sort of natural philosopher” indicates that 
the allusion is not to a particular philosopher but to a type of philosopher-scientist figure 
                                                
26 See the definitions of natural philosophy and natural sciences in the Oxford English Dictionary 
http://www.oed.com/ 
 
27 Isaack Newton, Queries to The Opticks, Philosophical Writings, ed. Andrew Janiak (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2014), 187. 
 
28 See Steven Shapin’s and Simon Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the 
Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985), 77. 
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that gained recognition during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England.29 As 
a representative figure, Caleb combines attributes not only of seventeenth-century natural 
philosophers such as Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle, but also of numerous physicians, 
chemists, and anatomists whom Godwin admired or met on a regular basis. According to 
Sharon Ruston, Godwin’s diaries contain numerous references to people who can now be 
categorized as scientific.30 His acquaintances included notable chemists such as Joseph 
Priestley, William Nicholson, and Humphry Davy, who introduced quantitative methods 
for studying chemical reactions and connected chemistry to moral and political questions, 
ushering in what is now known as the eighteenth-century “Chemical Revolution.” 31  
The natural-philosophical research of his predecessors and contemporaries 
furnished Godwin with methods and theories to delineate “the mechanism of the human 
mind” in his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice.32 Godwin presents the theory of the 
mind as “a system of mechanism,” wherein mechanism is “a regular connexion of 
phenomena, without any uncertainty of event, so that every incident requires a specific 
cause, and could be no otherwise in any respect than as the cause determined it to be.”33 
                                                
29 See The Cambridge History of Science: Eighteenth-Century Science, Volume 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2003). 
 
30 Sharon Ruston, Creating Romanticism: Case Studies in Literature, Science and Medicine of the 1790s 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 81. 
 
31 Joseph Priestley is known for his discovery of oxygen; William Nicholson edited Journal of Natural 
Philosophy, Chemistry and the Arts from 1797 to 1814 and is known to have been involved in the 
composition of Godwin’s Political Justice; Humphry Davy discovered several alkali and alkaline earth 
metals. Jan Golinski connects the development of chemistry to transformation of civic culture at the end of 
the eighteenth century. See Jan Golinski, Science as Public Culture: Chemistry and Enlightenment in 
Britain, 1760-1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992), 8. Also, see Ruston’s Creating Romanticism for a 
detailed analysis of Godwin’s interactions with William Nicholson and Humphry Davy, 82-88. 
 
32 Godwin, Political Justice, 4.7, 175. 
 
33 Ibid.  
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Godwin first represents the human mind as a mechanism or a natural phenomenon that 
can be explained by causes. He then connects cognition to necessary causality by 
suggesting that the antecedent always determines the consequent. At one level, the causal 
determinism here is similar to Calvinistic predestination wherein God dictates and 
controls all effects; however, Godwin takes pains to prove that the “language of 
necessity” is of utmost “importance to the cause of science and virtue.”34 Put another 
way, Godwin offers a version of necessity that can be empirically tested with ideas from 
natural sciences: the “regular connexion of phenomena,” Godwin suggests, are 
observable and systematically predictable.35 Godwin illustrates that cognition and 
causation are tied to sensation with a striking example: when a hot iron is applied to the 
body of an infant, the “report of this uneasiness, or irritation and separation of parts being 
conveyed to the brain, vents itself again in a shrill and piercing cry.”36 The application of 
hot iron is a type of an experiment that affirms the principle of causation. The infant’s 
sensations in the form of his piercing screams prove “a constancy of conjunction” 
between the antecedent and the consequent.37 
In his curious theoretical experiment involving the burning of an infant, Godwin 
draws attention to the neural vibrations that are carried from the body to the brain and 
discloses his interest in mental anatomy. Godwin acknowledges his debt to David Hartley 
for proving “the necessary connnexion of the phenomena of mind” through his theory of 
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36 Ibid., 4.7, 175-6. 
 
37 Ibid., 4.7, 176. 
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vibrations and “system of associations.”38 Hartley, Godwin indicates, provides him a 
framework to show that sensations and ideas are not innate but arise from an organism’s 
interaction with his environment. Even as Godwin acknowledges Hartley’s influence 
over his “philosophical experiments,” he subjects the human mind to experimentation and 
observation in the same way as Hartley’s close friend and admirer Joseph Priestley.39 As 
far as chemist Joseph Priestley was concerned, the human mind was akin to a 
“laboratory” that permitted experimentation and observation in a controlled 
environment.40 Priestley proposed that the mind was accessible to experiment-based 
research and carefully registered the impact of a natural philosopher’s prejudices on his 
observations. In his innovative six-volume work in chemistry Experiments and 
Observations on Different Kinds of Air (1774-86), Priestley conducts three consecutive 
tests using a candle, mice, and “nitrous air” (NO) and discovers a new substance that he 
calls “dephlogisticated air” (now known as oxygen). Priestley acknowledges that he 
initially failed to discover the connection between oxygen and the constitution of 
atmosphere as prejudice affected “the perception of [his] senses.”41 In brief, even as 
Priestley proposes that the internal operations of the mind can be accessed via 
observations, he forewarns his contemporaries against trusting the evidence of the senses 
                                                




40 According to George Sebastian Rousseau, Priestley turned Godwin’s attention away from Calvinism and 
toward the doctrines of David Hartley and experimental philosophy. To what extent Priestley’s influence 
resulted in Godwin’s questioning of Calvinism is debatable; however, it is clear that Priestley’s works 
nurtured Godwin’s interest in Hartley’s doctrines. See The Languages of Psyche: Mind and Body in 
Enlightenment Thought (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 275. 
 
41  Cited in Robert E Schofield’s The Enlightened Joseph Priestley: A Study of His Life and Work from 
1773 to 1804, (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 48. 
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for sensory organs and nerves can malfunction, the brain can be injured or become 
delirious, and one’s prejudices and circumstances alter sense-perceptions.  
Godwin’s Caleb Williams extends Priestley’s and Hartley’s empirical and 
associationist theories to elucidate that observations and sensations that inform our 
conjectures are themselves shaped by our circumstances. Having observed Mr. Falkland’s 
“agonies and terrors,” Caleb surmises that his master is a murderer (96). The idea, Caleb 
indicates, arises from observation and undergoes associative operations, whereby all his 
subsequent thoughts affirm his initial idea: “the idea having once occurred to my mind, it 
was fixed there for ever. My thoughts fluctuated from conjecture to conjecture, but this 
was the center about which they revolved” (96). Indeed, Caleb’s causal inferences are 
often outcomes of observation-based associative thinking. He sees a clear connection 
between Falkland’s mysterious past and the peasant murder case after carefully observing 
his master’s actions: “this man is arraigned of murder, and murder is the master key that 
wakes distemper in the mind of Mr. Falkland” (96,114). Having said that, although Caleb 
believes that he has discovered the “true state” of Mr. Falkland’s affairs, he hankers after 
positive evidence that can tie his patron to Tyrrel’s murder (119). 
Indeed, one of Caleb’s underlying motives for opening Falkland’s chest with a 
chisel is to discover positive evidence of his patron’s crime. In the eighteenth century, as 
Jack Lynch notes, many legal theorists regarded evidence provided by things as 
equivalents of positive evidence.42 A few jewels recovered from Caleb’s boxes play a 
significant role in transforming the protagonist into a thief in the eyes of Forester and his 
fellow servants. Caleb himself refers to the jewels as “seemingly decisive evidence” 
                                                




against him (150). Behind Caleb’s “seemingly” lurks a suspicion of evidence furnished 
by senses. Through a theatrical metaphor, Caleb indicates that Falkland has carefully 
framed him by appealing to his servants’ and kinsman’s senses: “To the rest of the 
persons present I seemed to be merely the subject of detection; but in reality I was of all 
the spectators that individual who was most at a loss [to conceive] through every stage of 
the scene what would come next” (150). By suggesting that he is a passive spectator to a 
staged investigation, Caleb unwittingly draws attention to Falkland’s astute knowledge of 
law and his own inexperience of the detective business promoted by legal institutions. 
Being a “total stranger to the intercourse of the world,” Caleb lacks sufficient experience 
to prove Falkland’s guilt” (97). In contrast, Caleb becomes the “subject of detection” 
because Falkland understands the role of circumstantial evidence in building a case 
against his employee: even before initiating a search of Caleb’s boxes, Falkland draws 
attention to Caleb’s awkward behavior with Forester and calls on his valet to testify that 
he saw “mark[s] of perturbation and fright” on Caleb’s countenance and observed broken 
locks of Falkland’s trunk (149). 
Caleb hears several stories that emphasize the importance of presumptive or 
circumstantial evidence at the beginning of the novel; yet, it is only in retrospect that he 
understands how legal institutions evaluate this type of evidence. At the beginning of the 
novel, Caleb is not very different from Tyrrel’s cousin Emily Melville who has negligible 
understanding of the English law. Out of petty jealousy, Tyrrel hatches a plan to have 
Emily raped and married to Grimes. When his plan fails, he has Emily arrested for “a 
debt contracted for the board and necessaries” that he supplied to his ward for fourteen 
years (71). Given the harassment, critic Bridget M. Marshall notes, Emily has “grounds 
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for criminal complaint against Grimes and Tyrrel.”43 Not only does Emily fail to take any 
action against Tyrrel, she becomes the defendant and eventually dies in a jail. In the 
narrator’s perspective, Emily’s actions during her ordeal are courageous but they are 
“neither confirmed nor directed by the dictates of experience” (63). Empirical forms of 
knowledge, in other words, have no sway on Emily’s life. The retrospective account 
assists the first-person narrator to reexamine Emily’s case in the light of his own 
skirmishes with the law. Put another way, once Caleb acquires more experience of 
detection and judgment of crimes, he can actively interpret the stories that he has heard 
before. 
That Caleb deciphers stories of crimes and their judgment with the help of his 
own experiences becomes clearer when he retells steward Collins’s version of farmer 
Hawkins’s story. The story, at first, seems to induce an element of repetition in Caleb 
Williams as Hawkins, like Emily, fails to understand the operations of the English law. 
Tenant Hawkins naively believes that his lease with Squire Tyrrel safeguards him from 
eviction, and takes the risk of not sending his son to work for his landlord. Unlike Emily, 
Hawkins files a lawsuit against Tyrrel. Rather than endorsing Hawkins’s decisions, the 
narrator “borrow[s] the language of the world” to argue that the tenant farmer is “guilty 
in this affair of a double imprudence” (39). Firstly, Hawkins ignored Tyrrel’s social rank 
and wealth; secondly, according to the narrator, Hawkins “ought to have foreseen the 
consequences” of his actions. Given that Caleb begins his autobiographical narrative with 
the confession that he “had no practical acquaintance with men,” it can be suggested that 
his experiences have equipped him with “the language of the world” as well as an 
                                                
43 Bridget M. Marshall. The Transatlantic Gothic Novel and the Law, 1790-1860 (Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2011), 34. 
 186 
understanding of causality that helps him foresee consequences of Hawkins’s actions. In 
a confident tone, the narrator insists that “nothing could have been more easy to predict, 
than that it was of no avail for [Hawkins] to have right on his side, when his adversary 
had the influence and wealth, and therefore could so victoriously justify any extravagance 
that he might think proper to commit” (40). The narrator is, in fact, so sure about his 
prediction regarding Hawkins’s future that he presents it as a moral fable: “It was a fawn 
contending with a lion…Wealth and despotism easily know how to engage those laws 
which were perhaps at first intended (witless and miserable precaution!) for the 
safeguards of the poor, as the coadjutors of their oppression” (40). The fable synthesizes 
Caleb’s legal knowledge at the time when he decides to write his story: it is the wealthy 
and the powerful who control the execution of criminal laws. 
From second edition onwards, Caleb, in fact, cites the exact law that Tyrrel uses 
to annihilate the Hawkinses. For the unruly deed of removing barriers from his father’s 
property, Tyrrel persecutes Hawkins’s son under the “clause of the act 9 Geo. I, 
commonly called the Black Act” (288).44 The Black Act, according to Sir Leon 
Radzinowicz, “indiscriminately punished with death a great many different offences, 
without taking into account either the personality of the offender or the particular 
circumstances of each offence.”45 In the guise of law, the Black Act becomes a license to 
kill the poor in Godwin’s novel. 
                                                
44 See “Variants” to Caleb Williams, 288. 
 
45 See Leon Radzinowicz’s discussion of the Black Act in A History of English Criminal Law and its 
Administration from 1750 (London: Stevens and Sons, 1948), I, 49-79;  E. P. Thompson’s Whigs and 
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Caleb first suspects that class difference and economic circumstances can affect 
judgments when Falkland accuses him of theft. He addresses his concern about wealth-
driven justice in a rhetorical speech at the end of his mock trial at Falkland’s house:  
“Fellow Servants! Mr Falkland is a man of rank and fortune; he is your master. I am a 
poor country lad without a friend in the world. This is a ground of real difference to a 
certain extent; but it is not a sufficient ground for the subversion of justice” (152). By 
presenting himself as a “fellow servant,” Caleb hopes to obtain the approbation of 
Falkland’s staff; but, at some level, he realizes that servants cannot afford to remain 
nonpartisan and are likely to side with their master. At the end of the novel, Caleb repeats 
this lesson and drives it home. When a magistrate rejects Caleb’s testimony against 
Falkland, he understands that a servant’s testimony holds little weight against a 
“gentleman of six thousand per annum” (242). Caleb ties the ironic reversals in his 
narrative to the paradoxes built into the English law: “The story of a flagitious murder 
shall be listened to with indifference, while an innocent man is hunted like a wild beast to 
the farthest corner of the earth! Six thousand a year shall protect a man from accusation; 
and the validity of an impeachment shall be superseded, because the author of it is a 
servant!” (243). Caleb’s emphatic declaration that the English legal system favors the 
wealthy assumes the status of truth in the protagonist’s imagination by the end of the 
novel.  It is this seemingly certain legal knowledge that helps Caleb to interpret 





Speculation and Skepticism 
Through Caleb, Godwin’s novel introduces readers to a series of crime stories 
wherein the victim is ironically held responsible for the crime. By suggesting that habit 
and experience influence Caleb’s choices, and that there might not be a necessary 
connection between cause and effect, Caleb Williams evokes the kind of extreme 
empiricism and skepticism that we now associate with eighteenth-century philosopher 
David Hume. Judgments rooted in experiences do not resolve Caleb’s doubts; instead, 
they promote a skeptical attitude toward religious and non-religious beliefs. Rather than 
associating conviction with reason or faith, Caleb Williams associates it with current 
observations or relative probability. As a result, detection of crimes frequently gets tied to 
probability-based conjectures similar to those practiced in the fields of mathematics, 
philosophy, and law. In the absence of certain knowledge, circumstantial evidence, Caleb 
Williams indicates, can be the most convincing evidence available. Yet Godwin’s fiction 
resists the conclusion that all knowledge is just probability.  
When it comes to making inferences, Godwin’s protagonist acknowledges that he 
often falls back on his habits or experiences. As a new employee in Mr. Falkland’s 
household, Caleb candidly communicates his ideas and attributes it to his inexperience 
regarding social class and expectations: “I was excited accurately to compare my 
observations and study the inferences to which they led; for the effect of old habit was 
more visible, than that of a recently conceived purpose which was hardly yet mature” 
(97). Mr. Falkland’s altered appearance prompts Caleb to infer that Mr. Falkland harbors 
a secret. In retrospect, Caleb attributes this inference to probabilistic reasoning: “These 
appearances I too frequently interpreted into grounds of suspicion, though might with 
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equal probability and more liberality have ascribed them to the cruel mortifications he 
had encountered in the objects of his darling ambition” (97). In connecting causal 
inference to habit and probability methods, Caleb follows the argument expounded by 
empirical philosopher David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature (1738) and An 
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748).  
Developing his skeptical argument in his Treatise and Enquiry, Hume shows that 
our knowledge of causal relations is derived from experience: when we observe two 
objects in “constant conjunction” with each other, we infer that one is the cause of the 
other.46 But even frequent experience of constant conjunction of objects cannot help us 
predict effect from a given cause. Anticipating what we now call “the problem of 
Induction,” Hume shows our experience of cause and effect is primarily an inductive 
inference that has nothing to do with reason or sense: “even after the observation of the 
frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference 
concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience.”47 Experience 
itself, Hume warns, is “not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into 
errors.”48 To use Hume’s example, neither sense nor reason informs us that bread 
provides nourishment; only our past experiences support this belief. But no matter how 
many times we eat bread, we still cannot demonstrate that other bread will have the same 
effect.49 
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Inferences that vary with experiences, according to Hume, only yield probabilistic 
knowledge: “all knowledge degenerates into probability; and this probability is greater or 
less, according to our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding, 
and according to the simplicity or intricacy of the question.”50 Hume cautions that 
probability, like experience, is “liable to a new correction by a reflex act of the mind.”51 
Even though Hume interrogates probabilistic reasoning as well as causality, he insists 
that he is not endorsing “total skepticism” of those “who hold that all is uncertain, and 
that our judgment is not in any thing possest [sic] of any measures of truth and 
falsehood.”52 Hume, in fact, wishes to “make the reader sensible to the truth of [his] 
hypothesis,” i.e., causality is derived from custom and belief: it is a psychological as well 
as probability-based act calling one to make comparisons as well as associations. Even as 
Hume extends the empiricist framework into a psychological and skeptical direction, 
according to Lorraine Daston, he also bends it toward the mathematical and quantitative 
route. 53 In a Treatise of Human Nature, Hume suggests that there are two sources of 
probability or reasoning from conjecture: chance and cause.54 Chance, for Hume, is “the 
negation of a cause,” and frequent chance occurrences do not necessarily guarantee belief 
in the outcome.55 Having said that, since repetition of experiences assists psychological 
associations that guide our belief, the degree of belief ends up being proportionate to 
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mathematical probability. No matter what kind of probability is under consideration 
(either determined by cause or chance), numerical frequency, Hume indicates, affects our 
judgment: “When the chances or experiments on one side amount to ten thousand, and on 
the other hand to ten thousand and one, the judgment gives the preference to the latter, 
upon account of that superiority.”56 As the numbers increase the difference between 
probability and proof or certain knowledge disappears from our imagination: “the first 
instance has little or no force. The second makes some addition to it: The third becomes 
still more sensible; and ’tis by these slow steps, that our judgment arrives at a full 
assurance…The gradation, therefore, from probabilities to proofs is in many cases 
insensible.”57 Here, Hume indicates that although our mind increasingly perceives large 
probabilities as certainties, this act is not the outcome of rational thinking; instead it is a 
subconscious or psychological response to frequent experiences of the same kind. 
By the time William Godwin was writing An Enquiry Concerning Political 
Justice and Caleb Williams, Hume’s understanding of causality and probability had 
become a subject of debate and scrutiny. Wary of Hume’s skeptical tendencies, 
dissenting minister Richard Price, whose works, according to Mark Philp, informed the 
idiom of Godwin’s philosophical theories, drew on the works of mathematicians to 
demonstrate that inductive inferences are rational as well as useful.58 Price, who edited 
and introduced Thomas Bayes’ major work An Essay towards solving a Problem in the 
Doctrine of Chances (1763) to the Royal Society, claimed that Bayes’ theorem gives “ a 
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clear account of the strength of analogical or inductive reasoning.”59 Bayes’ theorem 
answers the question of how the probability of a theory being true changes when a new 
piece of evidence is introduced. Through a mathematical formula, Bayes’ theorem 
connects current probability to prior probability. 60  By suggesting that estimates can be 
revised on the basis of new evidence, Bayes endorses inductive reasoning, and provides a 
counterpoint to Hume’s analysis of probability and causality. 
 In Political Justice, Godwin evokes Hume’s understanding of probability; at the 
same time, like the eighteenth-century promoters of mathematical probability, he 
hesitates to undermine the rational foundations of probabilistic knowledge. Like Hume, 
Godwin examines different sources of knowledge, primary among which are perception, 
experience, and reason. For the most part, Godwin adopts an empiricist stand and 
associates knowledge with sensation and experience: “all human knowledge is the result 
of perception. We know nothing of any substance, a supposed material body, for 
example, but by experience.”61 At times, however, Godwin adheres to a rationalist 
epistemology and emphasizes the significance of reason for understanding the political 
world: “Men are weak at present, because they have ben told they are weak, and must not 
be trusted with themselves. Take them out of their shackles, bid them enquire, reason and 
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judge, and you will soon find them very different beings.”62 Godwin’s epistemology 
takes a Humean turn when he examines the doctrine of necessity in Political Justice.63 
Like Hume, Godwin indicates that repetitive observations are the bases of our beliefs or 
opinions for they enforce the mind to make inferences regarding causes and effects. 
Adopting a skeptical attitude, Godwin suggests that the mind “is not capable of arriving 
at absolute certainty upon any subject of enquiry,” and therefore probabilistic knowledge 
often takes over proofs or moral certainty: “But human beings are capable of 
apprehending and weighing all…degrees; and to know the exact quantity of probability 
which I ought to ascribe to any proposition, may be said to be in one sense the possessing 
certain knowledge.”64 As per Hume’s theories, Godwin insinuates that opinion or belief is 
often the beginning and the end of knowledge. 
 Godwin’s admiration of skepticism is nowhere more apparent than in his “Essay 
on Scepticism” (1797). In this essay, Godwin suggests that a skeptic consistently 
questions opinions and undertakes new enquiries because he is a “lover of truth.” 65 
Godwin ingenuously expands on the idea that truth can be discovered via skeptical 
inquiries in An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Caleb Williams. In these texts, 
Godwin examines evidence and criminal law through the lens of Hume’s skeptical and 
probabilistic view of knowledge. More than the intention of the criminal, Godwin 
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indicates in Political Justice, the law needs to ascertain “the probability of [a criminal] 
repeating his offense, or being imitated by others.”66 To calculate this probability, 
according to Godwin, one needs to know the habits of the offender, the effects of the 
experience of crime on his mind, and the circumstances that led him to commit the crime 
in the first place. Rather than considering these three parameters, courts primarily 
evaluate a person’s guilt on the basis of direct or circumstantial evidence. In Godwin’s 
perspective, the veracity of both kinds of evidence is “a subject of continual doubt;” 
consequently, they often result in the unjust imprisonment of innocent men: “I am found 
near to the body of a man newly murdered. I come out of his apartment with a bloody 
knife in my hand or with blood upon my clothes. If, under these circumstances and 
unexpectedly charged with murder, I falter in my speech or betray perturbation in my 
countenance, this is additional proof.”67 Circumstantial or presumptive evidence, whether 
in the form of a bloody knife or blood on clothes, Godwin indicates, influences our 
beliefs but does not prove any crime conclusively.  
Although circumstantial evidence cannot provide demonstrative knowledge or 
proof, Godwin, like his contemporaries, was aware of the advantages of this type of 
evidence. According to Alexander Welsh, as probabilistic thinking gained significance in 
the eighteenth century, circumstantial evidence became the favored form of proof among 
theologians, philosophers, and legal theorists.68 In 1785, clergyman William Paley 
famously argued that a “concurrence of well authenticated circumstances composes a 
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stronger ground of assurance than positive testimony, unconfirmed by circumstances, 
usually affords. Circumstances cannot lie.”69 Godwin did not share Paley’s faith in 
circumstantial evidence; yet, even he recognized that this type of evidence is convincing 
and often the best evidence available. An example of Godwin’s understanding of 
circumstantial evidence appears in Caleb Williams when the protagonist takes recourse to 
an “ample field of speculation and conjecture” to solve the mystery of Falkland’s past 
(7). As Falkland’s secretary, Caleb lacks access to places and people who can supply 
direct evidence of his master’s crimes. In an important scene in the novel, a fire accident 
provokes Caleb to find clues or missing evidence of Tyrrel’s murder. He enters 
Falkland’s private apartment and opens his mysterious trunk. At first glance, this scene 
embodies the thrill and suspense of a climatic episode; but rather than a culmination of 
Caleb’s detective work, it turns out to be a scene of anticlimactic letdown: “the fastenings 
gave away, the trunk opened and all that I sought was at once within my reach…I was in 
the act of lifting up the lid when Mr. Falkland entered… At the moment of his 
appearance the lid dropped from my hand” (119). Neither Caleb nor the readers of his 
narrative ever get a glimpse of the contents of the trunk. Like Caleb, they can merely 
conjecture that the trunk contains incriminating evidence of Falkland’s crimes: the 
evidence, according to Caleb, can take the form of a murderous instrument, a relic, or a 
manuscript. Caleb presumes that the secret enclosed in the trunk is “a faithful narrative” 
of Falkland’s transactions “reserved in case of the worst, that, if by any unforeseen event 
the guilt of Falkland should ever come to be fully disclosed, it might contribute to redeem 
the wreck of his reputation” (268). At this point in the narrative, Caleb calculates the 
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odds and puts forth two conjectures: First, “if Falkland shall never be detected to the 
satisfaction of the world, such a narrative will probably never see the light,” and he 
(Caleb) will remain the victim of persecution (268). Second, if such a narrative exists, it 
can preserve truth and reconcile the two parties. Caleb, however, fails to foresee that the 
open trunk can be used as circumstantial evidence against him and prove the charge of 
theft. The oversight results in the reversal of Caleb’s fortunes: from this point in the 
narrative, he is no longer the agent of detection, but a target of persecution. 
While rummaging through Falkland’s drawers and breaking into his chest, Caleb 
forgets that though circumstances do not lie, they can be staged, managed, or interpreted. 
In other words, circumstantial evidence is always open to probabilistic conjectures that 
may or may not go in the favor of an innocent man: by planting a few jewels in Caleb’s 
box, Mr. Falkland can demonstrate that his secretary is a thief. What’s worse, the 
decisions made on the basis of circumstantial evidence are often irreversible: a few 
clothes stained with blood, a blade, and a speculation-based testimony are sufficient to 
execute Hawkins and his son: 
The first thing that lead to their detection was a parcel of clothes covered with 
blood that were found in a ditch, and which, when drawn out, were known by the 
people of the village to belong to this man [Hawkins]…A diligent search being 
made, the rusty handle with part of the blade of a knife was found thrown in a 
corner of his lodging, which being applied to a piece of the point of a knife that 
had been broken in the wound, appeared exactly to correspond. Upon farther 
enquiry two rustics, who had been accidently on the spot, remembered to have 
seen Hawkins and his son in the town that very evening, and to have called after 
them, and received no answer, though they were sure of their persons. Upon this 
accumulated evidence both Hawkins and his son were tried, condemned and 
afterwards executed (91-92). 
 
Caleb who at this point is telling Collins’s version of Hawkins’s story in a third-person 
voice clarifies the pivotal role played by the parcel of blood-stained clothes in the 
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detection and punishment of farmer Hawkins and his son. The clothes along with the 
blade of the murder weapon are treated as positive proofs or direct evidence of crime. 
Circumstantial evidence concretized as material objects (clothes and knife) is juxtaposed 
with the testimony of the two rustics who “had accidently” been at the murder site. The 
narrator subtly expresses his doubts about this testimony: the rustics claim to have seen 
Hawkins and his son but they had never interacted with the suspects. Yet the cumulative 
circumstantial evidence appears to be sufficient for convicting the two peasants of 
Tyrrel’s murder. Each of these pieces of evidence is open to other interpretations; 
however, the legal system pays little attention to conflicting conjectures regarding 
Tyrrel’s murder.  
 
Accident and Alternative Ending 
It turns out that inferences based on probability are susceptible to inaccuracies and 
imperfections in Caleb Williams. The novel’s representation of circumstantial evidence 
and probabilistic knowledge recalls two of Hume’s skeptical claims: first, all knowledge 
resolves into probability; second, each new estimate of probability must take into account 
new doubts derived from the likelihood of error.70 Rather than celebrating the new doubt 
or the impetus to re-calculate probability, Caleb Williams often resents the loss of 
certainty. When causal relations cannot be established, probabilistic events seem to be 
uncannily similar to accidents or chance occurrences. Unsurprisingly, then, laws that 
privilege circumstantial evidence come across as arbitrary and generate a pessimistic 
mood that pervades the two endings of the novel. 
                                                
70 Hume, Treatise,1.4.1;122. 
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 The narrative of Hawkins and his son encompasses the unsettling idea that 
collection and application of circumstantial evidence is simply a matter of chance. When 
Falkland privately confesses his crime to Caleb, he surmises that an accident or random 
chance connected Hawkins to Tyrrel’s murder: “Whence came the circumstantial 
evidence against [Hawkins], the broken knife and the blood, I am unable to tell. I suppose 
by some miraculous accident he was passing by, and endeavored to assist his oppressor in 
the agonies of death” (122). Falkland indicates that the punishment of Hawkins and his 
son is an upshot of a “miraculous accident.” In all likelihood, Falkland reckons, Hawkins 
was a passerby or a compassionate witness to Tyrrel’s death. Yet this interpretation of 
circumstantial evidence against Hawkins never surfaces during his trial.  
  The phrase “miraculous accident” reappears when Jones follows Caleb’s landlady 
Mrs. Marney in order to apprehend the protagonist. In this case, the accident’s outcome is 
in favor of Caleb: Jones’s appearance “awakens [Mrs. Marney’s] conjectures,” and she 
warns Caleb regarding the approaching danger” (234). The narrator repeatedly avails 
himself of a Humean vocabulary of accidents and chance for delineating events that are 
unforeseen and whose causes are not known.71 Like Hume, the narrator is aware that 
human lives and civil histories rarely follow the rules of probability or calculus. In his 
History of England (1754-62), Hume famously notes that the establishment of a good 
government is a result of “the great mixture of accident, which commonly concurs with a 
small degree of wisdom and foresight.”72 Falkland’s history, according to the narrator, “is 
one uninterrupted persecution of a malignant destiny, a series of adventures which 
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seemed to take their rise in various accidents, but pointing to one termination” (17). 
Whereas Caleb equates accident with mischance or malicious destiny, Falkland happily 
acknowledges to Tyrrel that his social rank is an “advantage that accident has given” him 
(43). The idea that a series of accidents rather than rational decisions determine outcomes 
minimizes human agency and engenders disconcerting uncertainty in Godwin’s novel. 
Caleb recalls that even the moment of detection, wherein he opened Falkland’s trunk, 
hinged on an accident: “an alarm was given that one of the chimnies [sic] of the house 
was on fire. No accident could be apparently more trivial” (119). That accident, Caleb 
points out, triggers a reversal of circumstances and drives him to despair: “All was chaos 
and uncertainty within me…Death-dealing despair was the only idea of which I was 
sensible” (121). Unsurprisingly, then, even though Caleb recognizes that accidents may 
or may not go in his favor, he increasingly resents theories and institutions that conceal 
causes and prevent him from predicting outcomes.  
Among the institutions that Caleb comes to resent is the legal institution that, on 
the surface, privileges probabilistic inferences for connecting circumstantial evidence to 
facts. Caleb’s resentment of law is rooted in his inability to predict outcomes of trials. At 
the end of the mock trial in Falkland’s household, Caleb cries, “What chance had I, after 
the purgation I was now suffering, that I should come out acquitted at last? What 
probability was there that the trial I had [just] endured in the house of Mr Falkland was 
not just as fair as any that might be expected to follow? No, I already my own 
condemnation” (162). Caleb expects to be convicted, but even this expectation is 
temporarily thwarted: armed with circumstantial evidence against Falkland, the 
protagonist finally appears in the court only to learn that the case against him will be 
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dismissed. Even though, like Falkland, Caleb can put together sufficient circumstantial 
proof, the court rejects his evidence on the basis of a ridiculous sounding rationale: “A 
man shall not be heard in the detection of a crime, because he has not been participator of 
it” (243). The English law, Caleb realizes, has little to do with religious or moral dictates 
on the one hand and empirical and circumstantial evidence on the other hand; instead, it 
comprised of arbitrary and malleable regulations, which rarely favor the poor. In 
hindsight, Caleb realizes that the punishments meted by the criminal court are as arbitrary 
if not more so as the rulings of one’s conscience: “The sufferings I had already 
experienced, my anxieties, my flight, the perpetual expectation of being discovered, 
worse than the discovery itself, would perhaps have been enough to satisfy the most 
insensible individual in the court of his own conscience, if I had even been the felon I 
was pretended to be. But the law has neither eyes, nor ears, nor bowels of humanity; and 
it turns into marble the hearts of all those that are nursed in its principles” (244). The 
arbitrary execution of laws, Caleb indicates, overturns expectations and ties the 
possibility of detection with unthinkable suffering. The law is an abstraction that not only 
fails to consider human needs and circumstances but also dehumanizes anyone who 
comes in contact with it.  
Caleb’s observation that law is independent of sense and sensibility—law does 
not see, think, hear, or feel—gives rise to the conjecture that knowledge and judgment are 
random or uncorrelated variables. That knowledge may have little or no impact on 
individual judgments and administrative justice becomes clear in the two different 
endings that Godwin wrote for Caleb Williams: in the original ending, Caleb is 
imprisoned and loses his sanity; in the published ending, Falkland confesses his crime, 
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and reconciles with Caleb. Although Godwin never published the original manuscript 
ending, the conclusions represent two possible outcomes of the final trial in which Caleb 
accuses Falkland of murdering Tyrrel. The two endings, at first glance, seem so different 
that critics tend to favor one or the other: a set of critics believes that the original ending 
offers a “more compelling political statement on the injustice of things as they are” ;73 
another set of critics insists that “although the published ending is not a happy one, it 
does leave Caleb with an honest and admirable speech as well as his sanity.”74 Both 
endings exhibit skepticism toward causal inferences and dissociate knowledge from 
justice. An extreme form of epistemological skepticism results in the dehumanization of 
Caleb in the original ending to the novel. The published ending resists moral or 
epistemological skepticism and instead encourages readers to read narratives skeptically 
in order to bridge the gap between knowledge and justice.  
  Caleb Williams originally ended on a bleak and somber note: despite being 
innocent, Caleb faces imprisonment, torture, and insanity. Accustomed to making 
“conjectural speculations,” the narrator predicts that Falkland “would probably leave a 
legacy of persecution.” 75 The conjecture prompts Caleb to accuse Falkland of murder in 
front of a magistrate and bring Tyrrel’s murderer to justice. Far from succeeding in his 
attempt, Caleb is reprimanded by the magistrate for producing insufficient evidence 
against Falkland: “Never was the dignity of the administrative justice in any instance 
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insulted with so bare faced and impudent a forgery.”76 Contrary to his expectation, Caleb 
finds himself in a prison; consequently, he descends into inertia and hopelessness, and 
compares himself to a lifeless stone: “True happiness lies in being like a stone—Nobody 
can complain of me—all day long I do nothing—I am a stone—a GRAVE-STONE!—an 
obelisk to tell you, HERE LIES WHAT WAS ONCE A MAN!” (340). Stylistically 
speaking, these ramblings, as Pamela Clemit points out, are “heavily indebted to 
Richardson’s Clarissa (1747-8), especially the heroine’s disjointed narrative after her 
rape.” 77 More importantly, the lines present human condition and knowledge as 
philosophical problems. Pursuit of knowledge brings nothing but unhappiness and 
suffering, whereas inactivity deprives one of humanity. Caleb’s transformation from an 
ordinary stone to a gravestone and eventually to an obelisk conveys a sense of corruption, 
decay, and waste. As a stone, Caleb is deprived of his reason and senses; the gravestone 
signifies the final silence that is imposed on Caleb by magistrates and by his powerful 
patron, Mr. Falkland; the obelisk, at once, marks Caleb’s death and acts as a reminder of 
his failure to achieve justice thorough dissemination of knowledge.  
By the end of the novel, Caleb understands that the law is insensible to most types 
of evidence; still, he hopes that the minute particulars of his realistic narrative will 
impress the magistrate: “I entered with minuteness into some parts of the story. I 
depended for my success upon the consistency and probability of my narrative.”78 In his 
defense, Falkland argues that a narrative can appear to be consistent and probable without 
conveying any truth. Given the distrust of narratives, it is not surprising that Caleb’s story 
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disintegrates into irrational fragments in the original postscript to Caleb Williams. 
Reduced to an unthinking stone-like entity, Caleb can no longer aspire to empirical or 
probabilistic knowledge. He cannot even use the retrospective mode of narration to make 
causal inferences. As Caleb tells Mr. Collins, “I should like to recollect something…but it 
is all a BLANK…I have dreams-they are strange dreams-I never know what they are 
about-No, not while I am dreaming-they are about nothing at all.”79 Dreams, which 
embodied providential knowledge in Daniel Defoe’s and Samuel Richardson’s fictions, 
are emptied of content and meaning in Godwin’s novel—they can neither be understood 
nor assist understanding.  
Since no investigation reaches its conclusion and judgments turn out to be 
arbitrary, the first ending appears to endorse extreme skepticism in a way that undermines 
Godwin’s objective of developing a form of fiction that laid bare the operations of human 
mind and wherein consequences were correlated to causes. In the advertisement to his 
second novel St. Leon: A Tale of the Sixteenth Century, Godwin summarized his first 
fiction as follows: “An atrocious crime committed by a man previously of the most 
exemplary habits, the annoyance he suffers from the immeasurable and ever-wakeful 
curiosity of a raw youth who is placed about his person, the state of doubt in which the 
reader might be for a time as to the truth of the charges, and the consequences growing 
out of these causes, seemed to me to afford scope for a narrative of no common interest.80 
Godwin insists that an extraordinary murder, Caleb’s curiosity-driven investigation, and 
Falkland’s noble villainy are the central foci of his novel. Even as Godwin draws 
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attention to Falkland’s exemplary behavior and suffering, he indirectly gives importance 
to the act of detection that emerges from Caleb’s “ever-wakeful curiosity.” Reduced to a 
gravestone, Caleb rejects stories about investigation of secrets or murder in the original 
manuscript ending: “I believe there was nothing in life worth making such a bustle about-
no, nor in SECRETS-nor in MURDERS neither, for the matter of that when people are 
dead, you know, one cannot bring them to life again!-dead folks tell no tales-ghosts do 
not walk these days-I never saw Mr Tyrrel’s-Only once!81A delirious Caleb threatens to 
undo the legacy of eighteenth-century fiction of detection: as neither ghosts nor one’s 
eyes are to be trusted, the idea of investigation of mysteries and murders becomes 
redundant.  
Godwin revised this ending in a week’s time and safeguarded his fictional project 
from extreme skepticism by rescuing his protagonist from a death in life existence. In the 
published ending, Caleb’s  “plain and unadulterated tale” elicits an unequivocal 
confession from Caleb’s patron, Falkland (275). In what seems like a hasty gesture of 
reconciliation, Falkland throws himself into Caleb’s arms and admits that “he spent a life 
of the basest cruelty to cover one act of momentary vice”; however, he is henceforth 
“prepared to suffer all the vengeance of law” (275). Although the published ending does 
not reject the possibility of justice, like the original ending, it severs any necessary 
connection between knowledge and judgment. Falkland’s confession, rather than 
providing relief, fills Caleb with remorse for his “misjudging and abhorred intervention” 
in his patron’s affairs (277). Caleb’s conjecture that Falkland is an unrelenting tyrant 
prevents him from seeing his employee’s more compassionate side. “In thus acting,” 
Caleb confesses, that he too has “been a murderer, a cool, deliberate unfeeling murderer” 
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(275). Whereas so far Caleb had judged himself to be the victim, he now finds himself 
guilty of maltreatment and criminal transgression.   
As the investigator of crimes becomes indistinguishable from the criminal, 
judgment and justice emerge as superficial and arbitrary concepts that are likely to 
change with characters’ opinions. Indicating the shortcomings of his probabilistic 
knowledge, Caleb acknowledges that he failed to predict an accurate outcome of 
Falkland’s trial: “I thought if the guilt of Falkland were established, fortune and the world 
would smile upon my efforts. Both these events are accomplished; and it is only now that 
I am truly miserable” (276). Caleb may not metamorphose into a stone at the end of the 
published ending; he is nevertheless overwhelmed with misery that stems from 
misdiagnosing and misjudging crimes.  
The published ending, however, differs radically from the original ending in an 
important way: it resists extreme skepticism by preserving the stories of Caleb and 
Falkland for future perusal and analysis. The novel’s end promotes the idea that 
narratives can embody knowledge: “I began these memoirs with the idea of vindicating 
my own character. I have now no character that I wish to vindicate: but I will finish them 
that thy story may be fully understood; and that if those errors of thy life be known which 
thou so ardently desiredst to conceal, the world may at least not hear and repeat a half-
told and mangled tale” (277). The memoirs are antithetical to the disjointed dreams of the 
original ending for they contain stories that “may be fully understood.” In contrast to the 
“half-told and mangled tale[s]” that Caleb’s audience may hear, written narratives can be 
re-read and reexamined (277). Since Caleb’s memoirs are open to assessment, they invite 
readers to revise their judgments: the narrative that potentially vindicated Caleb’s 
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character can also be read as a justification of Falkland’s actions.  
The conclusion that Godwin chose for his novel emphasizes the importance of 
“plain and unadulterated tale[s]” in prompting reevaluation of judgments (275). The 
published ending metaphorically opens the locks of Falkland’s trunk and reveals the 
“faithful narrative” that, according to Caleb’s conjecture, contains the truth about his 
master’s crimes (267). The truth, however, is open to interpretation. In Caleb’s 
perspective, Falkland is no ordinary criminal but a martyr: “I came hither to curse, but I a 
remain to bless. I came to accuse, but am compelled to applaud” (275). From Caleb’s 
story, Falkland infers that he is guilty of extreme cruelties: “I see that the artless and 
manly story you have told, has carried conviction in every hearer. All my prospects are 
concluded…I stand now completely detected” (275). Persuasive and coherent narratives, 
Falkland hints, can assist detection of crimes and influence judgments of hearers and 
readers.  
 
Skeptical Reading or The Hermeneutics of Detection  
In emphasizing the importance of creation and interpretation of narratives in the 
published conclusion, Godwin clarifies the hermeneutic code that guides a reader’s 
reading of Caleb Williams. This hermeneutic code anticipates elements of the nineteenth-
century detective stories of Edgar Allan Poe and Arthur Conan Doyle, which, to use 
Roland Barthes’s formulation, “set up delays (obstacles, stoppages, deviations) in the 
flow of discourse” to create suspense and to challenge thought.82 According to Barthes, 
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truth in these narratives “is what is at the end of expectation.”83  The hermeneutic code of 
Godwin’s fiction, however, also differs from that of nineteenth-century detective stories 
in noticeable and important ways: it undermines scientific and logical solutions to 
enigmas and exposes the impact of the philosophical problem of knowledge on our 
understanding of mysteries.84 Godwin’s experimentation with skepticism yields a 
hermeneutic tale that puts forth questions and sets up expectations without offering 
comforting answers; after all, as I have shown in the previous section, order is never 
completely restored in the two endings of Caleb Williams. This is not to suggest that truth 
is lost or abandoned in Godwin’s fiction. By way of conclusion, I want to suggest that 
skepticism paves way for a philosophical hermeneutic code or a type of skeptical reading 
that opens narrative truths to analysis and investigation in Godwin’s novel of detection. 
 Caleb’s memoir, which gains significance in the published ending, is one of the 
many narratives that demand to be read critically in Godwin’s novel. Indeed, every time 
the novel introduces a new mystery, it also makes a meta-fictional gesture by introducing 
a written or printed story that is open to interpretation. One such mysterious episode that 
manifests the problem of knowledge and culminates in the surfacing of a printed story 
appears after Caleb, on being absolved of theft, takes up residence in an obscure market 
town in Wales. When the kind and hospitable townsmen suddenly become cold and 
distanced, Caleb uses different theories of knowledge, including the ones that ascribe 
supernatural powers to certain entities, to support the conjecture that Falkland is 
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responsible for the change in his neighbors’ behavior: 
It is Falkland! In vain I struggled against the seeming improbability of the 
supposition. In vain I said, Mr Falkland, wise as he is and pregnant in resources, 
acts by human and not by supernatural means. He may overtake me by surprise 
and in a manner of which I have no previous expectation; but he cannot produce a 
great and notorious effect without some visible agency, however difficult it may 
be to trace that agency to its absolute author. He cannot, like those invisible 
personages who are supposed from time to time to interfere in human affairs, ride 
in the whirlwind, shroud himself in clouds and impenetrable darkness, and scatter 
destruction upon the earth from his secret habitation (256). 
 
In this passage, Caleb avails himself of at least two epistemological theories: the first 
evaluates the probability of the conjecture—“It is Falkland”—on the basis of “previous 
expectation,” and is in line with David Hume’s understanding of knowledge and causality 
that I discussed earlier in the chapter; the second promotes belief in supernatural 
personages who exercise amazing power, often in arbitrary and cruel ways, and recalls 
providential knowledge associated with God in the Bible. The negatives that punctuate 
Caleb’s statements indicate his dissatisfaction with epistemological theories that attribute 
providential knowledge and supernatural powers to Falkland: “not by supernatural 
means”; “he cannot produce a great and notorious effect”; “he cannot [be] like those 
invisible personages” (256). At the same time, the repetitive use of the phrase “in vain” 
indicates the difficulty of dismissing providential theories that potentially explain 
Falkland’s amazing powers.  
Caleb’s solution—“It is Falkland”—turns out to be what Barthes calls “a partial 
answer”; it is a delay tactic that creates the expectation of the truth without seeming to 
disclose it in its entirety to the novel’s readers. The lines echo an earlier moment in the 
novel when Caleb is arrested for a robbery simply because he is disguised as an Irishman. 
When neither reason nor religion enables Caleb to understand his mysterious detention, 
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he draws attention to his own experience of oppression and blames Falkland for his 
arrest: “it was not a subject of reasoning or of faith; I could derive no comfort either 
openly from unbelief, or secretly from the remoteness and incomprehensibility of the 
conception; it was an affair of sense; I felt the fangs of the tyger striking deep into my 
heart” (214-5). Even as Caleb draws attention to his sense-experience through the image 
of a tiger attacking his heart, he refuses to give into skeptical “unbelief.” Skepticism, 
however, looms large when Caleb fails to deduce causes from effects in Wales. Rather 
than proceeding methodically, Caleb’s investigation begins with a random event or an 
accident: “I looked round [sic.], my eyes accidentally glanced upon a paper lying on one 
corner, which by some association I was unable to explain, roused in me a strong 
sensation of suspicion and curiosity” (257). An admixture of chance and observation-
based associative thinking motivate Caleb to pick up the paper, which “at once clears up 
all the mystery” (257). 
What first appears to be an ordinary sheet of paper is in fact the pamphlet that 
thief-taker Jones circulates to discover Caleb’s whereabouts in London. Titled “The 
Wonderful and Surprising History of Caleb Williams,” the pamphlet provides a 
sensational criminal biography that makes the absconding protagonist more vulnerable to 
detection in London. As this piece of ephemeral print invites different interpretations, it 
can transform a detective-like figure into a criminal and vice-versa. The circumstantial 
details present in the pamphlet seek to establish Caleb “as the “most accomplished 
swindler in plausibleness, duplicity and disguise” (238). A printed sheet sold at “the price 
of one halfpenny” creates an alternative story about Caleb whereby he metamorphosizes 
into the popular rogue Kit Williams: he is no longer an ordinary secretary but a 
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“notorious house-breaker” who can penetrate through walls and doors and break out of 
prisons at will.  
The rapid proliferation of cheap print creates a community of readers that shows 
an interest in apprehending criminals. Soon after reading the pamphlet, Caleb 
understands print’s potential to disperse detection of crimes among communities of 
discriminate and indiscriminate readers: 
 Disguise was no longer of use to me. A numerous class of individuals, through 
 every department, almost every house of the metropolis, would be induced to look 
 with a suspicious eye upon every stranger, especially every solitary stranger, that 
 excite their cupidity, and sharpen their penetration. It was no longer Bow Street, it 
 was a million of men, in arms against me. Neither had I the refuge…of a single 
 individual with whom to repose my alarms, and who might shelter me from the 
 gaze of indiscriminate curiosity (238). 
 
In this passage, detection is neither the prerogative of God nor the privilege of the state 
police; anonymous individuals who have no training carry out the task of detection. The 
pamphlet, acting as metonym of the print medium, holds the potential to empower 
common people in Godwin’s novel: it can “sharpen their penetration” and make them 
more discerning members of the metropolis. It can further transform millions of men into 
a powerful resource for detecting crimes and make redundant the need for an 
institutionalized police force such as the one established by novelist and magistrate Henry 
Fielding at the Bow Street in 1749.85   
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Caleb’s tone, however, betrays a deep discomfort with the spread of detection 
among members of a homogenous crowd that is incapable of reading the pamphlet 
critically. While discriminate readers can together create a body of knowledge useful for 
catching criminals, indiscriminate readers can misjudge, torment, and terrorize an 
innocent man. The indiscriminate crowd, Caleb observes, isolates, suspects, and 
scrutinizes outsiders. Unsurprisingly, then, instead of seeking refuge from the “gaze” of 
an omniscient God, Caleb wants to be sheltered from the crowd’s “gaze of indiscriminate 
curiosity” (238). 
While Caleb shares the curiosity of the readers of the pamphlet, his reading style 
is noticeably different. Caleb quickly dismisses the details that characterize him as a 
housebreaker: these, he indicates, are generic features of “this [sensational] species of 
publication” (238). What distinguishes Caleb from millions of detective-like figures on 
the street is his ability to subject stories to rigorous skeptical analysis. Whether it is the 
story of Falkland or that of Hawkins and his son, Caleb looks for gaps and 
inconsistencies in narratives to form appropriate judgments:  
But the story I had heard was for ever in my thoughts and I was peculiarly 
 interested to comprehend its full import. I turned it a thousand ways and examined  
 it in every point of view. In the original communication it appeared sufficiently 
 distinct and satisfactory; but, as I brooded over it, it gradually became 
 mysterious (95). 
 
Here, Caleb positions himself as a reader who opens the story of Tyrrel’s murder to a 
new reading. At no point Caleb confuses Mr. Collins’s tale with absolute truth. In fact, he 
indicates that no matter how neat and adequate the story seems in its original rendition, it 
primarily presents one point of view—that of its narrator. Caleb first opens the tale to 
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other points of view, and attempts to connect its parts to the whole to understand the 
stakes or the “full import” of the story. As a result, he comes across inconsistencies in the 
narrative that render it mysterious and unbelievable. One such glaring inconsistency that 
compels Caleb to reconsider Mr. Collins’s account of Tyrrel’s murder revolves around 
the representation of Hawkins: “So firm, so sturdily honest and just, as he appeared at 
first; all at once to become a murderer!” (96). While searching for a more consistent 
narrative, Caleb comes across a letter written by elder Hawkins to Falkland that he reads 
with “considerable attention” and infers that it presents “picture of a blunt, downright, 
honest mind” (104). Skeptical reading assists Caleb to eliminate suspects and arrive at the 
conjecture that Falkland is the murderer of Tyrrel.  
 Through a protagonist who investigates crimes by reading texts carefully, Godwin 
encourages his readers to adopt a mode of reading that embodies the spirit of skepticism. 
In the essay appropriately titled “Of Learning,” Godwin suggests that critical reading 
“creates a certain manliness of judgment, not indebted for its decisive character to 
partiality and arrogance, but seeing truth by its own light, even while it never divests 
itself of the sobriety of skepticism, and accommodated to the office of producing 
conviction in its intimates and hearers.”86 Godwin asks readers to maintain a questioning 
or skeptical attitude toward facts and ideas in narratives. By suggesting that a reader can 
potentially see “truth by its own light,” Godwin distances himself from extreme 
skepticism; however, he proposes that readers should embrace a restrained form of 
skepticism that does not undermine the vivacity or persuasiveness of fiction.  
                                                
86 William Godwin, “Of Learning.” Essay XI. The Enquirer: Reflections on Education, Manners, and 
Literature in a Series of Essays (London: G.G. and Robinson, 1797), 366. 
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Indeed, Caleb consistently invites readers to pay attention to rhetorical uses of 
language and come to their own conclusions regarding the tales being told. For example, 
when Caleb first attempts to break out of prison, he takes readers into confidence, hoping 
that they will pardon his duplicity: “In these proceedings it is easy to trace the vice and 
duplicity that must be expected to grow out of injustice. I know not whether my readers 
will pardon the sinister advantage I extracted from the mysterious concessions of my 
keeper” (173). According to Caleb’s own analysis, his deceitful act is a direct 
consequence of the injustice inflicted upon him; the readers, however, are free to 
disapprove of his behavior.  
Godwin’s own tale, in fact, emerges as “half-told” or “mangled” only if readers 
passively accept Falkland’s or Caleb’s narrative (277). Through multiple stories about 
investigation of crimes and trials of criminals, Godwin exposes his readers to plural 
epistemologies and invites them to subject all perspectives on knowledge and judgment 
to scrutiny. The reader of Godwin’s novel is supposed to play the role of a detective-like 
figure.  In his 1812 letter to poet Percy Shelley, Godwin clarified this idea by comparing 
critical reading to investigation: “true reading is an investigation, not a passive reception 
of what the author has given us, but an active enquiry, appreciation, and digestion of his 
subject.”87 Reading, Godwin suggests, is not very different from systematic inquiries 
undertaken to solve crimes. Godwin’s novel of detection proposed a model of skeptical 
reading that was to be extended to all literary texts. Ostensibly, a story about crime and 
its detection, Caleb Williams is a foundational text about the importance of skeptical 
reading.     
                                                
87 10 December 1812, Godwin/Shelley Correspondence, ed. Mark Philp, vol. 1 of Collected Novels and 
Memoirs of William Godwin (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1992), 81. 
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Coda 
Romantic Form and the Limits of Knowledge 
Of what a strange nature is knowledge! (136) 
                       —Mary Shelley, Frankenstein1 
Philosophical, theological, and ideological questions about knowledge, as I have 
shown in this project, become conspicuous in eighteenth-century fictions when detection 
and punishment of crimes are at stake. Published in 1818, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
also involves violent crimes, criminal trials, chase, suspense, and investigations of 
wrongful accusations. An innocent girl Justine Moritz is framed for the murder of Victor 
Frankenstein’s brother; on the basis of circumstantial evidence (William’s locket is found 
in the girl’s pocket) as well as a confession extracted under duress, Justine is executed. 
Still, the central preoccupation of Mary Shelley’s novel is not detection of crimes, but the 
guilt that follows pursuit of knowledge. Frankenstein reminds us that the problem of 
knowledge was not limited to fictions about detection of crimes; epistemological 
conflicts could and did motivate different techniques of storytelling during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries in England.  
The layered narrative structure of Frankenstein embodies heterogeneous elements 
such as letters, dreams, confessions, testimonies, journals, alchemical and scientific 
inquires, which at first glance do not seem to belong together and result in confusing 
shifts in focalization. To the casual eye, the formal traits of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
appear as “undeveloped” or eccentric modes of storytelling that would eventually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 All references are from the 1818 edition of Shelley’s novel. Mary Shelley, Frankenstein; or The Modern 
Prometheus, ed. D. L. Macdonald and Kathleen Scherf (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2012). 
The 1831 introduction and textual variants are included as appendices to the Broadview edition and are 
cited parenthetically here.  
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culminate in a more formal realism in nineteenth-century Europe. Written at a time when 
Romanticism had gained momentum in Europe, Frankenstein exhibits formal anomalies 
that are strikingly similar to those present in fictions by Aphra Behn, Daniel Defoe, 
Samuel Richardson, Henry Fielding, and William Godwin that I have examined in the 
previous chapters. Narrative traits such as intrusive narrators, abrupt shifts in point of 
view or focalization, extreme tonal fluctuations that are often regarded as eccentric or 
flawed, I have argued, are in fact interesting symptoms of conflicts between competing 
theories of knowledge. By making a case for evaluating stories for their epistemological 
complexity and formal innovativeness, this study undermines the critical campaign 
spearheaded by Ian Watt that views eighteenth-century fictions through the lens of formal 
realism whereby their narrative techniques come across as less sophisticated than those of 
nineteenth-century novels.2 The story that I tell alerts readers to formal innovations and 
experimentations that are pervasive in the eighteenth-century literature, but which tend to 
be obscured when we impose nineteenth-century standards of narration onto eighteenth-
century texts.  
Besides alerting us to the importance of non-realist, gothic techniques for 
capturing competing theories of knowledge, Frankenstein clarifies the ethical 
implications of narrating any epistemological crisis: while working out the problem of 
knowledge at the formal level, Mary Shelley’s novel not only asks what can be known, 
but also who can know it. Indeed, the multiple narratives of Frankenstein respond to the 
problem of knowledge elucidated by eighteenth-century fictions discussed in this 
dissertation: Do men and women access knowledge in the same way? What do they need 
to do or experience to know? How can they be certain that their “knowledge” is really 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Ian	  Watt,	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Novel	  (Berkeley	  and	  Los	  Angeles:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1957),	  32.	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knowledge? Is there any form of knowledge that is universal and can therefore quell all 
doubts?  
Through a narrative frame that resembles a Chinese box or a layered onion, Mary 
Shelley’s novel refuses to provide simple solutions to the problem of knowledge. Each of 
the three narrators confesses that empirical knowledge obtained via senses and 
experience first ushers in “wonder and delight” but later brings pain and suffering (134). 
Yet the narrators are equally reluctant to endorse religious and occult theories of 
knowledge. For example, the creature, often mistakenly referred to as Frankenstein, 
initially endorses knowledge acquired through observations: he observes conversations 
and behavior of cottagers Agatha, Felix, Safie, and old De Lacy until he learns the 
“godlike science” of language and begins to understand social norms (129).  Rather than 
helping him overcome a sense of alienation, “increase of knowledge,” the creature insists, 
only exacerbates the experience of being a “wretched outcast” (145). Since the creature’s 
narrative is embedded within his creator Victor Frankenstein’s story, which in turn is 
interpolated in Robert Walton’s frame narrative, it is difficult to say with any degree of 
certainty that the creature’s opinions and beliefs are his own. Victor Frankenstein, after 
all, also warns Robert Walton, the Arctic explorer, against “the acquirement of 
knowledge”: “You seek for knowledge and wisdom, as I once did; and I ardently hope 
that the gratification of your wishes may not be a serpent to sting you, as mine has been” 
(80, 62). Here, Frankenstein, the scientific enquirer, recruits the serpent image from 
Genesis, reminding Walton and the novel’s readers that God punishes seekers of 
forbidden knowledge. Put another way, even as Frankenstein showcases the seductive 
allure of the occult (which motivates Frankenstein’s search for the elixir of life) and the 
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radical potential of modern sciences such as chemistry and anatomy, it never wanders too 
far from providential forms of knowledge that endorse Christian values. In retrospect, 
Frankenstein attributes his discovery of the secret of life not only to his expertise in the 
sciences of physiology and anatomy but also to an unforeseen revelation: “from the midst 
of this darkness a sudden light broke in upon me...Some miracle might have produced it, 
yet the stages of the discovery were distinct and probable” (79). According to 
Frankenstein, it is likely that the “sudden light” is miraculous and has divine origins; it is, 
however, equally probable that the light is a product of methodical scientific investigation 
involving fixed sequence of steps.   
Frankenstein, in fact, is one of the many Romantic-era texts that clarify the 
relationship between epistemological conflicts and formal disruptions at the end of the 
eighteenth century. James Hogg’s The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified 
Sinner (1824) is yet another example of a discomforting and destabilizing text involving 
a frame narrative, a fictional editor, a highly unreliable narrator called Robert Wringhim, 
repetitive confessions, and conflicting accounts of murders that generate uncertainty and 
prevent readers from passing easy moral judgments.3 By making apparent competing 
theories of knowledge grounded in Calvinism, psychology, Adam Smith’s philosophy, 
and occultism, the narratorial disruptions in Hogg’s fiction encourage a range of 
interpretations that cannot be reconciled effortlessly with one another: the reader can see 
Wringhim as a serial-murderer, a victim of religious fanaticism, an easy target of the 
devil, or a schizophrenic.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 James Hogg, The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 
2010).  
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 When we learn to acknowledge different ways of knowing that manifest in literary 
forms, we become wary of theories that tidy up cultural complexities. One such theory 
that the previous chapters subtly challenge is Max Weber’s theory of the “disenchantment 
of the world,” which discerns a progressive decline of religious beliefs from the 
eighteenth century onwards. Weber’s account of secularization and disenchantment, 
however, is unilinear and teleological. Even critics such as Simon During, Joshua Landy, 
and Michael Saler who highlight limitations of Weber’s secularization thesis often 
underplay the extent to which religious forms of knowledge continued to hold sway over 
eighteenth-century literary imaginations. For instance, Landy and Saler note that Weber’s 
theory makes us forget that “each time religion reluctantly [withdraws] from a particular 
area of experience, a new, thoroughly secular strategy of re-enchantment cheerfully 
emerge[s] to fill the void.”4 This dissertation shows that the narrative strategies of writers 
such as Aphra Behn, Samuel Richardson, and William Godwin were expressions of a 
world that was reluctant to reject the allure of religious modes of knowledge. 
  Time and again, the strands of intellectual criticism that resist the Weberian thesis 
also represent poetry as a “secular strategy of re-enchantment.”5 Wordsworth’s “Preface” 
to the Lyrical Ballads (1802), which now enjoys the status of a romantic manifesto, at 
first glance, encourages such a claim: imagination, after all, is a form of divine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Joshua Landy and Michael Saler, “Introduction: The Varieties of Modern Enchantment” in The Re-
Enchantment of the World: Secular Magic in a Rational Age, ed. Joshua Landy and Michael Saler 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009), 1. 
 
5 For example, Joshua Landy argues that self-reflexivity in the poetry of Stephen Mallarmé might have 
stemmed from the need to re-enchant the world. See “Modern Magic: Jean-Eugène Robert-Houdin and 
Stéphane Mallarmé” in The Re-Enchantment of the World: Secular Magic in a Rational Age, ed. Joshua 
Landy and Michael Saler (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009), 102-129. 
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knowledge in his literary theory as well as in the poems themselves.6 Even as 
Wordsworth distinguishes a poet from the Man of Science, he also insists that the same 
“spirit” characterizes both poetry and science.7 “Poetry,” according to Wordsworth, is 
“the breath and spirit of all knowledge. It is the impassioned expression which is the 
countenance of all Science.”8  Put another way, Wordsworth’s “Preface” simultaneously 
emphasizes distinctions between religious, poetic, and scientific forms of knowledge as it 
illustrates their common characteristics. In challenging epistemological rigidity, 
Wordsworth’s ballads mimic their eighteenth-century predecessors. 
  Written in the form of poems that narrate stories in short stanzas, Wordsworth 
and Coleridge’s Lyrical Ballads further remind us that innovative strategies of 
storytelling were not confined to the genre of the novel at the end of the eighteenth 
century. Both Wordsworth and Coleridge wrote ballads involving crime, guilt, and 
questions of knowledge. The intrusive narrator of Wordsworth’s “The Thorn,” for 
instance, tells the tale of an infanticide committed by a single mother and her subsequent 
suffering. At once loquacious and reticent, the narrator gathers local rumors and relies on 
a set of irrational beliefs to suggest that the spirit of the murdered infant enlivens the 
moss that covers the thorn and haunts the hilltop. A dense symbol of cruelty, suffering, 
guilt, and mortality, the stunted thorn makes the narrator painfully aware of the limits of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013), 104.	  
	  
7	  Ibid., 106.	  
	  
8 Ibid.  
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his knowledge: “I cannot tell; I wish I could;/ For the true reason no one knows” (lines 
89-90).9  
 The formal and stylistic strategies of “The Thorn” used to question the nature and 
limits of knowledge are akin to those of Coleridge’s “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”: 
both poems contain interlocutors and listeners (unnamed narrators, Martha Ray, and the 
wedding guest) who provide readers with mediated accounts of crimes and their 
punishments. Ambivalence, anxiety, and guilt in Coleridge’s poem are symptomatic of 
the irreconcilable tensions between rational forms of knowledge that promote reason, 
order, and coherence, and epistemologies that alternatively draw on the Christian 
theology, the supernatural, and the occult.   
 My brief analyses of Frankenstein, The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a 
Justified Sinner, “The Thorn,” and “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” shed light on one 
of the stakes of this dissertation: even as there is a case to be made for desecularizing and 
romanticizing eighteenth-century literature, it is possible to argue in favor of enlightening 
romanticism.10 The insight that Romanticism was not simply a reaction against the 
Enlightenment, against eighteenth-century rationalism, or against neoclassical forms, can 
help to change Romanticism studies. Extending my study’s arguments into the 1800s and 
beyond helps to break down the stiff categories and oppositions between Enlightenment 
and Romanticism that we have grown accustomed to reinforcing either out of habit or 
convenience’s sake. As Reinhart Koselleck points out, conceptual and cultural changes 
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  Wordsworth	  and	  Coleridge,	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  Ballads,	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10 See Miriam L. Wallace,  “Enlightened Romanticism or Romantic Enlightenment?” in Enlightening 
Romanticism, Romancing the Enlightenment: British Novels from 1750 (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 
2009), 1-19.  
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are never straightforward and rarely follow progress of historical time: “chronological 
sequence, by which our history is still guided at times, can quite easily be exposed as a 
fiction.”11 Reinhart reminds us why it is important to discover “the simultaneity of the 
non-simultaneous” in any history: “it is, after all, part of our own experience to have 
contemporaries who live in the Stone Age.”12 By making apparent overlaps between 
religious, rational, and scientific theories of knowledge, Restoration to Romantic-era 
literary texts examined in this study challenge the faith-reason dualism and remind us of 
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